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Introduction
‘is ing Called Reconciliation’
As new facts emerge and new truths are brought to light; as old 
opinions disappear and others take their place; the image of an ideal 
and always eeting perfection presents itself.1
—Alexis de Tocqueville
R econciliation is regularly hailed as decisive to the resolution of modern conict. For those places and people emerging from a history of internal violence, it is understood to be a vital mechanism in their 
transition to a peaceable and more equitable future. Deployed in an uneven but 
broadly global fashion since around the middle of the twentieth century, from 
Germany ‘aer Auschwitz’ to Liberia’s more recent reckoning with the atrocities 
committed under Charles Taylor’s regime, reconciliation is now the principal 
language as well as the conceptual ideal through which post-conict societies are 
conceived. But as a goal as much as a method of transitional justice, what are the 
conditions required for reconciliation to proceed? e cessation of state violence 
rarely also means an end to the more fundamental structures of injustice and 
inequality that enable such abuse. Nor does it promise any alleviation to their 
combined eects, whether traumatic or otherwise. But even more uncertain is 
the question of what precisely reconciliation constitutes. Early in reconciliation’s 
conceptual elaboration, Johan Galtung, founder of the Journal of Peace Research, 
sought to overcome this epistemic insecurity with the seeming certitude of an 
arithmetic equation: ‘reconciliation = closure + healing’.2 As coe	cients, how-
ever, both closure and healing suggest a decidedness that is rarely ever borne out 
by their solution, especially amid the competing priorities of state and society. 
More oen, the language of reconciliation is made to calculate a symbolic res-
olution that runs in tension with the insecurity of its lived, demotic experience.
In this, South Africa is exemplary. e vision of national unity conjured up 
in the dying days of the twentieth century still ickers on occasion across the 
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contemporary democratic imaginary. New facts emerge, new truths are brought 
to light, and old opinions continue to be overhauled. And yet, even as the faint 
spirit of reconciliation remains, its wider reality does not. Indeed, the whole re-
gime of transitional justice appears encumbered by disillusionment. Its ashes of 
non-racial perfectibility are now witnessed with such diminished regularity as to 
seem hubristic. To follow the words of Justice Albie Sachs, democracy appears to 
have consummated at the very same time as it has also extinguished one of South 
Africa’s most precious assets: its hope for the future.3 But whatever the intense 
disappointment that may now countermand images of the long, sanguine queues 
that amassed outside polling stations in anticipation of the country’s rst demo-
cratic vote in April 1994, there is perhaps no sharper bellwether (or more prom-
inent target) for the regret that rolled in to dim this initial glow than the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Inaugurated in 1996 with a hopeful 
appeal by its chair, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for ‘light over darkness’, it now 
stands among the most discredited of the democratic regime’s early enterprises, 
a formal mechanism of the transition that in many critics eyes has done more to 
defer than enable ‘this thing called reconciliation’.4
ere are, of course, many reasons for the Truth Commission’s widely held 
miscarriage. And, certainly, the determined criticism it has received is only in 
part a consequence of reconciliation’s imprecise, regularly incongruous agenda. 
In actively measuring the terms of its own success, as John Borneman elsewhere 
describes, in terms of ‘the recuperation of losses that are almost impossible to 
recuperate’, however, the Commission did much to advance precisely those qui-
etist and exculpatory ends that tend to discredit reconciliation’s other plausible 
achievements.5 Finding the past an object to be overcome, reconciliation was 
arguably introduced as a broadly ideological rather than strictly moral end. In 
this, systematic racial oppression was revised according to an entirely therapeutic 
logic. ‘Revealing is Healing’, read placards on display at its public hear-
ings. ‘The Truth Hurts but Silence Kills’, claimed others, mobilising 
the psychoanalyst’s ‘talking cure’ as a putative means of national recovery.
Under these terms, it was not just reconciliation that suered. Personal truth 
too was evaluated according to its moral virtue—that is, in terms of its potential 
to oer a humanising corrective to the inhumanity of the past. Certainly, this 
model of ‘negative commemoration’ empowered the voices of those many victims 
suppressed under apartheid.6 But it also depended on a rights-based agenda or-
ganised around individual abuse, to the general exclusion of the apartheid state 
and its system of racialised oppression. e result was, as Mahmood Mamdani 
puts it, a ‘truth diminished’, a mode of partial reckoning with the past that too 
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oen mistook discrete acts of violence for the ‘social catastrophe’ underpinning
the apartheid regime.7 It is unsurprising therefore that critics like Deborah Posel 
were quick to deride the Truth Commission’s ‘creaky conceptual grid’.8 For ‘with-
out the truth’, to follow Gerhard Werle, ‘there [could] be no reconciliation’.9
Improvising Reconciliation does not retreat from these fundamental critiques. 
In its eorts to secure from the aesthetic sphere a more supple commemorative 
form, it begins regretfully, circumspect about the Truth Commission’s many 
procedural deciencies as well as its moral shortcomings. at said, there is also 
much among these preliminary remarks that demands further scrutiny. For one 
thing, it is not my intention to discredit altogether the Commission’s basic con-
fessional structure of telling and collective listening. Whatever else may be said 
of the Commission, the fundamental urge to speak out and share one’s suering 
with others remains just as vital to the scenes of public reckoning that I analyse 
in this study. I am conscious too that amid the swollen body of largely corro-
sive commentary (which began to emerge even before the Commission’s rst 
hearings) there is a certain merit in Erik Doxtader and Philippe-Joseph Salazar’s 
cautionary observation that ‘the question that asks for a denitive judgment is 
not the question that sheds the most important light’. As they elaborate: ‘e 
rush to determine the TRC’s ultimate success has come at the expense of a larger 
reection on the Commission’s historical roots, its relationship to the constitu-
tional transition that took shape between 1990 and 1994, and the precise details 
of its work’.10 eir own belated scholarship goes some way in compensating for 
this expediency. But equally there can be no ignoring the many other serious 
challenges that have also emerged with the subsequent relief of time. To regret 
the compromised political settlement that appears to have determined, say, the 
Commission’s narrow attitude to truth does little to dissipate the enduring 
sense of disempowerment that its ‘transcendent moral philosophy’ ultimately 
delivered.11 Indeed, in the two decades or more that have passed since the Truth 
Commission’s rst public hearings in 1996, the adverse eect of this moralism 
has only proliferated. Even the Commission’s most widely lauded adage—‘no 
future without forgiveness’—has proven itself more of a shackle than a spur to 
liberation, binding the country to a pristine and, as such, intolerable self-image. 
As Bhekizizwe Peterson laments, this ‘deication’ of forgiveness has all but sev-
ered the public sphere from its ‘moral moorings’, enabling the unjust remains of 
apartheid to dri from everyday view.12 Viewed under this light, it remains hard 
to frame the Commission as something other than a tool of social domination.13
Rather than attempting to recover the Commission’s monumentalized am-
bitions from the weight of their present defeat then, this study intends to locate 
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from within this gloomy prospect several ancillary ashes of ethical and political 
possibility. By this, I mean to approach the project of national reconciliation 
from a position of partial scepticism. As such, there are no prescriptive calcula-
tions here to solve the problem of what reconciliation should otherwise aggre-
gate. It is an idea as much as an ideal held in suspension, a language maintained 
in my analysis for strategic but not essential reasons. What emerges over the 
course of this study is, I intend, a mode of reconciliatory possibility interwoven 
at all times by uncertainty. In other words, I turn to the aesthetic sphere in pur-
suit of a subjunctive form, or rather a set of plural, specically devised forms of 
reconciliation liberated from the orthodoxy of national healing and historical 
closure. As a point of departure, such an improvised model provides few guar-
antees. But it is precisely improvisation’s threat of failure, its perilous way of 
thinking as well as doing, that conditions its possible success. Risk is, I want to 
stress, a vital part of what here links the reconciliatory to the improvisatory. At 
its most fundamental, improvisation moves to open up the notion ‘that failure 
doesn’t matter’—at least, not in the context of what it also attempts to make 
possible. As advocates of improvisation like Anthony Frost and Ralph Yarrow 
elaborate, it is precisely this liability at the heart of an improvised agenda that 
encourages us ‘to avoid the reex of trying to make [a thing] into something you 
think it ought to be’, in favour of fostering ‘what it can be’.14
Such a distinction may appear prosaic, even subtractive at rst glance. In pref-
atory terms, however, these two modalities are indicative of the wider separation 
between the certain and the uncertain, or the credible and the incredible, that 
this comparatively risky form of reconciliation must traverse if it is to assist in 
bridging apartheid’s racial divisions and undo its legacy of injustice. Moreover, 
this incipient distinction arguably alerts us to the ways of alternative being to-
wards which the improvisatory also tends, its disruptive as well as its recreative 
outlook. To follow theorist Gary Peters, improvisation regularly produces a 
‘xing of the unxed’, even as it also pursues a corresponding ‘unxing of the 
xed’.15 is too is more than some glib volte-face, even if, like the improvisa-
tional, it likely courts a pejorative judgement. Rather, as Peters elaborates, an 
improvisatory attitude involves itself in the negotiation of a series of such cor-
respondences, each act making co-existent origin and originality, certainty and 
doubt, as well as xity and unxity. In this, it is perhaps protable to think, as 
Peters does, in terms of the ‘compossibility’ towards which improvisation argu-
ably aims—that is, following the metaphysician Gottfried Leibniz, the imag-
ined co-presence of compatible but also separate ways of possible being that sit 
outside what is actual. For one thing, the term anticipates the otherwise stark 
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seeming divides, whether conceptual or ethical, that this study nds in relatively 
close correspondence as part of any improvisational attitude. is may be seen 
in improvisation’s proximity to failure or, separately, its determined attachment 
to the provisional in the eld of meaning making. But the compossible is also 
an abstract explanation of the many specic contradictions that rise up as part 
of my subsequent eort here to retrieve the language of reconciliation from its 
more general dissolution in the eld of racial justice. Ultimately, improvisation’s 
compossible attitude works to expand what was delimited and even denied by 
the otherwise impoverished approach to reconciliation adopted institutionally 
in South Africa aer apartheid.
As a basic qualication, however, it is also vital not to confuse such a perfor-
mative expansion of the (com)possible for a sphere of action liberated absolutely 
from those ‘temporal, material, technical, genre-specic, linguistic, cultural or 
social’ laws that, according to the likes of Edgar Landgraf and others, always 
also condition the improvisational.16 Indeed, we might well remind ourselves of 
the ‘scene of constraint’ which, in a very separate context, Judith Butler appends 
to improvisation.17 For her, there are always a set of necessary, inextricable con-
ditions that guide its potential. is is equally the case in the eld of collective 
being aer apartheid. Any scene of improvised reconciliation cannot be thought 
outside the limits of South Africa’s violent and divisive history, even if it also 
permits its ‘conscious reinterpretation’, to borrow from Tracy McMullen.18 To 
this extent, the improvisatory is always performed in clear relation to the rules 
that dene its unruliness. Or put dierently, ignorance—the assumed ‘predic-
ament of the improviser’—has very little to do with improvisation.19 Rather, it 
is almost always a deliberative act, a considered departure into the relative un-
known. Central to any critical account of the improvisational, then, is a parallel 
scrutiny of the scene of constraint within and against which it knowingly acts. 
Indeed, under these terms, the act of improvisation oers itself up as an adjacent 
explanation for the conditions that prompt its own possibility.
Improvising Reconciliation is precisely motivated by this adjacency, both as 
method for evaluating the Truth Commission’s pursuit of reconciliation and as 
a scene from which to imagine its alternative. As such, what follows is principally 
about the unsettled aerlife of the Commission, rather than the specic terms 
with which it was launched (as telling as these also remain). In recommending 
the improvisational as a guiding concept, this study responds to the Commis-
sion’s comparatively narrow imagination not censoriously but as a prompt for 
the extemporary practice levied by theatre- and lmmakers in the years since. 
Put dierently, the Truth Commission’s manifold faults are arguably also what 
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make possible the parallel account of reconciliation privileged here. Reecting 
upon the contributions made by South Africa’s contemporary stage and screen, 
spheres uncommonly responsive to the logic of improvisation, I favour those 
performative works that move with and against the Truth Commission to imag-
ine what might be otherwise. is is no necessary relief from the sense of excess 
and insu	ciency that the Commission originally engendered—its seeming ne-
cessity as much as its futility. In the modest repertoire of creative works by the 
dramaturg Yaël Farber and lmmakers Ingrid Gavshon, Mark Kaplan, and Ra-
madan Suleman prioritised here, I do not propose a strict—and thereby unblem-
ished—divergence from this eld of disappointment. Even as these examples are 
separated by virtue of their conceptual distance from the Commission’s vexed 
practice, they are still rooted in the same fundamental history of loss, pain, and 
injustice uncovered day aer day at its hearings.
Staged and screened initially over a noticeably intense period (2000–2004) 
and just as the Commission’s public hearings were coming to a formal close, 
these works maintain a temporal as well as aective proximity to this scene of 
national expiation. ey are also stalked by a more general pattern of creative 
national reection that would have us repeat and reinforce many of the Com-
mission’s limitations. By important contrast, however, the practitioners I choose 
to prioritise in this study neither deny the extreme divisions that apartheid gen-
erated, nor underestimate the challenge of incorporating these extremities into 
the democratic now in South Africa. Rather, they work to imagine, I propose, 
those reconciled ways of collective, reciprocal being that might be improvised 
from within this scene of historical suering. Put simply, this repertoire oers 
up a parallel sphere of representation, an adjacent form through which to recon-
stitute in more provisional terms ‘this thing called reconciliation’.
Reconciliation’s Constraints
Before turning in detail to this repertoire of theatre and lm, it is perhaps helpful 
to attend to improvisation’s more generalised insecurity in the spheres of political 
and moral thought, to say nothing of the more specic domain of reconciliation. 
For one thing, few schematic accounts of these elds nd in the improvisational 
an organising principal. Certainly, it is possible to cite prominent instances in 
which an extemporary attitude is also the most pragmatic one, as Martha Nuss-
baum and, more recently, Barbara Herman have argued of the ‘mature moral 
agent’ and their ‘ability to navigate complex or changing circumstances’.20 In-
deed, in this, Herman returns us to the guiding root of improvisation, emerging 
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as it does from the Latin improvisus, meaning the unforeseen, the unexpected. 
For her, as for other situated ethical thinkers, improvisation marks less ‘an aban-
donment of moral values’ and more ‘a way of extending them’ in the face of 
unprecedented circumstances.21 Such agility extends equally to the eld of po-
litical advocacy, where improvisation has arguably long been a critical part of the 
way politics gets done. is is, for instance, what political theorist Yves Citton 
nds at stake in almost every attempt to secure from the volatile ‘potency of the 
multitude’ the type of ‘compositional foresight’ required to navigate the ‘un-
avoidable novelty’ encountered as the political sphere evolves.22 In other words, 
there is oen a democratic impulse at the root of improvisation. But in an eort 
to secure the value of this ‘minoritarian intelligence’, Citton also moves to resist 
any rhetorical move that might make improvisation into some benign ‘structural 
necessity’, insisting upon its peripheral rather than generalizable status. For him, 
its peculiar ‘spirit of insurgence’ is only ever derived from a certain ‘margin of 
action’, a certain ‘margin of error’.23 It is at its most eective, we might surmise, 
when it operates as a displaced actor, approaching its object not directly but 
askance. As such, improvisation’s greatest constraint—namely its reluctance to 
inhabit a position of direct authority—is arguably also its chief asset.
To this extent, a critic like Sara Ramshaw is unusual in making improvisation 
a rule—most specically, a rule of law. Embracing its irregular eects, its ‘always 
changing and adjusting’ form, she nds improvisation to be a necessary condition 
of, as well as for, the enactment of justice. For her, ‘all law is improvisation’.24
While her claim threatens to undo the insurgent agenda that Citton asserts, 
in making visible the gap between ‘abstract notions of justice and the everyday 
practice of judging’, Ramshaw also helps to uncover the ordinary improvisational 
action that determines even the most rational seeming of institutions. Recon-
ciliation is arguably not much dierent. Like the law, it must maintain what 
Ramshaw describes as an ‘aporetic relation between singularity and generality, 
repetition and alteration’.25 If it is to serve as anything other than a mode of social 
domination, reconciliation is obliged equally to establish a normative framework 
within which individuals might act, while remaining open simultaneously before 
the exceptionality of their experiences. It is with this ‘aporetic relation’ in mind 
that the improvisatory might oer up a method for integrating the latent volatil-
ity that arguably also inheres within ‘this thing called reconciliation’.
Indeed, in its timidity, this very phrase, rst uttered by Cynthia Ngeweu as 
part of her testimony before the Truth Commission, is precisely indicative of 
the uncertainty and imprecision that informs its subjective pursuit. For despite 
being evoked at every turn of the Commission’s public hearings, rarely was 
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reconciliation straightforwardly understood or uniformly adopted by those in 
attendance. As Paul van Zyl summarises:
Certain victims stated that they would be reconciled once they discovered 
the truth about human rights abuse. Others said that reparation and mon-
etary compensation for past abuse were indispensable to reconciliation. 
Some victims felt extremely embittered about amnesty for perpetrators, 
stating that they would not be reconciled unless justice was done, while 
other families stated that would be satised if the perpetrators made a sin-
cere apology and showed genuine remorse.26
For a theorist of reconciliation like Andrew Schaap, such uncertainty is merely 
indicative of the fact that it ‘means too many dierent things to too many dif-
ferent people’ to be imposed as a coherent ideal.27 Adaptive before these seeming 
confusions, however, the improvisatory arguably works to contain reconcili-
ation’s experiential plurality without necessarily diluting the merits of its po-
tential iterability. In this, improvisation also provides a specically performa-
tive variety of the broadly scientic notion of ‘experimentalism’ that political 
theorists like John Dewey favour.28 Both are a type of learning by doing, ways 
of knowing how, rather than knowing that. But where this experimentalism 
prefers a problem-solution method of inquiry, improvisation favours a more 
dynamic, reexive model. It is under these terms, as a situated and ‘recursively 
operating process’, to return to Landgraf, that an improvised approach to rec-
onciliation proves preferable to the more monumental pursuit favoured by the 
Truth Commission.29
All that said, in returning to survey the Commission’s widely accepted aberra-
tions, this study might reasonably be accused of tethering itself to a set of public 
feelings and political conditions at some distance from the onerous and separate 
seeming concerns of South Africa’s democratic now. Amid the ongoing litany of 
corruption scandals, the murderous events at Marikana in 2012, and the repres-
sive policing of public dissent that came to mark Jacob Zuma’s presidency, for 
instance, the particular solecisms perpetrated by the Commission arguably pale 
by comparison.30 Even with the subsequent election President Cyril Ramaphosa 
and a programme of targeted reform, this recent turbulence continues to mutate 
many of his ambitions into their opposite—political and economic stagnation. It 
is not my intention to distract from this contemporary damage. Rather, to adopt 
the long view that this study encourages, I want to suggest vital evidence of the 
continuities—whether structural or emotional or both—that arguably bind the 
country’s present grievances to democracy’s earliest shortcomings.
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For one thing, the two decades or so that have elapsed since the Commis-
sion’s end have not only oered up new instances of injustice but they have also 
furnished us with a more considered prospect, I contend, from which to engage 
with the lingering and deep-rooted eects of white rule in South Africa. As 
such, we might begin to take greater note of the ways in which apartheid was not 
just a legal framework, not merely a fact of policy to be repealed or overcome; it 
was also a racialized way of individual and collective being that has proven itself 
much more stubborn to undo. With the relief of time, it has become more and 
more clear that, when conceived in strictly political or national terms, reconcil-
iation remains an insu	cient remedy to apartheid’s manifold ‘aerwardsness’.31
So, while I insist upon reconciliation’s failure as a specic miscarriage of the 
Commission, I do not want to distract from the fact that, under a separate light, 
its insolvency is also testament to the noxious and, indeed, obdurate structures 
of racial injustice that emerge unbidden in South Africa even still.
Under these terms, the potential that might otherwise be rescued from rec-
onciliation’s improvisation cannot be altogether disentangled from apartheid’s 
manifestly corruptive remains. Indeed, even where a relatively sanguine critic 
like Njabulo Ndebele lobbies on behalf of the type of aesthetic risks and, with 
them, political possibilities embraced by such an improvisatory agenda, he can-
not avoid alighting upon the ‘long, unrelenting, jagged’ material conditions 
within and against which such risky acts must also venture.32 Of course, it is 
precisely because of these stubborn inequities that a more deliberative and, above 
all, situated approach to reconciliation arguably retains its urgency. As Ramshaw 
has it, improvisation’s general heterodoxy is precisely what ‘keeps alive the pos-
sibility of . . . ethics, democracy and justice’.33 But this should not be confused 
for e	cacy. To this extent, the ‘unnished business’ of the apartheid past does 
much to explain the hesitancy with which I approach my task here. In short, it 
is impossible to step past the fact of reconciliation’s chronic deferral. At worst, 
this historical record risks discrediting the basic impulses driving my analysis. 
At best, it delimits the claims I might reasonably oer.
Nonetheless, as far as I understand them, the continuities and constraints 
made evident during the past two decades are also a vital condition for this study. 
More expressly, it is reconciliation’s plainly imperfect possibility that guides my 
analysis through what is an otherwise polarising atmosphere of euphoria and 
despair, and what prompts my less strident, more equivocal approach to the dis-
cordant claims of liberty, on the one hand, and liberation, on the other. is is 
not to dilute the potential insurgency of my chosen repertoire. It is, instead, to 
take reconciliation as an ideal that has itself been compromised. But it is also 
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to admit the serious historical constraints against which the pursuit of racial 
justice aer apartheid is compelled to operate. Put dierently, I do not discount 
the possibility that the Commission’s own faulty approach to ‘this thing called 
reconciliation’ was itself constrained by the injustice handed down by the past. 
In attending more directly to the shortcomings of the Commission itself, then, 
it is important to consider how these failures also oer up a lesson for reconcil-
iation’s adjacent improvisation, how it too suers beneath the weight of exactly 
those unjust material conditions that make its pluralised pursuit at once so vital 
and so di	cult.
Situating the Truth Commission
As suggested already, this study does not intend to repeat the exhaustive analyt-
ical and evaluative work pursued elsewhere on the Truth Commission. Instead, 
I attempt to set things apart from this critical industry by responding to the 
implications of its general failure. Part of my mission, then, is to understand the 
Commission as more than some faulty legal mechanism, reecting as much on 
its profound cultural, political, and moral legacies as its procedural shortcom-
ings. Examined in this context, however, the Commission should also be valued 
for its symptomatic rather than essential signicance. At their most enlighten-
ing, its limitations help adduce both the national brinkmanship and the global 
imperatives that were driving the country’s democratic transition. And while 
much has been made of its local political constraints, South Africa’s Truth Com-
mission also registers the particular priorities of an international human-rights 
agenda that was pressed upon other transitional, former authoritarian states in 
Eastern Europe and South America during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
By the time the Commission’s ten nominated commissioners rst convened 
under the chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu in Cape Town on 16 De-
cember 1995 to debate its formal organization, twelve other nations had already 
staged similar such commissions.34 is latest commission was made to line up 
behind international orthodoxy, corroborating the supposedly universal tenets 
of transitional justice. But it also enhanced elements of this paradigm. For one 
thing, South Africa’s Truth Commission chose to stage the majority of its hear-
ings in public, even televising its proceedings as part of its reputed aim to deliver 
the full facts of the past into the nation’s consciousness. Under the auspices of 
three separate committees, the Human Rights Violation Committee (HRVC), 
the Amnesty Committee, and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, 
the Truth Commission spent more than three and a half years travelling across 
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the country to hear testimony from some eighteen hundred victims of human 
rights abuse and almost two thousand amnesty applicants.35 Journalist Max 
du Preez’s weekly review of the hearings, ‘Truth Commission Special Report’, 
which ran on the national broadcaster, SABC, from 1996–1998, became com-
pulsive viewing for many. Such public scrutiny was historically unprecedented 
and remains a large part of the reason why the Commission was held up as piv-
otal to the nation’s transition. It also why the Commission garnered so much 
critical, oen caustic attention. Nonetheless, the basic decision to make public 
its proceedings was a self-evident departure from the privileged investigations 
undertaken, say, by Chile’s otherwise comparable National Commission of 
Truth and Reconciliation (1990–1991). And just as this latter example has been 
blighted by accusations of suppression, conversely the sense of justice delivered 
(or not) by the South African Truth Commission cannot be extricated from its 
public character.
To observe South Africa’s Truth Commission through this comparative lens 
is to recognise the ways in which it blended its generic appeal for national unity 
with more situated ambitions, like its call for ubuntu rather than victimization. 
As a southern African philosophy of communitarianism, ubuntu was hailed as 
a uniquely immanent response to the racial estrangement handed down by the 
apartheid past, a ‘prophetic moral culture’, as Michael Onyebuchi Eze puts it, 
‘in which all South Africans, irrespective of race, [could] nd a home’.36 Accord-
ingly, it  was oen summarised at the Truth Commission by way of the Nguni 
language proverb umuntu ngumuntu ngabuntu—‘a person is a person through 
other persons’—and was taken to provide a generally humanistic, mutually de-
termined and indigenous ethical framework within which to situate the pursuit 
of national unity. Like almost everything attempted by the Commission, how-
ever, this particular agenda has also come under censorious attack. Christian 
Gade, for one, challenges the ways in which the Commission actively distilled 
the meaning of ubuntu. Insisting that it circulated in this specic, proverbial 
form only rarely before the Commission, he casts this institutional use of ubuntu 
as an invented tradition of sorts, one used to ‘sell’ a particular version of rec-
onciliation to the country.37 As such, it attened out the term’s philosophical 
complexity, attenuating its regional as well as interethnic variety, Gade argues.38
Whether or not we follow Gade’s claims, the Commission’s deferral to a con-
cept like ubuntu is also illustrative of the ‘self-conscious contingent’ operation 
of transitional justice more generally. As Ruti Teitel elaborates, in the aermath 
of endemic state violence, it is necessarily the case that ‘the concept of justice 
that emerges is contextualised and partial’.39 In other words, we would do well 
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to take transitional justice as always also conditioned by the type of injustice that 
precedes it. With specic respect to the Commission’s controversial amnesty 
clause, however, such a situated elasticity arguably proved pernicious. For un-
like other transitional regimes, the conditional immunity from prosecution for 
perpetrators of abuse was entirely unique to the general praxis of South Africa’s 
Truth Commission. is was not a decision born of some abstract investment in 
the values of tolerance and forgiveness, even if it has been defended subsequently 
as such. It was, instead, the express result of the settlement negotiated some years 
earlier during the draing of the Interim Constitution in 1993. Produced under 
the heading of National Unity and Reconciliation, the Constitution stated that:
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall 
be granted in respect of acts, omissions and oences associated with po-
litical objectives and committed in the course of the conicts of the past. 
To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law deter-
mining a rm cut-o date, which shall be a date aer 8 October 1990 and 
before 6 December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and 
procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall 
be dealt with at any time aer the law has been passed.40
No comparable dispensation was made for the victims of abuse, nancially or 
otherwise. Nor was there any specic requirement for a wider commission of 
national inquiry. e mandate was designed merely to indemnify those indi-
viduals otherwise exposed to future criminal as well as civil prosecution. is 
included, most obviously, the National Party (NP) government and their bu-
reaucratic subordinates, but it also extended to members of the African National 
Congress (ANC) and other political dissidents who had committed their own 
acts of violence as part of the co-ordinated resistance to apartheid. is is not to 
presume a moral equivalence. It is to admit to the expedient, singularly political 
ends towards which amnesty aimed.
Doubtless, in the burdensome aermath of a history as divisive and damag-
ing as apartheid, any attempt at future order is compelled to negotiate several 
such competing, even insuperable ethical as well as political demands. ere is 
rarely a compromise suciently rened for a society emerging from the trauma 
of such prolonged state violence and entrenched racial subjugation. As Martha 
Minow argues in Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, the drive towards unity is 
everywhere risked by the parallel danger of ‘too much memory or not enough; 
too much enshrinement of victimhood or insucient memorializing of victims 
and survivors; too much past or too little acknowledgment of the past’s staging 
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of the present’.41 Each seeming accomplishment threatens its own attendant 
failure, every potential resolution chancing a capitulation to an injustice of a 
dierent order. To this extent, it may seem that the amnesty clause merely made 
evident the perilous concessions that were required to avert the larger injustice 
of historical impunity, on the one hand, and violent reprisal, on the other. Even 
aer President De Klerk’s unbanning of the ANC in February 1990 and the 
formal end to the armed struggle, the will to revenge and insurrection appeared 
everywhere in evidence. Stoked by secessionists like the Inkatha Freedom Party 
in Natal, as well as by a reputed ird Force made up of death squads directed 
by the NP, the years leading up to Nelson Mandela’s election as president in 
April 1994 were among the bloodiest in the Republic’s history, with uno	cial 
reprisals ongoing from all sides. In the end, the cut-o date for amnesty had 
to be extended to include the events surrounding the rst democratic vote, so 
unrelenting was this violent agitation.
e eect, however, was to make amnesty—with all its obvious moral 
hazard—an indispensable seeming condition of the formal transition. Moreover, 
under these terms, everything that followed thereaer, generally scripted as a 
concern for the ‘truth about the past’ and for ‘the restoration of human and civil 
dignity’ (to follow the terms of the subsequent Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act of 1995), was also arguably contrived to facilitate this 
politically necessary but morally intolerable end. In other words, much of what 
the Commission was eventually oriented towards—and, indeed, has found it-
self most heavily criticised for mishandling—were broadly strategic inventions, 
devised in order to mitigate the specic injustice of the amnesty clause. is is 
corroborated by the fact that the Commission had no legal authority beyond 
this clause.42 Its recommendations for reparations to victims of human rights 
abuse were heeded only in part and with much delay. Moreover, certain of these 
victims were compelled to abide by court injunctions that prohibited them from 
naming alleged perpetrators in their submissions. If these specic miscarriages 
do not su	ciently signal the institutional tide against which the Commission’s 
wider aims were set, then we need only recall the much wider pattern of self-in-
terest and ideological acquiescence also ongoing at a governmental level, with 
the ANC presiding over what John Saul gures as a ‘beggaring of [its] historical 
imagination’.43 Not only did government o	cials seek to discredit many of its 
ndings against the ANC, but in refusing the Commission’s implicit call for 
targeted economic redistribution, the ruling party also betrayed its capitulation 
to the arguments made and inducements oered by neoliberal elites at home and 
abroad. Ultimately, it is for reasons of this sort, I aver, that the Commission’s 
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pursuit of reconciliation must also be understood as a form of ‘bureaucratic le-
gitimization’, as Richard Wilson phrases it, a progressive alibi devised for and by 
an inwardly regressive, largely unreformed state.44
By rhetorical extension, the Commission’s ‘poorly constructed conceptual 
grid’, to return to Posel, may be explained alternately in terms of the ‘national 
political constraints’ that, as Wilson further elaborates, ‘dramatically redened’ 
the international orthodoxies of its rights-based agenda.45 Indeed, as Posel con-
cedes, ‘the historical crucible of the truth commission [. . .] is inherently paradox-
ical’, for even as each ‘share a central epistemological and ethical challenge’, every 
individual ‘truth commission is a situationally specic political intervention’.46
It is here that the language of improvisation proves to be at its most expressive, 
for it arguably cites as part of its situated logic precisely the compromised and 
expedient politics from within which the Truth Commission’s impoverished 
drive towards reconciliation emerged. Without revising wholesale its praxis to 
conform to the logic of improvisation, it is enough to understand its shallow 
and symbolic pursuit of reconciliation as conditioned in large part by the moral 
decit it was obliged to oset, if also ill-equipped to correct.
In contriving a version of reconciliation that pretended to justice, but pre-
sided over injustice, the Commission makes clear the constraints that threaten 
to corrupt the concept beyond repair. Of course, reconciliation is not always 
complicit with injustice. Nonetheless, as a situated pursuit, it necessarily remains 
vulnerable to those contradictory possibilities that, for a theorist like Peters, 
dene all such acts of improvisation. As such, the tendency towards discord as 
much as concord, towards expediency as much as e	cacy, captures precisely the 
riskiness that surrounds reconciliation even as a condition of its improvisation. 
In short, wittingly or otherwise, the Commission oers up its own cautionary 
tale in the extemporary, a record of reconciliation’s potential complicity with 
injustice that this present study cannot deny, even if it works hard to moderate.
Improvising the Archive
In highlighting improvisation’s imprecise and possibly hazardous eects in the 
eld of reconciliation, I do not want to distract from the fact that this insecu-
rity is also crucial to its disruptive agenda. For the improvisational necessarily 
supposes a degree of incalculability that does much to unsettle even the most 
decided of ideological ends. If nothing else, it sees the world, Landgraf advises, as 
only ever ‘constituted temporarily’.47 By comparison, one of the more troubling 
consequences of the criticism levelled at the Truth Commission has been the 
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way in which, collectively, this dismay has served to harden its general enter-
prise into an entirely calculable, durable space. In other words, such has been the 
depth of complaint that any residual kernel of reconciliatory possibility has been 
eectively discredited. Of course, this is not just the fault of expedient analysis. 
e sheer scale of the Commission’s enterprise raised expectations and deepened 
its subsequent disappointments. One crude measure of its ambition is the three 
kilometres of archival material that the Commission reputedly produced during 
the six years or so that it took to complete its investigations. ese materials, 
which included individual and institutional submissions, amnesty applications, 
as well as the transcripts and video recordings of each day’s public proceedings 
have since been collected by the National Archives in Pretoria. Yet, for all the 
attention its original hearings garnered, very little has been made of this sizeable 
resource in the years since.
ere is much to lament in this general neglect, not least in terms of the col-
lective sense of injustice these stories tell and the implicit claims for historical 
reckoning they make as a consequence. In this very specic sense, I am not en-
tirely unsympathetic to commentators like Charles Villa-Vicencio, national re-
search director for the Truth Commission, who seek to remind us that its o	cial 
mandate was to promote, not enact reconciliation.48 Certainly, the Commission 
did much to help collapse this delicate distinction, volubly stressing those in-
dividual instances of professed reconciliation between perpetrator and victim 
that emerged on occasion at its hearings. Nonetheless, to reanimate this view of 
reconciliation as an open, continuous and deliberative negotiation, rather than 
a closed event, is also to prioritise those radically diverse circumstances under 
which it might begin to emerge. It is to remake reconciliation into a partially 
incalculable end. I say this not to rehabilitate the Commission. Its corrupted 
reputation has arguably done much to distract from the wider pursuit of racial 
justice in South Africa. But there is little value in dismissing its action absolutely.
For example, even accepting the partiality of its public hearings, these were 
still spaces of comparatively uncommon as well as shocking historical exposure. 
ose victims given opportunity to give testimony to their experience under 
apartheid oered up a record of the national past that has rarely been matched 
since, either in historical detail or aective intensity. ere are, of course, many 
prominent instances of autobiographical writing and social history that add in 
vital ways to this record, but arguably little that compares either with the eviden-
tial weight or the emotional depth of the Commission’s HRVC hearings when 
taken in sum.49 And where much has been made of the consensual understand-
ing of the past that supposedly emerged from this space of ‘hearing and healing’, 
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many of these acts of personal anamnesis also retain a much more urgent, even 
belligerent historical charge.50
is is precisely what oral historian Sean Field identies amid the ‘disap-
pointed remains’, as he puts it, that patterned the HRVC’s hearings. Like those 
theorists of reconciliation who resists its tendency towards closure, Field con-
tests the therapeutic regime into which victims’ suering was more oen in-
terpolated. Instead, borrowing from David Lloyd, he reects on the potential 
of those ‘melancholy survivals’ that refuse recovery—that is to say, the claims 
to justice that might follow from ‘the injunction to mourn’.51 I return to these 
disappointed, melancholy remains in more detail elsewhere in this study. Here, I 
want to draw attention to the latent force to be recovered from the Commission’s 
archive. For in disrupting the violently erasive logic of apartheid, the Commis-
sion also ‘engaged archive, rescued archive, created archive, regured archive’, as 
Verne Harris, former deputy director of the National Archives, has described.52
If nothing else, its hearings provided an archival defence against a ruinous na-
tional amnesia, the submissions made by many victims of abuse performing ‘an 
archival intervention’ of sorts.53
ere is a divide, however, between the embodied life of the Commission’s 
public hearings and its at archival aerlife. Harris, for one, questions the way 
in which the ‘stories shared through the TRC have been woven into the collec-
tive memory of communities’, nding them restricted to elite, oen academic 
debate, rather than public discourse and discussion.54 is is partly a problem 
of transmission. For while the Truth Commission maintains unrestricted dig-
ital access to its public hearings, these reports and submissions are for the most 
part dense, heavily descriptive or discursive documents. is was by no means 
the daily experience of the Commission itself. Its public hearings were dynamic 
spaces conditioned by outbursts from grieving family members and traumatised 
victims, as well as the collective interjections of the hearings’ overwhelmingly 
black audiences who gathered at town halls across the country to bear witness 
to their mutual suering.55 Such contingencies are not part of the Commission’s 
archival transcripts, at least not self-evidently. Instead, critics have been com-
pelled to search out traces of this ‘liveness’, reecting on the intense emotional 
atmosphere underwriting each individual submission.
In Catherine Cole’s reading, this is equivalent to the divide separating ‘a 
site-specic performance event’ from its scripted record.56 More than merely met-
aphorical, this performative lens accounts for much of the Commission’s public 
praxis, providing a framework to explain the use in its hearings of ‘restored be-
haviour, expressive embodiment, storytelling and retelling’, Cole insists. is 
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sense of performativity helps us makes sense of the ways in which the Commis-
sion served ‘as a ritual for addressing a massive breach in the social fabric . . . how, 
in sum, the TRC served as a literal and gurative stage for South Africa’s polit-
ical transition’.57 As Cole notes, there is a theatricality implicit in international 
human rights jurisprudence, from the Eichmann trial to Slobodan Milošević’s 
appearance before the International Criminal Court at e Hague. Each insists 
upon the public performance of justice, in the ritualised rehearsal of guilt and 
legal redress. At South Africa’s Truth Commission, however, this theatricality 
was intensied by dint of its self-appointed ambition to ‘make visible that which 
had been unseen’—that is, Cole advises, its seeming invocation of theatre’s es-
sence as ‘a place of seeing’, as derived from the Greek theatron. Giving a stage 
to ‘the large-scale, mostly hidden abuses of the past—in particular, systematic 
abduction, torture, and murder—it exposed’, she declares, ‘a secret theatre to 
public view’.58
At its most searching, this performative model asks us to query the ‘special 
form of transitional justice that South Africa brought into being’.59 For Cole, it 
is the ritualism of this process that appears to have taken precedence, not least in 
the subjunctive possibilities that it arguably aords. But as a method of justice, 
there is also something about this ritualism that fails the stubborn durability of 
apartheid injustice. is is also Yvette Hutchison’s complaint with the Commis-
sion and its ‘archive of memory’, as she puts it.60 Without repeating her engage-
ment with the relatively familiar archival theories of Diana Taylor and Jacques 
Derrida, it is enough to note that for Hutchison the experiences documented 
by the HRVC make evident the gap between memory in action and its ‘public 
formulation’ in the archive, a gap through which the gestural, the emotional, and 
the unspeakable regularly fall. Silence, for instance, is not recoverable from the 
textual archive, even though it was a regular feature of the Commission’s hearings 
and remains a necessary condition, as Hutchison advises, of the racial trauma 
around which reconciliation must turn.61 As much as the Commission was a 
place of seeing, then, its archive has oen become a space of unseeing and partial 
forgetting. e point is a relatively familiar one, especially for those also conver-
sant with Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between history and memory.62 Even so, it 
is far from arbitrary, especially in the context of South Africa’s enduring struggle 
against racial injustice. For whatever the relative success of the Commission’s live 
hearings in conditioning an empathic, engaged audience, its archival aerlife has 
tended towards something of the reverse, namely neglect and unfeeling.
is is a theatrical complaint as much as an archival one. But for all their 
incisive probing into the theatrical qualities driving the Commission’s public 
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hearings, neither Hutchison, nor Cole take the historical record as ‘always in the 
process of being made’, as Harris describes it.63 To this extent, they also neglect 
the related contribution that a more improvisatory attitude might yield, partic-
ularly in relation to the Commission’s archival aerlife. is is as much about 
expanding upon the improvised activity the Commission arguably licenced (di-
rectly or otherwise), as it is about untethering its praxis from any strictly recuper-
ative agenda. As far as the former goes, Cole does at least note the unpredictable 
character of its hearings, with many victims departing, sometimes radically, 
from the written submissions they provided ahead of their public appearance 
before the HRVC. Commissioners too made ad-hoc interventions. Referencing 
Wendy Orr, vice chair of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, Cole 
describes how those charged with weighing up the evidence and responding to 
victims ‘had to improvise on the y’.64 As Orr herself puts it, ‘[t]here were no 
precedents to fall back on, no policies to guide decisions. We learned by mak-
ing mistakes’.65 For Cole, this ‘improvisational uncertainty’ merely added to the 
general theatrics of the Commission. Hutchison goes a little further, casting the 
Commission’s live hearings as something akin to ‘an improvised theatre piece’, 
albeit one ‘where all the participants have a sense of the basic plot outline and 
their roles’. For her, the hearings admitted to moments of individual impulsivity, 
but, ultimately, ‘what the audience see [was] being created for them’ according to 
the imperatives of the new democratic regime.66
If critics like Hutchison appear to stall before the Commission’s monumen-
tal claims, then they succeed in tracing the general limit point for this type of 
theatrical diagnosis. In the face of such concrete ideological ends, the promise of 
its performative spontaneity appears beyond recuperation. However, this should 
not be taken as reason to dispense either with the Commission’s fundamental 
ndings, its embodied history, or, indeed, the basic claims that improvisation 
upholds. As noted already, Improvising Reconciliation is motivated by its concep-
tual contiguity with the Commission. is must be understood too as a perfor-
mative relation. And in the repertoire of theatre and lm that drives this study, 
many of the Commission’s theatrical tenets continue to thrive, in particular the 
confessional model that motivated its public hearings. What distinguishes this 
repertoire is its willingness to undo the strategic political ends that this model 
was made to calculate. Less an improvisation in the act of telling, these works 
attempt, instead, to unsettle the national imperatives that condition their re-
ception, redeploying the Commission’s archive in ways that revise our sense of 
what this performance of the past might otherwise achieve and, ultimately, what 
reconciliation might otherwise constitute.
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Towards a Confessional Pact
To put things in more strident terms, I disagree with those who insist that we 
simply get ‘beyond the TRC’.67 For one thing, reconciliation’s more general 
defeat is a burden borne not just by the formal mechanisms of the transition. 
is miscarriage arguably lters into the everyday political landscape in South 
Africa, delimiting the eld of national, democratic possibility. However serious 
and justiable our misgivings may remain, then, there is something to lament 
in the Commission’s overhasty demise, not so much as a legal mechanism but as 
comparatively unique arena for the collective negotiation of apartheid’s unjust 
remains. And in moving here to defend my chosen repertoire of theatre and 
lm, I would begin by stressing their general return to something of a similarly 
deliberative arena. Sharing in its fundamental culture of telling and listening, of 
confession and expiation, these works all attempt, as Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela 
also argues of the Commission, to make intimate the nation’s otherwise es-
tranged collective life.68 is is more than the state of collective immanence for 
which reconciliation is sometimes confused. As I understand it, the intimate 
serves as a summary for the mutual vulnerability that, according to the likes of 
Ndebele and others, must be chanced if any of the ‘new, interpersonal solidari-
ties’ essential to a ‘broader, more a	rming social solidarit[y]’ are to emerge. As a 
beginning point for reconciliation, it depends on the same ‘risk of self-exposure’, 
as Ndebele puts it, as the confessional sphere, rather than the self-preservation 
that has more generally determined South Africa’s democratic order.69
As a pilot for this process, the Commission remains beyond repair. e related 
acts of public confession that it helped inaugurate on stage and screen retain, by 
contrast, a less decided appeal. Even if I cannot deny the taints that sometimes 
aict these works by simple virtue of their temporal and formal nearness to the 
Commission, there is opportunity still to recover from their adjacent, extra-legal 
action a space within which to pursue this risky enterprise. By contrast to the 
Commission, however, these works have also been hindered by their marginal 
status to date. Yaël Farber, for instance, is fast becoming a dramaturg of serious 
international repute. But her early theatre remains as peripheral to the national 
debate as the documentary lm tradition that I also analyse here. Loren Kruger, 
for example, citing Farber’s He Le Quietly, claims that the Truth Commission 
has not ‘generated theatre to match the complexity of prose such as Antjie Krog’s 
Country of My Skull ’.70 is dismissiveness should not be taken as signal of an 
essential inadequacy. As far as I understand it, the broad omission of my selected 
repertoire betrays the relatively cursory thinking by which the Commission 
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and its aerlife has been dispatched. Even among those commentators who af-
ford them credence, these works are largely reduced to mere analogues of the 
Commission and its public praxis. For example, Hutchison, who pays compar-
atively sustained attention to Farber’s testimonial plays, nds them animated 
by the self-same regime of truth—that is, ‘the dierent ways of telling various 
truths’—that led the Commission to distinguish between factual or forensic 
truth, personal or narrative truth, social or dialogue truth, and healing or restor-
ative truth.71 Certainly, Farber nds much nourishment in the Commission’s 
terms of reference. But like the other works addressed in this study, she has little 
interest in maintaining such an articial taxonomy.
In his analysis of those creative works performed ‘aer the Truth Commis-
sion’, Shane Graham provides a more telling assessment, citing an expanded 
approach to the ‘iconic “truths” produced by the TRC’.72 For him, it is the ‘am-
biguous truths’, the paradoxes and contradictions upheld by this allied arena of 
embodied performance that prove most compelling. As far as I am concerned, 
however, it is their ‘displaced’ agency, as Graham also has it, that is primary.73 As 
a form of adjacency, this displaced agency spatialises the degree of dierence that 
separates this creative repertoire from the Commission itself. But this displaced 
agency also incorporates the supplanted, volatile associations that structure their 
broader synchrony. Under these terms, this repertoire might also be understood 
as staging the Commission’s struggle with its own repressions, as giving action 
to the complex, oen contradictory feelings of anger and forlorn expectation 
underpinning its ambition.
At this stage, I do not wish to propose a more lucid, decided relationship 
between the formal activity of the Commission and its theatrical and lmic 
aerlife. For one thing, such a move would diminish the proximate, knotted mo-
tivations that, in large part, determine the specic interventions that I attempt 
to outline in the chapters that follow. Doubtless, at rst glance, the degrees of 
separation may be troublingly slight, but it is the intricacies of their relational-
ity that prove vital, I suggest. For this repertoire upholds a generally displaced, 
deposed sense of what the Commission might otherwise achieve, eschewing the 
national imperatives driving the state in favour of those emotional and material 
claims that motivate apartheid’s many victims. In this, they confront the risks 
taken in the act of confession, the failures as much as the possibilities that it 
implies for the eld of reconciliation.
In centring this ‘scene of risk’, to borrow again from Ndebele’s more gen-
eral description for South Africa’s transitional cultural milieu, this study neces-
sarily remains cautious in its claims. is is as much a condition of the serious 
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structural constraints that I list above as it is of the formal insecurity that 
structures the specic repertoire I privilege below. For not only are theatre and 
lm—my fundamental objects of inquiry—listed prominently on South Africa’s 
register of endangered aesthetic species but, in their confessional praxis, this 
repertoire also constitutes an especially vulnerable genus. Indeed, in many ways, 
there is arguably no more perilous a discursive act. As the literary critic Peter 
Brooks has it, confession remains one of ‘the most complex and obscure forms 
of human speech and behaviour’.74 Despite its reputed status as one of the oldest 
of human longings, it is no less di	cult to domicile for its centuries-long gesta-
tion or, indeed, its seeming cross-cultural appeal. Like autobiography, of which 
it might be considered a more ritualised variety, confession contains a series of 
‘generically hybrid’ impulses, whether legal, sacramental or, indeed, psychoan-
alytical.75 Given this institutional labour, it is hardly surprising that it so oen 
refuses to retreat into the comparative security of the ctional. Its claim over the 
real, over ‘what hurts’, is too fundamental to its character for any such a with-
drawal.76 But neither can confession necessarily aver the type of self-assurance 
that comes with the articulation of fact. It tends to abut equally the referential 
and the representational, subsisting at the border between these two provinces 
but refused full entry to either. In short, confessional works like those included 
here are always, as Christopher Grobe elsewhere a	rms, ‘on the move’.77
As such, it is precisely the mobile claims delivered by the act of confession, 
over and above a seemingly more stable discursive terrain like testimony, that 
encourage the expanded approach to intimacy, solidarity and, ultimately, rec-
onciliation that I favour here. For unlike witness testimony, the confessional 
acts under analysis in this study cannot be calibrated merely according to their 
evidential authority. Certainly, they retain a testamentary ambition. e OED, 
for instance, makes plain confession’s shared interest in ‘making known’, in dis-
closing ‘something previously held secret’. But in endlessly ‘chasing the letter 
“I”’, to borrow again from Grobe, the performances privileged in the chapters 
that follow are also in pursuit of an end that lies beyond the reach of any strictly 
legal or historical regime of truth.78 Without deferring to those more everyday 
confessional environments that have come increasingly to dominate the popular 
media, it is perhaps enough to note the ‘compulsion to confess’ as also contin-
gent on something approaching recognition.79 Whether motivated by guilt, as 
is assumed of the few criminal perpetrators analysed here, or by a suering so 
intense as to feel overwhelming, as is more common among the many victims’ 
experiences I survey, this confessional imperative derives, in part, from a de-
sire to unburden the inner self, to have it acknowledged and publicly dignied. 
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Certainly, there is a related hope of healing, or, in the sphere of guilt and sacra-
mental rites, forgiveness. But, to follow Leigh A. Payne, these confessional per-
formances emerge more oen from those moments when ‘[e]motion overpowers 
reason’.80 Put dierently, they are prompted by an aective rather than strategic 
urge to have the diminished and suering self mediated publicly.
is is not to liberate such confessional acts altogether from the claims of au-
thenticity, especially when mobilised in the sphere of historical inquiry. Rather, 
it is to propose a shi in emphasis. As such, I want to suggest a tentative route 
past a longstanding tradition of traumatic analysis that is, in large measure, sus-
tained by its eorts to theorise the historical claims that such subjective acts 
may be thought to provide (or not). In working out the historical dimensions 
of trauma, critics like Cathy Caruth have tried to shield the subject from undue 
positivist interpretation by guring the extreme experiences that individuals 
regularly reference as, ultimately, ‘unsayable’. By this, she means to cast the 
trauma of, say, apartheid abuse as precisely ‘constituted by the very incompre-
hensibility of its occurrence’.81 Under these terms, the capacity to translate ex-
treme suering into speech—in other words, to confess—is also ‘the capacity to 
elide or distort’. For Caruth, this is ‘not a denial of a knowledge of the past, but 
rather a way of gaining access to a knowledge that has not yet attained the form 
of “narrative memory”’. 82 It also marks out something of the discursive distinc-
tion that might be drawn between the act of confession and witness testimony. 
As far as the latter is concerned, Sanders makes specic its traumatised opacity 
when he centres the ambiguities inherent to the Truth Commission and ‘the 
di	cult public space of [its] hearings’.83 Sustained by a typically Derridean mode 
of critique, for Sanders the type of witness acts prompted by the Commission 
made a quasi-judicial demand upon the veriable even while they were ‘strictly 
speaking, unveriable at the moment that [they were] elicited’.84
e same attitude need not apply to the act of confession, however. At least, 
the question of its verity is altogether secondary. Central to the confessional 
mode is, I contend, the creative possibilities that also emerge by way of this 
self-recital. As Ndebele elaborates, such rehearsals of the past are much less about 
deciding history as they are about the pursuit ‘of meaning through the imagina-
tive combination of the facts’.85 Confession’s reliability is only a serious concern 
when it threatens to disrupt the possibility for such imaginative meaning mak-
ing. In other words, confession is best judged in terms of the imagined new ways 
of being it makes possible, rather than any evidential burden. Indeed, ‘whether 
or not we make them up’, as Grobe puts it, ‘confessions make us up—they make 
us real’.86 is is, I contend, equally applicable to confession’s public circulation 
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as it is to its private function. For the constitutive claims of confession do not 
end with the confessing ‘I’. Rather, they maintain the potential to promote, as 
John Beverley has elsewhere described, an ‘a	rmation of the individual self in 
a collective mode’.87 Even as it issues from the privileged sphere of subjective ex-
perience, each act of confession works to evoke, Beverley continues, ‘an absent 
polyphony of other voices, other possible lives and experiences’.88 Gayle Greene 
puts this dierently (and incisively) when she imagines the ‘community restored’ 
by confession.89 For her, as indeed for other feminist critics like Rita Felski, con-
fession speaks not just inwardly but also outwardly by ‘encod[ing] an audience’.90
In short, the act of confession both presumes and produces its own confessor or 
interlocutor, addressing a type of imagined community who oen share actually 
or empathically in the experience of the confessant.
Of course, it must also be said that this confessional community is not al-
ways benevolent, not always implicated sympathetically, especially not in the 
wake of a history as divisive as apartheid. Even within the type of progressive 
social movements that Greene and Felski address, the act of confession circulates 
within an unstable aective economy, one that is liable to elicit a range of re-
sponses, censorious as well as compassionate. is is likewise true of the predom-
inantly black female voices privileged in this present study, who have been more 
generally disqualied—as they were under apartheid—from public debate. But 
such volatility is broadly implicit to any such a confessional exchange. To confess 
and make public what otherwise remains private and privileged is necessarily to 
enter a space of vulnerability. It is to expose the self to judgment, positive or not. 
Ultimately, however, it is this inherent riskiness that arguably gives the act its 
measure of authenticity and, indeed, its potency.
In the wake of events as extreme as apartheid, this risk is doubtless intensied. 
For perpetrators of abuse, to confess is to subject the self to national reprehen-
sion, not just individual absolution. While for their victims, this threat of re-
proach is overtaken by a desire for restored dignity—what Gobodo-Madikizela 
names as ‘empathic repair’—to confess in this context is also to risk its destruc-
tive opposite: indierence and apathy.91 Yet, without these implicit threats of 
reproof, on the one hand, and disinterest, on the other, the act of confession is 
hardly a confession at all. Put dierently, to confess in anticipation of reconcili-
ation, as the Truth Commission arguably scripts it, is to run counter to the very 
logic of uncertainty that underwrites the confessional act more generally.
In reecting upon the uncertain potential of reconciliation that emerges from 
this confessional sphere, then, I resist returning to those calculable ends like 
repair or forgiveness at which a critic like Gobodo-Madikizela ultimately aims. 
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For all the merits of her analysis and psychological insight, as a former commis-
sioner who presided over HRVC hearings in the Western Cape, it is clear that 
she retains a certain faith in its recuperative technology. is is not something 
broadly tenable in the confessional acts prioritized in this present study. Instead, 
what denes them is the more modest, aective, and, indeed, intimate forms of 
communion that they sustain. Under these terms, it is the unspoken but com-
pelling pact that the confessing subject brokers with their onlooking audience 
that counts. Much like its autobiographical equivalent, such a confessional pact 
demands that both confessant and confessor make an implicit promise, each to 
the other, a promise that if broken threatens to wreck too its intimate eects.92
But unlike autobiography, the stakes of the confession are uniformly high. Any 
contravention of the confessional accord by one party violates the emotional 
endowment made by the other. I do not intend to resolve this risk. Instead, I ap-
proach this pact as a formal expression of the antagonisms that run throughout 
this study more generally, centring the di	culty of salvaging hope from disillu-
sionment, of kindling new intimacies from old estrangements.
Confessional Modes
Where I have so far oered up the improvisational as a theoretical framework 
through which to reconsider reconciliation, and the confessional pact as a formal 
arena within which to trace its intimate pursuit, I elaborate in this nal section 
on the terms around which each of the subsequent chapters are arranged. To a 
large extent, this also about the methodology required to coordinate a set of con-
cerns that otherwise tend to disrupt the potential for regular order or evolution-
ary argument. At least, if confession is thought an act always on the move and 
improvisation is marked, in part, by its unxing of the xed, then the chapters 
that follow are inevitably sustained by a similarly itinerancy. To put this in more 
concrete terms, each of the works included in this study deviates in their partic-
ular approach to the question of reconciliation and the allied pursuit of racial 
justice. Notwithstanding their shared concern for the voices of apartheid’s vic-
tims, they adopt dissimilar attitudes to the staging and reception of these voices. 
Take, for instance, Duma Kumalo’s confessional performance in Yaël Farber’s 
play He Le Quietly (2002), which I explore in chapter one. Kumalo was not a 
professional actor, despite his appearance in this and numerous other theatrical 
and lmic works in the rst decade of democracy. For much of his early life, he 
was a trainee teacher. Arrested for murder under the law of common purpose 
in 1984, he was condemned to death before, ultimately, securing release as part 
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of the political negotiations leading up to the rst democratic vote. Unusually, 
he appeared twice before the Truth Commission, rst at a HRVC hearing in 
Gauteng in August 1996 and then again at a special hearing on prisons in Cape 
Town in July 1997, recounting at each the traumatic details of his arrest and im-
prisonment. e experiences described at these hearings provide the basis for He 
Le Quietly’s script, which was developed collaboratively by Kumalo and Farber 
over the course of a few intense weeks. e play is performed by Kumalo with a 
professional actor reprising for the audience the acts of torture and humiliation 
that the former inmate suered. It makes for a deeply unsettling account, not 
least because Kumalo’s confessional performance, night aer night, threatens 
to reinscribe his own extant psychological trauma. And, as such, the play’s re-
iterative structure asks us to reect not just on the damage wrought by those 
melancholy survivals that Lloyd cites, but also their potential ethical charge. For 
Kumalo’s compulsive repetition of the past serves to incorporate, rather than 
overcome, I argue, these melancholy remains.
By comparison, Farber’s Molora (2003), a revision of the ancient Oresteia
and the subject of chapter two, reects in more gestural terms on the will to 
vengeance and the question of racial justice. And while the Truth Commission 
furnishes the play with its mise-en-scène, Molora is structured as a cycle of fa-
milial retribution, a meditation on the violence inherited by one generation from 
another. We are not made witness to Agamemnon’s tyranny, however. Instead, 
the drama begins with Klytemnestra’s confession to his murder. Remorseless in 
reciting her crime, she is rendered typical of apartheid’s white agents, many of 
whom refused to see their lethal actions as anything other than necessary and 
proportionate. Correspondingly, her black children, Elektra and Orestes, are 
made representational in their suering, citing as part of their subsequent plot to 
avenge their father’s murder something of the ‘terrible spectacle’, to borrow from 
Saidiya Hartman, that constituted life under apartheid for the black majority.93
is withdrawal from the historical into the terrain of the mythical enables a 
more generalised meditation on reconciliation’s ‘enabling condition’—which is 
to say, following Schaap, the state of tragic conict and insecurity that arguably 
also allows reconciliation to operate as something other than an exculpatory 
end.94 So while Molora refuses, like He Le Quietly, those deceptive notions of 
recovery that motivated the Truth Commission, it also remakes reconciliation 
in terms that appeal to the country’s ongoing racial divisions.
A similar separation between the abstract and the particular may be said to 
structure the contrast between the various documentary lms that I analyse and 
the narrative, so-called ‘TRC lms’ that make up my nal two chapters. Like 
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He Le Quietly, this documentary tradition traces the impact of the Commis-
sion on those individuals given opportunity to testify at its hearings over and 
above any of the more epochal concerns that pattern their ctional counterparts. 
Indeed, Ingrid Gavshon’s documentary Facing Death  . . . Facing Life (2001), pro-
duced even before the Truth Commission had completed its work, also situ-
ates Duma Kumalo and his traumatic experience on death row at its heart. For 
this reason, I include it alongside my analysis of He Le Quietly in the opening 
chapter. But Gavshon’s lm and Farber’s play are far from mere analogues. For 
Gavshon also grants important attention to the melancholy conditions of Kum-
alo’s life since his imprisonment, reecting on the material impoverishment that 
further inhibits his hope of healing. In this, Kumalo is not exactly unusual. As 
Gavshon makes clear as part of her lm, his subjective suering was exacerbated 
by South Africa’s ‘elite transition’, which le the majority of its black citizenry 
behind.95 Taken alongside Farber’s play, Kumalo’s performances centre the re-
sistant, rather than therapeutic, imagination that melancholy arguably enables, 
mobilising its disruptive outlook in the eld of racial justice and reconciliation.
Where my earliest two chapters are united by their relative fragility, chapter 
three is more resolute in challenging the claims made over the past by the Truth 
Commission. Extending the practice of community lmmaking initiated by 
Mark Kaplan and others under apartheid, his documentary Between Joyce and 
Remembrance (2003) begins as an investigative study into the torture and sub-
sequent disappearance of student activist Siphiwo Mtimkulu in the early 1980s. 
His body was never discovered. Siphiwo’s mother, Joyce, appeared before the 
HRVC in 1996 to lobby the state for information. Kaplan lmed the family 
in the months leading up to her appearance and aer. As part of his investiga-
tions, he also interviewed Gideon Nieuwoudt, a former lieutenant colonel in the 
South African Police Service, whom the Mtimkulu family suspected of killing 
Siphiwo. At this point, Nieuwoudt has already been convicted and sentenced 
to twenty years imprisonment for his part in the murder of three black police 
o	cers and one informer, known as the Motherwell Four. However, he was also 
engaged in an appeal to the Truth Commission for amnesty for this and a series 
of related crimes. And while he denied murdering Siphiwo, he did appeal to 
Kaplan to arrange a meeting with his family in order to ask for their forgiveness.
Far from absolving the former police o	cer, his encounter with the Mtim-
kulu family at their home in August 1997 stirred up many of the most incendiary 
feelings of injustice over which the Truth Commission presided, with Siphiwo’s 
teenage son, Sikhumbuzo, reacting violently to his appeal for clemency. Pick-
ing up a ceramic ornament, he smashes it over Nieuwoudt’s head, fracturing 
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his skull. It is a shocking scene, not least in terms of the depth of ongoing and 
intergenerational anguish that it surfaces. However, Kaplan’s treatment of this 
encounter also draws comparative attention to the melodramatic imagination 
that has motivated a set of more popular, narrative ‘TRC lms’, as they have 
since been dubbed. And by contrasting Kaplan’s documentary account with this 
popular tradition, my third chapter considers the emotional appeal that forgive-
ness has come to uphold over and above reconciliation.96
In reviewing this series of ‘TRC lms’, my aim is not to dismiss out of hand 
what are almost certainly the most widely reviewed renditions of the Truth 
Commission, internationally as well as nationally. Melodrama, like tragedy, up-
holds its own moral ambitions, especially in the legislation of a new democratic 
national order. But as part of their sentimental architecture, these ‘TRC lms’ 
also abet something of the Truth Commission’s own dematerialising tendency 
toward unity over and above agonism. Included improperly among this tradition, 
Ramadan Suleman’s Zulu Love Letter (2004) refuses these popular prescripts. 
But it also discards the Commission as a guiding moral framework, cultivating 
an entirely separate tradition of reconciliation that begins with the humanistic 
claims of Black Consciousness. Scripted in collaboration with the writer and 
critic Bhekizizwe Peterson, it is not quite the rst black feature-length lm of 
the democratic age—that particular accolade went to Fools, the pair’s 1997 ad-
aptation of Njabulo Ndebele’s short story. Nonetheless, it maintains a similarly 
denitional appeal, cultivating an experimental, vernacular style that merits 
sustained attention.
Accordingly, in my fourth and nal chapter, I trace Zulu Love Letter’s visual 
as well as ideological distinction, arguing on behalf of its ritualised way of think-
ing ‘this thing called reconciliation’. is closing sense of autonomy is signicant 
and not just for the arc of this study. For Suleman and Peterson’s credentials 
in the sphere of black lmmaking contrast with the oen contradictory, even 
complicitous status of those white theatre- and lmmakers examined elsewhere 
in this study, suggesting a vital future trajectory for the collective negotiation of 
reconciliation. Tethering their lm to the fundamental principles of Black Con-
sciousness, Suleman and Peterson are motivated by the comparatively liberating 
possibilities that might emerge from the sphere of black expression. is reects 
a potentially vital shi in the expressive economy, one otherwise dominated 
under apartheid and since by white artists and writers. In appraising Zulu Love 
Letter, then, my nal chapter necessarily favours those allied epistemological 
interventions made by the lm, which is to say, the privileged ways of thinking 
and doing reconciliation that its black, specically female characters enable.
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Nonetheless, if a tentative continuity is rst to be found across and between 
the repertoire included in this study, then it is in the way each challenge and 
even, on occasion, overwhelm their audience, both in the primary act of viewing 
and in the consequent process of reviewing. Indeed, in the scenes of individual 
suering they relay all issues from a history so intense as to appear even to ‘defeat 
the possibility of art’ itself.97 In this, they oblige an uncommon application of 
empathic engagement and, at the same time, critical deliberation that is di	-
cult to maintain when confronted by such extremities of experience. Much like 
the ‘intricate, oddly delicate’ confessions that were also heard before the Com-
mission, these public recitals of grief, anger, and guilt retain a complexity that, 
to follow Fiona Ross, arguably only ‘emerges slowly over time, the product of 
careful sustained mindfulness’.98 Perhaps this awkward admixture of emotional 
attentiveness and analytic dispassion is a large part of the reason why critics are 
yet to assume any serious responsibility for this adjacent sphere of confession.
In an eort to gure something of a formal passage through this demanding 
scene, therefore, I have been compelled to defer to the notion of genre as some-
thing of a rudimentary pilot. is may appear a somewhat unlikely proposal, 
especially accepting the attacks made upon the concept in decades past, with 
criticism regularly pressed to get ‘beyond genre’. Without pressing for a retreat 
into the orthodoxies of genre studies, there is, nonetheless, a certain clarity to 
be found in genre’s taxonomic system. As omas Beebee once put it, ‘generic 
classication’ is, in large part, what determines an object’s ‘meaning(s)’. Perhaps 
more signicantly, however, it also what ‘exposes its ideology’.99 And it is genre’s 
uncommon eorts to encode its ideological ambitions within its formal struc-
ture that ensure it provides this study with a potential illuminating framework 
through which to evaluate the various insurgencies and representational strate-
gies pursued by these works.
at said, this is not a study of genre, even if it makes strategic use of its lan-
guage and its ideas. Rather, I prefer to think more in terms of confession’s po-
tential modes—that is, partly generic, but also partly experimental and aesthet-
ically digressive. In short, beginning with the melancholic mode of Kumalo’s 
confession, I move from the tragic to the melodramatic, before concluding with 
the experiments with ritual that drive Zulu Love Letter. ere are immanent rea-
sons for this specic progression; for instance, I understand the melodramatic, 
following Peter Brooks, as motivated expressly by a failure of the tragic vision 
outlined in the preceding chapter. e melancholic, by contrast, is arguably la-
tent in everything that follows, performing a series of uncanny spectral returns, 
as I suggest in my nal chapter. But even while each of these four chapters nds 
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certain sustenance in generic laws, this is more oen in order to decide upon 
the departures from, and resistance to, established rubric that these respective 
examples pursue. Instead of being bounded by generic concerns, then, this con-
fessional repertoire experiments with the orthodoxies of genre, testing the for-
mal possibilities le in the wake of the Commission. As such, I oer up these 
examples as interventions, rather than answers, to the enduring problem of racial 
injustice, nding in their improvised practice a framework through which to 
challenge its worst excesses.
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Apartheid Acting Out
Duma Kumalo and Reconciliation’s Melancholy Scene
Reconciliation demands my annihilation.1
—Njabulo Ndebele
ere are no mirrors here—
but in the bathroom by the basin there is a frosted steel plate.
I can just see my outline—fading away.2
—Duma Kumalo
O fall the performative claims that the confessional act pre-sumes, rarely is it more assured than in its avowal of the confessing ‘I’. Whether of a broadly judicial or sacramental variety, the confession is 
nothing if not an embodied act of self-revelation and, as such, an actualisation 
of the subject’s sovereignty. Of course, this is by no means a uniformly positive 
act. Within the courtroom or the oratory, to confess is more o	en to expose the 
otherwise veiled, internal subject to the recriminatory eye of the jurist or the 
priest. It is to assert a shameful self to be acknowledged only so that it may be 
reprimanded. is is, nonetheless, as much a salving process as it is a reproachful 
one. To follow Freud in an early reection upon the logic of these rites, the con-
fessional compels the subject to articulate and, thereby, sluice the guilty secrets 
that otherwise threaten to disable them.3 In this way, confession is conceived 
as a powerfully enabling act of self-making. e ‘privileged communication’ of 
the confessant, as civil and common law generally names it, serves to verify as 
well as fortify the speaking subject. In religious custom too the potency of the 
act resides in its capacity to perform and, to follow the ritual orthodoxies of 
the confessional outlined by the literary critic Peter Brooks, ‘in a sense create’ 
the unied inwardness of the confessant. In short, ‘speaking guilt’ is precisely 
constitutive of the sovereign self.4
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But what claims to subjective sovereignty are available within a moral sphere 
from which religious instruction has begun its ineluctable retreat, or, more de-
cisively, in the a	ermath of the law’s catastrophic failure, something typied by 
South Africa’s capitulation to racial injustice under apartheid and, indeed, argu-
ably a	er? is is one among a small host of exigent questions implicit to the 
opening of Yaël Farber’s He Le Quietly (2002), an intense theatrical work rst 
staged just as the Truth Commission’s public hearings had come to a formal close. 
Entering onto a tenebrous performance space, Kumalo appears before the audi-
ence in starkly immaterial terms. Only the outline of his frame is visible against 
the so	, low backlighting that guides his languid progress to a chair at the centre 
of the stage. Sitting down, he then lights a cigarette and stares out meditatively 
towards the audience. Over the course of a noiseless but also perturbing minute 
or so, time appears to stall. e silence is only broken when he asks portentously:
When does the soul leave the body? . . . At which precise moment? Does it 
leave with our last breath? . . . Or the nal beat of our heart? Is it possible 
that I stayed here amongst you—the living—long a	er my soul quietly le	 
my body behind?5
It is a stoical deliberation upon the desolate ‘I’ that appears in body but deprived 
of spirit before the audience, one that precipitates yet further metaphysical 
insecurity:
In my life I have died many times. But here I am again and again—alive. I 
am Duma Joshua Kumalo. Prisoner Number V 34-58. In 1984, I was con-
demned to death for a crime I did not commit. I spent three years on Death 
Row, and [served] a further four years of a Life Sentence. I have been mea-
sured for the length of my con; the size of the rope for my neck; I took the 
last sacrament. . . . And with each of these moments, my soul le	 my body.6
Bearing public witness to his own su ering on death row, Kumalo is not en-
gaged in any confession to wrongdoing. Whatever we choose to understand of 
his culpability, this is no act of guilty self-articulation in either the legal or the 
spiritual sense. And yet, in line with all such acts of confessional disclosure, he 
appears desperate to avow before the audience the markers of his existence—his 
full name, his institutional alias, even the dimensions of his physical being—and 
with each such marker a plausible claim upon his own otherwise fragile sense 
of sel­ood. But rather than any individual actualisation, he manages only to 
contour the shape of a subject for whom, it seems, the ‘deep, recessed, secret self ’, 
to return to Brooks, has been hollowed out.7
32 chapter one
is scene of subjective insolvency is deeply unsettling, and not just for the 
audience made witness to his trauma. For Kumalo’s faltering claim here over his 
own internal sense of self also challenges the confessional technology made fun-
damental to the Truth Commission in its pursuit of reconciliation. Inaugurated 
as a quasi-judicial instrument to undo the schisms of apartheid, the Commission 
was deliberately organised into something of a ‘public confessional’, soliciting the 
Figure 1. Duma Kumalo delivers his confession in Yaël Farber’s 
He Le Quietly (2002). Photo courtesy of John Hogg.
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testimony of both victims and perpetrators of past abuse in an e ort to confront 
and, thereby, help repair the damage inicted by the apartheid regime.8 More 
than a mere place of seeing, then, to return us to the claims set out by Cather-
ine Cole, the Commission ‘embraced performance’ in an e ort, as she also puts 
it, to help society and subject alike ‘cope’ with the history of racial injustice.9
In this respect, Cole suggests that we read it as a prototypical ‘social drama’, a 
descriptor that, following cultural anthropologist Victor Turner, makes central 
the Commission’s investment in the cathartic but also collective reconciliatory 
ambitions of its confessional praxis.10 It was, she insists, an attempt at ‘redressive 
action’—the third in the four ritual phases that, for Turner, culminates in social 
reintegration.
While its hearings were indeed styled as spaces of healing, the actual stories 
that the Commission solicited also tested the remedial limits of such ritualised 
public action, o	en reaching deep into the intransigent terrain of the traumatic. 
For example, examining the eighteen hundred statements provided publicly by 
victims of human rights violations in his review of the Commission, Richard 
Wilson proles such a litany of individual and collective abuse, from systematic 
torture and murder to widespread disappearances (few of which have ever been 
resolved), as to challenge the very notion of redress.11 is, to say nothing of the 
deeply embedded structures of racial division around which the Commission 
was compelled to navigate, but with little authority to disrupt. Whatever Cole’s 
conviction, whether in the expressions of enduring anger and su ering that 
emerged at its hearings, or in the questionable e orts made nationally since at 
structural reform and economic redistribution, there is much evidence to suggest 
that the Commission was, in fact, ill-equipped to ‘cope’ with the injustice of the 
apartheid past, let alone repair it.
To say all this is not to deny the theatrical form structuring, for instance, 
the Commission’s Human Rights Violation Committee (HRVC) hearings, 
particularly what Cole identies as the layers of ‘restored behaviour’ underwrit-
ing its confessional procedures.12 Nor is it to disclaim in principle the remedial 
possibilities upheld by such a ritual performance. Rather, it is to challenge the 
reparative imperatives that so deeply, even violently determined the Commis-
sion’s confessional form. Indeed, in the years since it has proven untenable to 
uphold the conclusions made by its nal report. Here, the Commission claims 
to have given public exposure to ‘experiences that had been repressed or shut 
out for years’, to have ‘alleviated feelings of shame’ and ‘restor[ed] dignity and 
self-respect’.13 Even if the HRVC hearings were broadly armative for some, this 
is not also a defence for its prescriptive reconciliatory agenda, which depended, 
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as John Borneman is at pains to point out, ‘on the recuperation of losses that 
are almost impossible to recuperate, the reconciliation of an end to which there 
is no end’.14 As such, any of the inductive sovereignty prioritised by the Truth 
Commission as part of its confessional praxis only ever serviced the emergent 
democratic state, discounting, if not also further violating, the internal desola-
tion of apartheid’s many victims.15
Such misgivings are by no means exceptional. As I have suggested already, 
the Commission’s compromises, its unevenness and, ultimately, its failures as a 
space of healing and reconciliation have been detailed at such length elsewhere 
as to have become almost hackneyed.16 However, they bear some repetition here, 
not least for those le	 wrestling with the interminable feeling of injustice that 
the Commission helped to sustain. And it is in the context of this wider pattern 
of disconsolation that I centre Duma Kumalo’s experience. For not only do his 
confessional performances in both He Le Quietly and Ingrid Gavshon’s equally 
challenging documentary lm Facing Death  . . . Facing Life (2000) o er up an 
adjacent record of the Commission’s ritual impasse, but, more signicantly, they 
stage an account, I want to claim, of confession’s alternative, seemingly negative 
potential. Contingent upon a seeming inability to create for himself any prac-
ticable sense of self—at least, that is, the integrated, sovereign sense of self that 
institutions like the law presume—his recital of the irredeemable, rather than 
forgivable, su ering inicted under apartheid asks us to consider what reconcil-
iatory possibilities might otherwise ow from such a reiterative, even compulsive 
and, ultimately, melancholy negotiation with the apartheid past.
Duma Kumalo (1958–2006)
Before I return to elaborate upon the melancholy form that arguably structures 
both Farber’s He Le Quietly and Gavshon’s Facing Death alike, it is important 
to establish the biographical facts from which Kumalo’s compulsive confessional 
performances emerge. For his story is as remarkable as it is also altogether ordi-
nary, a spectacle of gross abuse that also shares in many of the everyday oppres-
sions inicted under apartheid and in some ways maintained under democracy. 
Indeed, his experiences are perhaps uncommon only in the sustained public 
attention they received, both at the time of his arrest for murder in 1984 and 
since. In addition to the two works under analysis here, Kumalo twice testied 
before the Truth Commission, once at an HRVC hearing when it convened in 
Sebokeng in August 1996 and again before a Special Prisons hearing held in Jo-
hannesburg in July 1997. He was also a performer in a theatre-for-development 
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piece e Story I Am About to Tell (1997–2001), before the writer Mtutuzeli Mat-
shoba published a detailed account of his experiences, entitled ‘Nothing But the 
Truth: e Ordeal of Duma Kumalo’, fashioned from an interview conducted in 
2001.17 From these sources, an unusually detailed account of his life has emerged. 
Rather than reciting in exhaustive terms the facts of his su ering, however, it 
is perhaps more valuable here to set out those pertinent details that shape my 
subsequent interpretation of his confessional acts on stage and screen. For this, 
I prefer Matshoba’s journalistic account as a broad frame, although I also draw 
from Kumalo’s testimony at the Truth Commission.
To begin, it is important to note—as Kumalo regularly insists—that he was 
no political activist, at least not before his arrest and subsequent conviction. As 
a resident of the Vaal Triangle, an industrial region south of Johannesburg and 
notorious under apartheid for its political volatility, Kumalo includes reections 
in almost every account of his life on the fatal protests that aicted the area, 
from the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 to the Boipatong Massacre in 1992. None-
theless, he also refuses the suggestion that he was involved with banned national 
political parties like the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC), or even the increasingly popular United Democratic Front 
(UDF). With ambitions to be a local educator, he was well into his second year 
of a teaching apprenticeship at the nearby Sebokeng Training College when he 
took part in a local march against proposed rent increases in September 1984. 
Residents of the district were already subject to the country’s highest average 
township rents and the proposed sixteen percent hike was to press this largely 
impoverished community beyond its limit point. Directed by members of the 
Vaal Civic Association, the boycotts mobilised the majority of local residents 
and Kumalo remained just one of a great number to converge on Sharpeville’s 
Zwane Street in protest.18
Kumalo recalled before the HRVC how the police were deployed to break up 
the march, launching tear gas and ring rubber bullets in an e ort to disperse 
the large group; a tactic increasingly widespread at protests during the turbulent 
emergency years of the 1980s. His neighbour, a man named Mango Mketsi, was 
shot in his lower leg and Kumalo reports how he helped bandage the wound 
before helping Mketsi back to his home. is, he assured the HRVC, was the 
sum of his involvement in this typically volatile encounter, even though many 
other local residents re-assembled outside the home of local town councillor and 
deputy-mayor of the Vaal Triangle, Jacob Kuzwayo Dlamini. As a non-elected 
representative of a newly established system of political representation, in which 
black councillors were used to implement and enforce state policy, Dlamini was 
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viewed by many of the residents as a complicit actor in the apartheid regime. At 
the sight of the impassioned crowd, Dlamini is reported to have emerged from 
his home shooting wildly and killing one of the protesters. e rest of those 
gathered at the scene responded by setting his house and car alight. Dlamini 
subsequently died from the burns su ered during the attack.
Kumalo was arrested at his home in Sebokeng’s Zone 7 some three months 
later under the notorious Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, widely used to 
restrict public protest. No explanation was given for his arrest and in accordance 
with the insidious terms legislated for in the Security Act he was held with-
out trial until April the following year in Diepkloof Prison, Soweto. Upon his 
eventual release, Kumalo was immediately re-arrested and charged with murder, 
subversion, and public violence. He recalls to Matshoba the unlikely optimism 
this initially encouraged. Along with his co-accused, Kumalo was nally per-
mitted legal counsel for the rst time. And in September 1985, along with a 
further eight other residents, he stood trial for Jacob Dlamini’s murder at Pre-
toria’s High Court. With the state prosecutors pressing for capital punishment, 
a number of witnesses were produced to testify against Kumalo. Two separate 
deponents placed him at the scene and accused him of blowing up Dlamini’s car 
using a petrol bomb and pouring petrol through a window into the councillor’s 
house before setting it alight. is Kumalo contested, providing an alibi for the 
time leading up to and including Dlamini’s death.
With little regard for this mitigating evidence, however, Acting Justice Wil-
helm Human found Kumalo and a further ve of his co-accused guilty of mur-
der by ‘common purpose’—a particularly draconian item of colonial British le-
galisation that had become a popular tool among apartheid prosecutors during 
the 1980s. Prior to this period, common purpose had only ever been cited infre-
quently in South African case law and even then only to indict co-perpetrators 
in acts of violent assault and murder when no individual participant could be 
found solely responsible. In its original form, the rule relied on a proven complic-
ity between all those indicted. However, with the rise of organised, siege revolts 
in South Africa’s townships during the 1980s, common purpose was increasingly 
repurposed, such that it relied only upon an individual’s ‘active association’ with 
a criminal act. As legal historians Peter Parker and Joyce Mokhesi-Parker de-
scribe, the accused could be found guilty if they were either ‘present when the 
crime occurred’, intentionally associated ‘with the commission of the crime’, 
or ‘gave overt expression to that association’.19 It was under these demonstrably 
exible terms that Kumalo and his co-accused were convicted.20 ey were all 
sentenced to death by hanging, with their right to appeal refused.
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Known by the press as the Sharpeville Six, their conviction inamed an un-
paralleled level of public censure, both nationally and internationally. Demands 
for a retrial were submitted by a number of leading, international legal counsels, 
while calls for state clemency were registered by the South African Council of 
Churches, the United Nations Security Council, Amnesty International, the 
Organisation of African Unity, the Commonwealth, the European Union, and 
numerous national governments. Ultimately, the case proved a signicant blow 
to the integrity of the South African judiciary who were forced therea	er to re-
consider wholesale the legitimacy of its common purpose legislation. For Kum-
alo and the ve others condemned to death, however, this lobbying did little to 
mitigate their plight.
A	er more than two years on death row, on 14 March 1988, Kumalo’s num-
ber, ‘V 34-58’, was called. Along with the rest of the Sharpeville Six, he was given 
ve rather than the requisite seven days’ notice to expedite proceedings. How-
ever, news of their imminent execution was leaked to the international media, 
mobilising a vociferous public outcry in South Africa and abroad. And a mere 
	een hours before they were due to be hanged, the state submitted to the 
mounting pressure by granting a four-week stay of execution. e group then 
remained on death row for a further six months until Justice Minister Kobie 
Coetsee, without permitting a retrial, had their sentences commuted to eighteen 
years imprisonment. His clemency was contingent on the group all signing an 
adavit in which they admitted liability for their part in Dlamini’s murder, to 
which they agreed. Some three years later, in July 1991, all six were eventually re-
leased from Pretoria Central Prison as part of the political negotiations ongoing 
at Kempton Park.
In the years following his imprisonment, Kumalo received counselling from 
the University of Witwatersrand’s Trauma Clinic. With no nancial compen-
sation and few long-term job prospects, however, his conviction cast myriad 
other material shadows that, along with the evident psychological trauma, he 
petitioned the Truth Commission to assist with. He began by asking them to 
arrange a formal meeting with Dlamini’s family in order that he might ‘clarify 
the record, clear . . . [his] name, so [he] could tell them who actually did those 
things and what were the reasons’.21 He also asked them to help him secure his 
future nancial security, whether in the form of a municipal job or a pension, so 
that he might be able to support his family. Finally, he requested a visit to death 
row in an e ort to bring about a clearer sense of closure. While the HRVC noted 
his appeals, it made no commitment to assist him. His only recourse was to the 
Khulumani Support Group, a non-governmental organisation established to 
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support victims of apartheid-era human rights abuse with whom he volunteered 
and who eventually launched a series of high-prole lawsuit against corpora-
tions in the United States that they accused of proteering under apartheid.22
However, Kumalo died before the suits were led, passing away in 2006 aged 
forty-eight and in relative poverty. His conviction for murder by common pur-
pose was never overturned.
Glass Confessionals
ere is much in this account that we might protably explore, not least the 
Truth Commission’s manifest failure as a space of individual restitution, let 
alone ritualised social reintegration and reconciliation. Given Kumalo’s endur-
ing sense of injustice, however, I am interested most particularly by the reitera-
tive qualities that also structure these painful confessions, especially since the 
Commission’s formal end. Without presuming to diagnose this repeated urge ‘to 
have his story told and heard’, as Farber puts it in her prefatory notes to He Le
Quietly, it is useful to reect more widely on the range of motivations that merge 
with Kumalo’s recurrent acts of public telling.23 To take up the specic requests 
he made of the Commission, this evidently includes a fundamental desire for 
redress, legal and otherwise. But, equally, such petitions appear to extend beyond 
the terrain of individual su ering, reaching out to claims that function in more 
social than solipsistic terms.
Kumalo puts this well at the outset of Facing Death. Illuminated by a single 
spotlight, his weary, pockmarked face is captured in suspension against the dark 
vacuity that otherwise dominates Gavshon’s opening shot. From the camera’s 
oblique perspective, this striking chiaroscuro depicts him not by what he is but 
rather, it seems, by what he is not. He appears on screen, much like he does on 
Farber’s stage, as little other than a spectre of himself. ‘My name is Duma Kum-
alo’, he reports, his voice languid but clear.24 ‘My dreams shatter and shatter a	er 
the long distance marching to my grave’, he continues:
Some say I do good for the people; I am there as a wounded healer. What I 
know is that I was born to witness evil being done by one human being to 
another human being.
With this stark, almost messianic disclosure—to pick up the shared etymolog-
ical root that pairs the martyr with the witness—the screen fades to black.25
I have cited already the demotic structure, the ‘absent polyphony of other 
voices’, to return to John Beverley, within which such public articulations of 
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the self are regularly implicated. As an act of seemingly collective as much as 
individual confession—bearing witness to a ‘story that extends far beyond him-
self ’, as Farber has it—Kumalo here gestures towards the allied political and 
ethical claims that attend his performances.26 As such, both He Le Quietly
and Facing Death are likely best understood as ‘glass confessionals’—that is, to 
follow Howard Barker, forms of self-narration committed to the ‘the clarica-
tion of social problems, the “raising of consciousness”, [and] the dissemination 
of the “truth”’.27 ere is much precedence for this type of intimate as well as 
insurgent act of self-exposure, not least in playwright Athol Fugard’s o	-cited 
desire to bear witness under apartheid to ‘the nameless and destitute (desperate) 
of this one little corner of the world’.28 I will return in subsequent chapters to 
some of the specics (and complexities) of this tradition as it was mobilised 
originally under apartheid. Here, it is enough to note the shared political ortho-
doxies that motivated groups like the Community Video Resource Association 
(CVRA) at the University of Cape Town and Afroscope, which produced short 
agitational lms in consort with the United Democratic Front during the tur-
bulent 1980s. Much like those famed protest plays like Woza Albert! (1981) and 
Born in the RSA (1985) that appeared at the Market eatre in Johannesburg 
Figure 2. Duma Kumalo, pictured in the opening shot of Facing Death . . . 
Facing Life (2001). Directed by Ingrid Gavshon and produced by Angel Films.
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around the same time, these works prioritised the experiences of the country’s 
oppressed black majority, while also citing the compromised, surveilled condi-
tions of their own production, o ering up a representational challenge to the 
segregated ways of seeing that apartheid produced.
As the clear moral imperatives of anti-apartheid resistance have given way 
to the contingencies of democracy, however, these glass confessionals have also 
receded from the critical horizon, their political function no longer immedi-
ately self-evident, it would seem. In part, this chapter attempts to challenge this 
retreat, especially once we understand the racial injustice of apartheid to be an 
ongoing condition rather than terminal event. When thought in these expanded 
terms, it is arguable that audiences in South Africa have been witness to a small 
host of similarly committed confessional works, especially in the years since the 
Truth Commission’s conclusion.29 Some are more critical of the Commission 
than others, but most refuse to make recourse to its salving ends. In their at-
tempts to incorporate the traumatic remains of apartheid, then, these latest ex-
amples of the confessional tradition have also found their shi	ing political am-
bitions freighted by equally pressing ethical and epistemic concerns. is is not 
to say merely that trauma ‘resists simple comprehension’, as Cathy Caruth puts 
it.30 More pertinent here is what Maggie Inchley frames, in strictly performative 
terms, as ‘the impossibility of feeling another’s pain’.31 For Inchley, the reitera-
tive performance of such acute su ering challenges the possibility for a ective 
reciprocity between traumatised subject and spectator. Even if audiences feel an 
urgent responsibility towards the pain on show, a sense even of being ‘begotten’ 
or ‘pursued’ by it, as Inchley also has it, we should be wary of presuming that 
its representation in performance also results in its a ective redistribution.32 In 
other words, while traumatic su ering may be in some, partial way communica-
ble, it is not entirely shareable.
is impasse is not one that either He Le Quietly or Facing Death necessarily 
overcome. Instead, in their marshalling of the traumatic, both works also enter 
into a decidedly ambivalent, even perilous negotiation with their confessional 
subject. At their most extreme, these works risk re-traumatizing as much as 
consoling their primary performer. Indeed, it is far from evident that Kumalo’s 
performances here enabled him to ‘reclaim’, as Farber would have us believe, 
the sense of sel­ood otherwise lost, as he puts it, to death row. Rather, each 
reiteration of his trauma upholds the potential to extend rather than end it.33
To recall again Kumalo’s claim at the opening to He Le Quietly: ‘I have died 
many times. But here I am again and again’. In this, it is clear that his repeated 
acts of self-revelation are underpinned not by a sense of shame that might be 
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sluiced—as the confessional orthodoxy set out by Brooks would have it—but 
by an internal devastation, by a disintegration, that is, of the speaking subject at 
the precise point of its own confessional avowal. To this extent, any fundamental 
desire to speak out and share his su ering also appears paradoxically self-defeat-
ing. For he also embarks in these works upon a performative exposure of the very 
traumas that rst triggered his thanatopsistic state—that is to say, his spiralling, 
traumatic xation upon his own death.
In attempting to work out the ethical as much as the political imperatives 
that frame He Le Quietly and Facing Death, then, notions like reclamation 
or remedy are also erroneous shorthands for the complex, even contradictory 
treaty that Kumalo’s performances broker with the past. is endless seeming 
reiteration of his su ering runs counter to the regime of repression—speaking 
guilt—that ordinarily underwrites confession’s self-producing end. But beyond 
this, there is also something disruptive at the root of his unremitting and irre-
deemable urgency to speak out, at least as far as the technology of confession is 
concerned. His insistent-seeming desire to confess even to his own internal dev-
astation, or, to follow Freud’s account of shame and self-expression in ‘Mourning 
and Melancholia’, his ‘insistent communicativeness’, exhibits, it seems, a para-
doxically insatiable ‘satisfaction in self-exposure’.34 Unable to articulate any de-
cisive claim upon the sovereign subject, the very facts of his repeated confession 
o er up a challenge to the self-actualizing imperative that we might otherwise
assume to motivate his performances. Repetition does not appear to yield any
relief, performative or otherwise; rather, it seems to spotlight more intensely the 
relative failure of his confessional claims upon the self.
Rather than nding ourselves undone by such failures, this insistence on 
speaking out again and again is vitally instructive, I would like to suggest, and 
not just because it sets Kumalo’s confession at direct odds with the redemptive 
logic upon which institutions like the law, the Church and, belatedly, the Truth 
Commission have thrived. Indeed, it is the irredeemable, repetitious structure 
underwriting his multiple acts of confession—rather than the more prosaic 
performative repeatability that, say, Cole gures in those submissions made 
before the Commission—that brings us to the precise challenges posed by He 
Le Quietly and Facing Death. For while Kumalo certainly displays as part of 
his performances a fragmented self in search of repair, the compulsion to com-
municate this su ering on stage and screen appears to do more than displace 
the self-actualizing logic of the confessional act. Returning to Freud, this con-
fessional displacement might most productively be understood as symptomatic 
of a specically melancholy confessional structure, one that appears to enable 
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something other than an abortive claim upon the sovereign self, something that 
approaches, instead, an intersubjective, even reconciliatory impulse that acts be-
yond the connes of the confessant.
Melancholy Repetition and Radical Unsettlement: He Le Quietly
Melancholy is already well established as a theoretical frame through which to 
approach trauma and its shattering, irredeemable e ects upon the individual, 
and not just in the elds of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. For instance, 
Dominick LaCapra, who regularly privileges the psychical symptoms of trau-
matic events like the Holocaust in an e ort to understand their historical im-
plications, describes how the melancholic survivor of an extreme experience like 
death row, ‘resist[s] working through [the past] because of what might almost 
be termed a delity to trauma, a feeling that one must somehow keep faith with 
it’.35 He reects too upon the melancholic’s symptomatic cycles of repetition and 
re-inscription whereby ‘tenses implode as if one were back there in the past re-
living the traumatic scene’.36 is type of analysis draws explicitly from Freud’s 
elementary distinction between the ‘normal’ process of mourning and the at-
tenuated experience of melancholy. e latter, Freud claims, is incapable of in-
tegrating and thereby relinquishing the lost object, whether directly or as ‘some 
abstraction which has taken the place of [it]’.37 Instead, the melancholic’s feeling 
of loss becomes pathological, turning grief ’s rupture inwards onto the fragile 
ego. e result, Freud maintains, is a ‘lowering of self-regarding feelings to a 
degree that nds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates 
in a delusional expectation of punishment’.38
In performative terms, Kumalo’s ‘powerful will’ to enact again and again the 
traumatising details of his su ering on death row appears to rehearse too the 
self-reproving symptoms that Freud attributes to the melancholy subject. In-
deed, the loss of personal liberty is, in Freud’s view, one of melancholy’s most 
prominent beginning points, even if he does not understand its articulation in 
overt, theatricalised terms. In accounting more fully for the melancholy that 
determines Kumalo’s reiterative acts of confession, however, the performative 
valence of LaCapra’s analysis proves more supple than Freud’s own. For instance, 
LaCapra outlines how the melancholic becomes caught in a cyclical ‘acting out’ 
of the past. Unable to mourn and thereby let go of their loss, victims o	en nd 
themselves destined to re-inscribe their own traumatic experience. Such is the 
intractability of their su ering, LaCapra concludes, that they remain ‘performa-
tively caught up in the compulsive repetition of traumatic scenes’.39 In this, his 
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analysis anticipates the thoroughgoing co-extension between the performative 
and the psychotherapeutic that has become a mainstay of both trauma theory 
and the type of performance analysis deployed by critics like Cole to appraise 
a social drama like the Truth Commission. Indeed, in a consummate account 
of the therapeutic impulses underpinning contemporary performance practice, 
Patrick Duggan and Mick Wallis cast trauma’s collective and individual cathar-
sis as ‘a key responsibility for theatre/performance practitioners’.40 For them, the 
theatre provides ‘a technical apparatus’ through which society might ‘aim to live 
beyond trauma’.41
What this type of analysis regularly omits, however, is the fact that this act-
ing out is not always also a working through, at least not in a psychotherapeu-
tic sense. And when extended to prop up the consoling—but also potentially 
coercive—ambitions of an event like the Truth Commission, this faith in the 
‘restorative ecacy’, as Duggan and Wallis put it, of trauma’s theatrical rehearsal 
proves particularly problematic.42 In moving, therefore, to look in closer detail in 
this section at the ways in which He Le Quietly might enable us to rethink such 
traumatic acting out, I choose to prioritise those moments in which Kumalo ap-
pears to refuse theatre’s redemptive, therapeutic end, those moments of repetition 
and reiteration that frame most clearly his melancholy urge to confess. In this, I 
also depart from LaCapra’s later conclusions, where he argues that to ‘believe in 
anything like a viable democratic politics’ is to believe in the ‘ethical solutions’ 
that emerge from a performative working through of trauma and injustice. By 
contrast, I want to explore how Kumalo’s confession alerts us to the democratic 
solutions that might also begin with a melancholy refusal—that is, with theatre’s 
failure as a site of recovery.43 is is not to embark upon an anti-theatrical inter-
pretation. Rather, it is to expand upon the possible reconciliatory charge under-
writing Kumalo’s performative inability to work through su ering and lay claim 
to some integrated sovereign self, as the confessional act otherwise presumes.
To appreciate theatre’s particular primacy within this confessional schema, it 
is important to recognise that Farber’s stage is as much a precipitant or cue as it is 
some substitutive theatrical site for Kumalo’s melancholy acting out. Indeed, Far-
ber frames his confession in such a way as to gure, but also beget, a melancholy -
delity with the performer’s own traumatic past. is begins most obviously when 
Farber moves to provide a reexive account of her own mediating presence in 
the production. For while Kumalo’s confession begins as a solo performance, the 
details of his su ering only emerge in dialogue with a white female interlocutor, 
played originally by the production’s assistant director, Yana Sakelaris. Named 
simply ‘Woman’ and described as ‘non-descript’, she appears at rst as an empathic 
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interlocutor, mirroring something of Farber’s professed function in the develop-
ment of the dramatic script. Crucially, however, Farber also describes the role as 
‘necessary in order to reach out to portray the white community’s relationship to 
injustice, indi erence and accountability’, signalling something of the collective 
responsibility, that she, like much of her theatre-going audience, retains towards 
both Kumalo’s original su ering and, now, as he attempts to recite it publicly. As 
a signal of this shared responsibility, the woman begins the production seated 
among the audience, only moving onto the stage a	er Kumalo challenges her to 
‘help [him] speak for the dead’. You are ‘in or you are out’, he proclaims, disrupt-
ing the possibility for impassive observation.44 e woman responds therea	er by 
asking critical questions and lling factual gaps in his story, in an e ort to share 
in, and perhaps also share out, the burden of his confession. However, this is not 
an act of exculpation. For the woman is also charged with performing the role 
of his apartheid interrogators: demanding identity documents, tormenting him 
with racial slurs, and callously passing sentence over him. In this, then, she makes 
explicit not just the consultative but also the interrogative and even potentially 
exploitative structure from which Kumalo’s confessional performance arguably 
emerges. She is, in short, an ethical pilot for the audience, unsettling the bound-
aries that might otherwise distinguish the apartheid past from the democratic 
present and thereby distract from the complicitous, ongoing structure of racial 
inequality in which they are broadly implicated.
At risk of repeating, rather than merely representing the violence inicted in 
the past, however, Farber also attempts to separate out Kumalo’s confessional 
self from the historical, traumatised self that his performance produces. And 
following the play’s stoical and sedentary opening scenes, He Le Quietly pro-
ceeds in more dynamic terms by setting the confessant apart from and against 
an image of the self as other. Neither imagined, nor altogether real, this sec-
ondary, surrogate self, named Young Duma and played by the production’s only 
professional performer, Lebohang Elephant, materializes on stage by way of an 
incantatory ritual. Kumalo, still seated on his chair before the audience but par-
tially veiled by a cloud of cigarette smoke, begins to chant in isiZulu an item of 
Christian liturgy (Jonah 2: 6–7):
e waters closed in over me.
e deep engulfed me.
Reeds were wrapped around my head.
I sank to the base of the mountain.
I went down to the land whose bars closed over me forever.45
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From amid a heap of old green prison uniforms and shoes piled in a dark corner 
of the stage, Young Duma rises up, stumbling across the otherwise bare stage 
like the biblical Jonah—himself dragged down towards the realm of the dead 
before being unceremoniously regurgitated back into the land of the living. is 
seeming avatar of death row, dressed in prison garb but not yet encumbered by 
any traumatized torpor, then lights a cigarette in a gesture designed as much to 
assert his material presence upon the stage as to make clear his ontological link 
to Kumalo.46 Any of the nominal truth-claims that might be thought to sustain 
Kumalo’s confessional act are here overtaken by a ritualism that inaugurates and 
then hardens into a surrogate form of the confessant’s remembered self, a self 
that is also made other.
e simultaneity on stage of the present and the past, of the confessional self 
and its embodied other, provides the audience with an externalised expression of 
the internalised melancholy collapse around which Kumalo’s performance more 
generally turns. It articulates the traumatised ‘duality (or double inscription)’ 
of time and subjectivity that, to follow LaCapra’s logic, so insistently disrupts 
Kumalo’s confessional claim upon the self.47 More than just a performative expo-
sition of a psychical division, however, Young Duma also helps to give phenome-
nological form to the otherwise inexpressible su ering that Kumalo reportedly 
Figure 3. Duma Kumalo and Young Duma, alongside each other in 
Yaël Farber’s He Le Quietly (2002). Photo courtesy of John Hogg.
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experienced on death row. For in fashioning this self as other, Farber deploys 
Young Duma to make legible, if not absolutely knowable, Kumalo’s treatment 
at the hands of the apartheid penal system in a way that the confessant himself, 
languid and largely immobile for much of the production, cannot. is is, in 
part, a pragmatic choice on Farber’s part. For despite being aged only forty-ve 
at the time of his performance in He Le Quietly, Kumalo’s experience on death 
row had le	 him chronically fatigued. But equally, in spotlighting Kumalo’s 
physical incapacity within the work, Farber also draws the audience’s eye to the 
confessional failure of his body. In this way, Kumalo’s inability to give theatrical 
presence to his experience bears its own witness to the irredeemable loss exacted 
by death row. His embodied inability is only made starker by Young Duma’s 
comparatively busy presence upon the stage, regularly pacing behind his author-
ing, older self—imprisoned by the spatial and temporal boundaries of the stage 
but not yet burdened by the trauma of death row that Kumalo moves presently 
to describe.
As Kumalo proceeds to relay the facts of his detention and his subsequent 
conviction for murder, Young Duma is the one charged with acting out, in a the-
atrical and traumatic sense, Kumalo’s experiences in all their disquieting detail. 
From his arrival at Pretoria C-Max Prison, where he was stripped naked and inva-
sively searched, to his rst night in the cell, which contained nothing more than a 
wooden bench and several soiled blankets le	 by previous inmates, Young Duma 
ensures that the audience are made witness to the everyday humiliations of Kum-
alo’s incarceration. Standing within a makeshi	 metal cage that has been erected 
on the stage, the performer oscillates, almost manically, from states of depressed 
quietude, reading passages from his prison-issue Bible, to unbridled hysteria, 
shouting frantically at imagined prison guards. e restored behaviour that Cole 
ascribes generally to the traumatised confessions heard at the Truth Commis-
sion is here made separate to, and at an embodied distance from, the confessant 
himself. While Kumalo remains seated throughout, giving stoical voice to the 
daily abjection that accompanied his time on death row, it is Young Duma who, 
as his apartheid other, is charged with giving form to its distressing e ects. Of 
course, to recall Richard Schechner’s precise description, such restored behaviour 
is always ‘separate from those who are behaving’.48 is confessional separation or 
‘secondness’, as Schechner terms it, is merely made extreme upon Farber’s stage in 
an e ort to give shape to Kumalo’s own peculiarly melancholy sense of his self as 
‘someone else’, as a self traumatically ‘beside himself ’ upon the stage.49
As far as the fundamental ethics of this dramaturgy extend, Young Duma 
a ords Farber opportunity to give a theatrical account of Kumalo’s extreme 
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su ering on death row without ever making it absolutely concrete. A ritual-
ized gure always in the process of becoming, Young Duma’s restored distress 
remains, in this way, at a distance from the performer’s own bodily presence 
upon the stage. Like Kumalo, he too is consistently lit obliquely from below 
and behind, helping to trouble any seeming claim to materiality. Indeed, Young 
Duma fades with regularity into nothing more than a dark silhouette. As such, 
the gure retains his reconstituted, surrogate status, maintaining too a vital gap 
between the visceral action that proceeds on stage and its potential to disable in 
traumatic terms performer and spectator alike. And it is this critical distance, 
this defamiliarizing breach, I want to suggest, that helps enable the play to work 
not just as an acting out of injustice but also as an exploration of the ethical, 
intersubjective possibilities that inhere within trauma’s melancholy repetition.
Where Young Duma’s ritual form helps maintain a general ‘secondness’ to the 
su ering performed on stage, in key moments He Le Quietly also makes the 
divide between theatrical action and its potentially traumatising e ect especially 
acute. For instance, when the woman recounts how Kumalo attempted suicide 
during his rst few days in prison by eating ‘[broken] glass from a window pane’, 
Young Duma proceeds at this point to smash a glass on the oor, appearing to 
ingest its small shards. Writhing in pain next to Kumalo, this surrogate self as 
other then squats on the stage. ‘You shit blood in the toilet’, reports the woman 
as a dark pool seeps onto the stage beneath Young Duma: ‘ey take you to a 
doctor. But within hours you are back in your cell’.50 Despite its disturbing, at 
times even horrifying verisimilitude, such scenes also manage to retain a relative 
indi erence before their own violent action. At least, there seems to be a sense in 
which this action is designed not necessary to overwhelm the spectator but rather, 
following Helena Grehan’s account of the ethics of traumatic spectatorship, to 
help precipitate a form of ‘radical unsettlement’—that is, ‘engaged with the other, 
with the work and with responsibility’.51 For in giving embodied but dislocated 
form to Kumalo’s self-excoriating su ering, He Le Quietly also helps ‘liberate’ 
the type of complex, even competing mix of emotional, visceral and intellectual 
responses crucial, according Grehan, to a spectator’s continued and engagement 
with a work ‘long a	er they have le	 the performance space’.52 is is by no means 
a secure or even a uniformly understood outcome, but, as one reviewer of the 
original production corroborates, Farber’s play at least upholds the seemingly 
contradictory potential to deliver a ‘lingering a	er-shock’ to its audience.53 In 
this way, He Le Quietly’s unsettling action is vital if the audience is to serve as 
a possible ‘listening community’ for an experience that, in the received terms of 
trauma theory, appears otherwise to have ‘annihilated any possibility of address’.54
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Even while Farber’s dramaturgy may be defended along these relational or 
intersubjective lines, it is vital to add that the play’s reiterative pattern of restored 
violence threatens to unsettle more than just its audience. For these scenes also 
appear to condition a traumatic dislocation between Kumalo and his own con-
fessional claims upon the self. In subjecting himself to the drama’s successive and 
at times even relentless display of violence, Kumalo is obliged to bear witness to a 
type of performative attack upon the integrity of the self, albeit one made other. 
Traumatically as well as theatrically estranged from his own su ering, Kumalo is 
in this way made to understand the self through the othering vision of apartheid, 
nding his personhood reduced to an object of the regime’s violent disciplinary 
procedures, even still.
is loss is by no means conned to Kumalo’s embodied claims upon the self, 
for He Le Quietly gures too a punitive errancy at the heart of the perform-
er’s confessional voice. For instance, when asked by the young woman, ‘Who is 
Duma?’, Kumalo’s reply is shared by Young Duma in a synchronous avowal: ‘I 
am’.55 is verbal co-extension between the confessant and his surrogate self as 
other only precedes a more profound rupture. As the woman moves to interro-
gate Kumalo, cross-examining him about the protests that led to his arrest in 
1984, it is Young Duma who moves to reply and assert authority over the confes-
sional arena: ‘A	er the police opened re—I le	 the scene. I went home’.56 No 
longer assured in its distinction between the confessional self and its traumatic 
other, the drama proceeds by way of a gurative struggle between the two. And 
with each of Kumalo’s attempts to articulate his experience, Young Duma moves 
to expropriate the verbal as well as somatic claims made by the confessant over 
his own su ering.
No longer merely ‘unsettling’ or ‘restored’, this repossessive behaviour appears 
to undo absolutely the confessant’s claims to sovereignty. e confessional self 
is made impossibly contingent, only ever armed against the intractable, oth-
ering remains of death row. Estranged from his own experience, even Kumalo’s 
seemingly deant assertion that ‘inside death row—you nd your own voice’ 
begins to collapse before Young Duma’s appropriative acting out.57 In this way, 
Young Duma’s ‘secondness’ is gured as much more than a melancholy reiter-
ation; rather, the traumatic other acquires its own violent authority over the 
confessant, reiterating and re-inscribing apartheid’s disarticulating ends. Indeed, 
such is the vicarious but powerful hold maintained by death row, that despite 
the twenty-odd years separating his arrest and his performance in He Le Qui-
etly, Kumalo is forced to acknowledge to the audience that ‘I have never really 
come home’:
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Every night, I am back there.
Every night—I go home to Death Row.58
is is a metatheatrical revelation as much as it is a melancholy one. While his 
nightly confession prompts a theatrical return to the time and space of the orig-
inal trauma-event, a melancholy delity to the self-same trauma is also what 
partly compels his nightly return to Farber’s stage. It is not just that the two 
spaces have become indistinguishable or substitutable, but that each precedes 
the other in a pattern of interminable re-inscription.
Perhaps more signicantly, under this analysis, it is also important to rec-
ognise the way in which the audience appears fashioned not just as witnesses 
to, but as carceral wardens for, Kumalo’s nightly return to death row. For far 
from sustaining his claim to sovereignty, the presence of the audience necessarily 
solicits his confessional avowal of the self, at the very same instant as his own 
melancholy performance threatens to dissolve it. While obviously problematic, 
this complicity with the play’s seeming pattern of disarticulation is by no means 
uniformly deleterious. To follow literary critic Mark Sanders, apartheid gener-
ated ‘throughout its life span’, including its a	erlife, I would add, ‘a common 
ensemble of complicities’, deforming and forming as part of this history what 
he calls a ‘responsibility-in-complicity’.59 By this, Sanders means to reclaim from 
apartheid a critical response that does not presume to resist its own collusions. 
As such, the witness to the past is forced to inhabit a compromised, interstitial 
position, one that in professing ‘responsibility—be it in the name of justice, resis-
tance to injustice, or merely in the cause of solidarity—entertains the possibility 
of doing injustice’.60 For Sanders, however, this complicity is critical to ‘the basic 
folded-together-ness of being, of human being, of self and other’ in South Africa, 
as it refuses the ‘apartness’ upon which the trauma of apartheid injustice thrived, 
even as it also marks it out.61
In working out this reading in anticipation of my turn to Gavshon’s Fac-
ing Death, I want to propose that rather than merely unsettling the audience, 
Kumalo’s performance in He Le Quietly might also be thought to stress the 
‘foldedness’ of self and other in such a way as to potentially ‘undo’ the spectator. 
‘[I]mplicated in, dependent upon, entangled with and enthralled by’ Kumalo’s 
melancholy confession—to follow Donna McCormack’s model of traumatic 
witnessing—the audience are invited to consider their own self-estrangement as 
key to the reconciliatory ambitions of the play.62 In other word, by recognising 
their own ‘responsibility-in-complicity’, their own potential to perform injustice 
in the pursuit of justice, Farber’s audience are pressed, it seems, to feel beside 
50 chapter one
themselves, to feel similarly undone by the melancholy structure of Kumalo’s 
confession. It is only in this space of shared undoing, it seems, that reconciliation 
might equitably proceed. Of course, this estrangement is never guaranteed, but 
it accounts, in part, for the play’s capacity to be, as one reviewer put it, at once 
both ‘overwhelming’ and ‘potent’, both ‘harrowing’ and ‘penetrating’.63 It is the 
spectator’s reciprocal self-estrangement that, ultimately, performs the ethical la-
bour of a play like He Le Quietly. For in ‘laying [one’s] self open to the other’, 
to return to Sanders, the audience not only enables a process of ‘continuous 
self-examination’ but also begins to incorporate, if not altogether comprehend, 
the discontinuity between self and other that is otherwise central to apartheid’s 
violent and enduring authority.64
Of course, in realizing any such ethical and, potentially, reconciliatory end, 
the audience must be led by the performer’s own exemplary, self-sacricing ac-
count. In He Le Quietly Kumalo’s self-annihilation echoes throughout his 
confession, the performer repeatedly declaring, ‘If not me . . . who?’65 Even as he 
exposes publicly the depths of his peculiar trauma, he actively refuses to demark 
the borders of the sovereign self. ‘I speak for the dead’, he declares in the play’s 
epilogue, ‘[f]or we who survived must tell the world’.66 Kumalo’s performance 
certainly arms something of the melancholy delity that LaCapra nds at 
stake in a former prisoner’s bonds with dead inmates, which o	en invests shared 
‘trauma with value’, making ‘its reliving a painful but necessary commemora-
tion’.67 But his confessional insistence also extends far beyond such monumen-
talizing ends. Kumalo moves at the play’s conclusion, as he did at its beginning, 
to reduce the confessional ‘I’ to that same arbitrary conguration of letters and 
integers—’Prisoner V 34-58’—imposed upon him by the administrators of death 
row. In reclaiming this cipher of the self made other, Kumalo’s confession closes 
as it begins with the confessant seated before the audience, a cigarette smoul-
dering in one hand. e light then fades before Kumalo departs from the stage, 
leaving the audience to contemplate what it has witnessed.
In making a return to its own opening tableau, He Le Quietly evidently 
strives, on the one hand, to stage for the audience the circular, endlessly reiterat-
ing quality of Kumalo’s confession. On the other hand, it moves to make the au-
dience central to its reconciliatory praxis. In this respect, what the play sustains 
is not some expedient therapeusis—individual or collective—to be abstracted in 
order to corroborate a larger national narrative of healing and collective unity. 
Rather, as part of its melancholy compulsion, Kumalo’s confession makes to 
undo this redemptive, self-actualising structure for performer and spectator 
alike. Striving endlessly to incorporate the injustice of apartheid without ever 
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presuming to overcome it, He Le Quietly remains potentially constitutive not 
of some reconciled sovereign self but a community of witnesses, a space of recon-
ciliation built from a folded sense of self and other, responsibility and complicity, 
justice and injustice.
Melancholy’s Critical Agency: Facing Death . . . Facing Life
In developing this reading of He Le Quietly, I have taken reconciliation to be 
an object of broadly ethical negotiation, a process of recursive, if also speculative, 
intersubjective engagement across the traumatic divide that otherwise separates 
self and other. In moving here to compare Kumalo’s theatrical performance 
with his confession in Gavshon’s documentary lm Facing Death, my aim is to 
develop a secondary analysis of the material constraints and political demands 
that similarly condition this process. As such, I want to frame the emergent rec-
onciliatory praxis cited above as also dependent upon an allied unsettlement 
of the stubborn, regressive political structures that otherwise delimit its col-
lective appeal—something arguably absent in Farber’s theatrical account. In 
this, it is melancholy’s potentially insurgent attachment to injustice of the past 
that counts, over and above its individualised account of traumatic repetition. 
While critics like LaCapra are instructive in elaborating, a	er Freud, upon its 
psychical symptoms and performative pathologies, melancholy also retains an 
alternative, specically political valence that psychoanalysis, in its slide into an 
‘ante-historical and post-historical’ semantics, broadly fails to countenance.68
Max Pensky summarises neatly this broader outlook when he claims melancholy 
as a ‘fundamentally dialectical’ way of seeing the world and its su ering.69 Under 
melancholy eyes, private pain must be understood in ‘dialectical relationship 
with cognition of the “objective” world’, he insists. It is, in other words, a mode 
of political critique, a way of diagnosing the shared conditions of injustice that 
otherwise disrupt trauma’s narrative of subjective recovery. Or, as Pensky also has 
it, melancholy ‘empowers the subject with a mode of insight into the structure 
of the real’, even as it ‘consigns the subject to mournfulness, misery, despair’.70
Like the psychoanalytic account o ered above, there is an equally long tra-
dition to this ‘disruptive’ melancholy imagination, to borrow from Jonathan 
Flatley.71 Beginning most obviously with a theorist like Walter Benjamin—who 
epitomises, for many, melancholy’s tortured political acuity—but extending 
equally into the type of pessimistic thought that motivates contemporary critics 
like Anne Anlin Cheng and Ranjana Khanna, melancholy serves here as a type 
of ‘low theory’—that is, what Jack Halberstam describes as, ‘a way out of the 
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usual traps and impasses of binary formulations’. It is, Halberstam continues, a 
strategy of the ‘in-between’, a refusal of the utopian and the optimistic in favour 
of those alternatives that ‘dwell in the murky waters of counterintuitive, o	en 
impossibly dark and negative realm of critique’.72 Under these terms, melancholy 
o ers up a less-than-hopeful framework through which to consider precisely the 
type of anti-institutional, improvised ways of thinking and doing reconciliation 
advocated by this study at large.
More than mere pessimism, however, this tradition also attempts to uphold 
the lessons passed on by Freud and others, transforming their psychogenic les-
sons into demotic ones. Under these terms, this melancholy imagination o ers 
up a collective unconscious of sorts, a ‘repository of [the] energies suppressed’, as 
Khanna puts it, by the racial violence of the past. It o ers up a symptomatic ac-
count of the historical, material and socio-political damage of apartheid. But it 
is also more than merely descriptive; this shared melancholy proceeds as a form 
of ‘critical agency’, Khanna insists, an immanent ‘revolutionary politics’ aimed 
at ‘the unworking of conformity’.73 In prioritising this insurgent potential over 
and above melancholy’s potentially pathological ends, this critical agency is vi-
tally instructive in thinking through apartheid’s manifold ‘melancholy surviv-
als’, to return to Sean Field. Under these terms, melancholy works to transform 
the ‘inassimilable and interruptive’ remains of apartheid abuse into a ‘call for 
justice’.74
To petition for melancholy’s ‘unworking’ of the apartheid past is not to escape 
the general compromises upheld by reconciliation. Quite the opposite. In citing 
its critical agency, it is also important to admit to the decidedly ambivalent possi-
bility that any such a melancholy way of looking also delivers. Always structured 
as a ‘half-willing collaboration with the forces it seeks to oppose’, any political 
mobilisation of melancholy must also grapple with the corresponding, even com-
pulsive tendency to immobility that it likely delivers.75 is ambivalence is in 
partial evidence in He Le Quietly, most particularly in Kumalo’s compromised 
e orts to think outside his own thanatopsis—that is, the intractable sense of in-
ternal devastation delivered by death row. And in returning Kumalo to the very 
scene of this traumatic attachment—his original cell in Pretoria’s C-Max Pris-
on—Facing Death does little to break this seemingly downward spiral. Much 
like Farber’s theatrical practice, Gavshon’s documentary risks aggravating the 
traumatic repetition that animates Kumalo’s confessional performances at large.
is risk notwithstanding, Facing Death also di ers from He Le Quietly in 
a number of other important ways. For one thing, rather than prioritising the 
performative separation of self from its traumatised other, as Farber attempts, 
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Gavshon’s lm proceeds by making an insurgent appeal to the political soli-
darities enabled by Kumalo’s melancholy attachment to the shared, enduring 
injustice of the past. is insurgency is as much aesthetic as it is ideological. At 
least, the latter depends heavily upon the former. Shot over the course of a few 
months, Facing Death was screened originally in 2000 at the International Doc-
umentary Film Festival Amsterdam (IDFFA).76 It has since toured a number 
of international festivals, winning the 2002 Best Film Award at South Africa’s 
Tri-Continental Film Festival and the Frank Capra Award at the Washington, 
DC Independent Film Festival. As its striking, almost painterly prologue sug-
gests, Facing Death is reliant upon its highly evocative cinematography, its polit-
ical critique bound up with its visual form. In this, Gavshon partnered with Gi-
ulio Biccari, a prominent gure in South Africa’s budding lm industry, whose 
subsequent work with Ian Gabriel on Forgiveness (2004) serves as a subject in 
my third chapter.
Tethered narratively to certain conventions of documentary practice, de-
ploying talking heads along with found archival footage, Facing Death also 
makes a number of formal, more impressionistic departures that help to frame 
its melancholy method of critique. For instance, following Kumalo’s opening 
lament from his cell on death row, the lm cuts to a series of grainy images of 
Sharpeville, the township in which he originally gathered to protest against the 
rent hikes in 1984. Shot in a naïve style that draws immediate parallels with the 
type of rudimentary, expedient documentaries produced on Super 8mm lm by 
lmmakers during the 1980s, these images purposefully confuse and collapse—
not unlike Farber’s play, in this instance—the temporality of these scenes. O  
screen, Kumalo simultaneously explains the political structure imposed upon 
the township during the 1980s, which saw complicitous ‘black councillors used 
by the apartheid government’ to maintain local order. However, it is altogether 
uncertain whether the images on screen depict Sharpeville under apartheid 
or, alternately, in the present day. e scenes are also visually heavy, scans of a 
place in more than mere temporal stagnancy. A thick smog, for one thing, hangs 
across the skyline in these scenes as workers return at the end of their day’s la-
bour from the district’s many industrial plants. Children play amid the rubbish 
that lls the streets, signal, it seems, of a more general trashing of Sharpeville’s 
future possibility. Gavshon subsequently cross-fades from one scene of relative 
impoverishment to another as a picture of an elderly man pushing an empty 
shopping trolley across the dirt road cuts to a group huddled in attempt to keep 
warm around a small barrel re on the roadside. It is a landscape of uniform 
deprivation rather than promise, a place seemingly ossied by its relative lack.
54 chapter one
e temporal indeterminacy here is entirely purposeful. For where He Le 
Quietly performs the ‘a	erwardsness’ of apartheid in strictly traumatic terms, 
Facing Death cites it in more broadly everyday ones. In the seeming simultaneity 
of the apartheid past and the democratic present in these opening shots, the one 
inextricable from the other, Gavshon asks us not to distinguish between the two 
but to reect upon their many continuities. In other words, the ‘foldedness’ of 
self and other that Farber stages manifests here less in subjective terms and more 
as a collapse of apartheid’s ordinary violence into the landscape of the present. 
Under melancholy eyes, Sharpeville gives spatial form to a grammar of injustice. 
As such, apartheid emerges as much more than the series of singular, if also wide-
spread, human rights violations that the Truth Commission elaborated upon. 
Rather, it is understood as a highly systematised structure of ongoing oppression 
and everyday subjugation, something that the Commission was ill-equipped to 
address. Indeed, even its recommendations for reparations were framed in indi-
vidual, rather than social and redistributive terms.77
is is not to deny the traumatic remains inscribed in Kumalo’s confession 
as it emerges in Facing Death. As elsewhere, traces of his wounded self are in ob-
vious evidence. Merely, that his own su ering entails a story, as he puts it, ‘that 
extends far beyond [himself]’. So where Farber sees this story, at its most expan-
sive, as one of white complicity, Gavshon presses us to consider too its deeper, on-
going socio-political resonances. In this, she defers to Kumalo’s shared, socially 
integrated sense of his su ering. For instance, his testimony begins in earnest 
by recalling how ‘on the 3 September 1984, the lives of ve people were forced 
along the same path as mine’. is imbrication of the remaining members of 
the Sharpeville Six, also imprisoned on death row, into this narrative concep-
tion of his own su ering is in obvious contrast to the internalised structure that 
dominates He Le Quietly. Gavshon echoes this relational interpretation by 
interweaving, in seemingly elegiac terms, black and white photographs of the 
four men and one woman that made up the Six, each pictured in comparatively 
happier times before their arrest. She interlaces these headshots between images 
of Sharpeville, as Kumalo describes the basic biographical details of each of his 
fellow victims. As an act of self-description on Kumalo’s part, this performance 
of his own su ering by way of the lives of those who endured the self-same legal 
injustice inicted upon him here displaces any of the solipsism that might oth-
erwise attend such a confessional act. His story emerges as exemplary and indic-
ative rather than exceptional or singular. In other words, the ‘absent polyphony 
of other voices’ that John Beverley nds implicated in the act of confession are 
invited into his self-narrative and given material presence on screen.
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e documentary progresses herea	er as a more conventional act of historical 
inquiry, its status as an account of the past as told from the present less pur-
posefully ambiguous. is temporal clarity does not necessarily undermine the 
folded sense of su ering on show. Switching between interviews with members 
of the Sharpeville Six, the group attempt to account for the local conditions 
that led to the fateful protest in September 1984. Aerial shots of a Casspir (large, 
heavy-duty, military defence vehicles deployed by the apartheid state to suppress 
opposition) as it rolls into the township are clearly from original footage, as are 
the subsequent sequences of violent clashes between black protestors and police, 
of large crowds surging through the streets, and of a car set alight as protestors 
toyi-toyi around it. e Six then recount their subsequent arrest and torture at 
the hands of security police. Uniquely, however, it is only Kumalo who is pic-
tured inside his prison cell as he describes his interrogation. e heavy cell doors 
remain open behind him. He recalls how:
Without touching me, [the security police ocer] just said to me, ‘Tell me 
what do you know about the 3 September’. But in his face you could see 
cruelty, that he could do anything that he wanted to do. I told him, ‘I don’t 
know anything’. And I told him that I was just part of the crowd. And he 
told me, ‘You will never see your parents. We are going to lock you up for 
six months or twelve months in solitary connement, you will never see 
even your lawyer’.
e moral impunity of the apartheid state is nothing new, but here Kumalo re-
veals the racialised malice through which it also proceeded, a legacy that, it seems, 
cannot be undone by freedom alone. Indeed, as if to underscore its stubborn ma-
lignancy, the picture cuts back to the heavy prison door, which slams shut with 
an evocative, reverberating thud. It provides the sound for a whole history of state 
abuse, a blunt but expressive sonic metonym for the material as well as emotional 
resonances of racial injustice as they reverberate in the democratic present. As 
such, Gavshon has it repeat at key moments throughout her documentary.
In working out the signicance of this memory work, it perhaps goes without 
saying that ‘psychical experience is not separate from the realms of society or law’ 
but, to follow Anne Anlin Cheng, ‘the very place where the law and society are 
processed’.78 Under these terms, it is possible to see how the specic violence of 
apartheid might be processed in melancholic terms, how its manifold injustices 
may also be framed as a pathology of grief and loss. But as the double temporality 
of its early scenes imply, Facing Death is not simply an account of abuses past, psy-
chical or otherwise. It is also about the betrayal of the contemporary democratic 
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ideal—that is, the failure of truth and reconciliation to undo the racial injustice 
of the past. And it is in precisely this historical, rather strictly traumatic, capit-
ulation that melancholy o ers up itself up as a particular valuable explanatory 
a ect. Without drawing explicit comparisons with the history of American ra-
cial melancholy that Cheng analyses, it is enough to cite the national denialism 
at similar seeming work here, something that the Truth Commission arguably 
institutionalised. For like the myth of progress and American exceptionalism 
under which racial ‘denigration and disgust’ were allowed to prosper, the Truth 
Commission’s celebrated reconciliatory agenda has done much to extend the 
racial domination of the past into the present, rather than end it.79
In diagnosing this general impasse, Andrew van der Vlies suggests that we 
gure it as a temporal disjunction, a grammar of the ‘present imperfect’ in which 
the rising disappointments of the democratic age also depress the future horizon, 
‘beyond which it [is] a struggle to see’.80 is is also the tendency to torpor and 
inertia that melancholy risks, its paralysing as much as insurgent attachment to 
loss.81 Indeed, such descriptions arguably capture something of Kumalo’s sec-
ondary punishment, the life sentence, as it were, cited by Gavshon’s conjunctive 
title. As he puts it from his cell, ‘facing death was painful, but facing life a	er 
facing death, it is more painful’. is is, in part, the immobilising incongruity 
that Kumalo’s melancholy way of seeing the present—that is, as a capitulation 
to the injustice of the past—threatens to deliver.
To recognise this as a paradox of the melancholy imagination is not to undo 
its critical potential. As He Le Quietly infers, the stings of liberty are by no 
means illogical, especially in the context of trauma and its melancholy delity 
to the site of its own su ering. In Facing Death, Gavshon returns Kumalo to the 
specic gloom of death row in an e ort to provide a less than gural account of 
this delity. Under these terms, ‘darkness is’, as Daphne Brooks elsewhere has 
it, ‘an interpretive strategy’.82 At least, in composing his confession, Gavshon 
relies upon the darkness of his cell to give visual form to its many inexpressible 
oppressions. Breached by a single sha	 of bright sunlight that cuts across Kum-
alo’s face as he speaks to the camera, this seeming allusion to the relief found 
beyond death row is not, however, a corrective to the general sense of defeat 
that pervades the scene. Instead, this seam of light competes with the heavy, 
grievous responsibility that death row continues to impose from the inside out. 
As Kumalo elaborates:
For those who have died, there is no more pain. e pain always remains 
with the living. ey leave us with a burden because their faces are with us.
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As elsewhere, he refuses the type of individuated interpretation of abuse and re-
covery that the Commission attempted to institute, insisting upon its relational, 
shared and, above all, enduring structure. So even as Gavshon cuts to original 
news footage of the Sharpeville Six’s defence lawyer, Prakash Diar, emerging to 
a jubilant crowd outside Pretoria’s High Court following his successful appeal 
against their execution in 1988, she also switches back almost immediately to 
Kumalo in his cell, pacing from side to side. His survival is not equal to justice, 
at least not the expanded version of justice around which his confession here 
turns. Rather, it confers upon him an interminable, inconsolable responsibility 
before, and solidarity with, those who are no longer alive to confess to their own 
su ering.
As an example of melancholy’s critical agency, most particularly its ‘call for 
justice’, to return to Khanna, this delity is also symptomatic of the dialectical 
and above all relational way of understanding trauma that Kumalo’s confession 
delivers. As he puts it towards the close of the lm:
Being traumatized is a big book, bigger than the Bible itself. And to deal 
with it we need to turn pages. . . . I keep on turning pages, which is when 
I become aware that it is not the only issue of mine. ere is another part 
also, which needs to be helped.
In this, Facing Death brings us to an account not just of apartheid’s melancholy 
acting out but, more importantly, to the political failures that sustain this reiter-
ative pattern within the present. For instance, cutting from this intimate scene 
on death row, Gavshon provides a long shot of Kumalo’s township home. e 
door to this small brick dwelling is slightly ajar and, through a lattice of rusted 
barbed wire that circles the house, Gavshon captures an image of Kumalo and 
his wife sitting at the kitchen table. Despite the warm glow given o  by the 
internal house lights, the scene replicates the same sense of connement and 
repression that also patterns the preceding image of Kumalo in his prison cell. 
‘My life was going down every minute, every second, my life was going down’, 
Kumalo confesses, recalling the years immediately a	er his release, during which 
time he was earning less than R700 (c. US$70) a month and, unable to support 
his family, was forced to sell many of their meagre possessions.
As Gavshon’s documentary attests, the only measurable relief to this material 
privation came when Kumalo eventually joined the Khulumani Support Group, 
rst as an ordinary member and subsequently as a full-time counsellor. His 
membership did not equate to any necessary personal psychical relief. Rather, it 
became a seeming source for the sublimation of his trauma into collective action. 
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Like the Truth Commission, Khulumani encouraged victims to testify to their 
su ering under apartheid. Divided into small, local branches, Khulumani went 
further than the Commission, however, by cultivating a much wider, permanent 
network of support for its members. With guidance from professional services, 
like the Trauma Centre at the University of Witwatersrand, members were in-
vited to attend weekly meetings in which one or two individuals would speak 
publicly about their experiences. eir accounts were not limited—as they were 
at the Commission—to examples of gross human rights violation, but actively 
engaged apartheid’s wider structural and symbolic abuses, including, for in-
stance, forced removals, poor education and health services, as well as the general 
poverty endured by the majority of South Africa’s black population both under 
apartheid and since. In other words, their traumatic storytelling returned to the 
everyday environment of oppression from which it rst emerged. As such, Khu-
lumani has sought to frame its psychotherapy as distinct to and separate from 
the narrative of recovery that Euro-American ‘confessional culture’ prioritises, 
searching out ways, as Christopher Colvin elaborates, to encode ‘new social cat-
egories and moral orders’ as a local response to the violence of the past.83
It is only very recently that the secondary work of the Khulumani Support 
Group, and, indeed, similar advocacy groups, has been recognised in scholarly 
accounts of the democratic transition in South Africa. Colvin’s ethnographic 
account of its development during the late 1990s sets the group at an important 
conceptual and methodological distance from the ‘standardized victim testi-
mony’, as he puts it, that otherwise delimited the Truth Commission. Where 
the Commission celebrated the working through of trauma and its pathological 
e ects, the Khulumani Support Group was both ‘shaped by but also exceeded 
the terms of this discourse’, Colvin claims. By this, he means to establish the 
shi	 that Khulumani encouraged ‘from the clinic to . . . advocacy’.84 is is not 
to liberate its model of storytelling from the claims made by ‘the global political 
economy of traumatic narrative’. Rather, it is to centre this model as a poten-
tially resistive, perhaps even adversarial revision of the glass confessional for the 
democratic age. Colvin’s analysis arguably holds too for Gavshon’s documen-
tary, which, in prioritising Kumalo’s formal engagement with the group, aims 
similarly at fostering the ‘political powers of traumatic storytelling’.85 Depicting 
Kumalo in group sessions, the lm o ers up an account of the solidarities that 
apartheid trauma has promoted as a condition of its contemporary ‘a	erwards-
ness’. Leading group sessions of his own, Kumalo is seen helping to support oth-
ers from his local Sharpeville branch to testify to their shared, rather than merely 
individualised, su ering.86
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As the insurgent tradition of melancholy established above insists, to recog-
nise the shared, relational status of su ering is not merely to diagnose it. It is 
also to transform this pain into a call for justice. And in speaking out alongside 
his fellow victims, listening to their stories of su ering and sharing in their own 
struggles to work through their trauma, Kumalo became animated in a new 
chapter of struggle. Together with Khulumani, he became involved in a series of 
local and national protests that aimed to secure for its members the type of sub-
stantial nancial reparation promised but never delivered by the Commission. 
At the time of Kumalo’s sudden death in 2006, for instance, the Khulumani 
Support Group were involved in a landmark case against a number of interna-
tional corporations. e group alleged that multinational corporations such as 
Barclays, Daimler, Ford, General Motors, and IBM, many of whom had been 
previously indicted by the Truth Commission’s Special Hearing on the Role of 
the Business Community, both proted from and propagated the oppressive 
legislation adopted by the apartheid government. Only recently dismissed by 
the US Court of Appeal, the lawsuit resulted in an undisclosed settlement with 
General Motors in 2012. To date, however, no other companies have made an 
o er of reparation.
With ‘the rope still around his neck’, as his wife puts it towards the end of
Facing Death, Kumalo’s commitment to this legal challenge, as well as Khuluma-
ni’s many more local lobbying activities, gestures towards the radically redressive 
impulses born by this melancholy inability to overcome the apartheid past. As 
Jill Eagle, psychotherapist at the University of Witwatersrand’s Trauma Clinic, 
puts it in an on-camera evaluation of Kumalo:
While he hasn’t been able to get the kind of justice around his court case 
and the legal conviction, some of the sense of calling public attention to 
people who don’t have a voice, that’s also been important to him. So at the 
level of being a kind of wounded healer, it’s been both about understanding 
people and facilitating other people being able to talk about things.
It is in the context of his wounded confessional that I would frame the claims 
made by Facing Death on behalf of reconciliation, specically its attempts to 
establish this national end as an object of material as well as moral restitution, 
rather than simply one of subjective or even intersubjective reform.
is is not, however, to give up on reconciliation’s potential psychical benets. 
Indeed, when brought together with the remaining members of the Sharpeville 
Six at the conclusion to Gavshon’s documentary in an old prison yard, their rst 
meeting since their release, Kumalo recalls in his narrative voice over how he 
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wanted to talk seriously and frankly with his fellow survivors about everything 
that had happened to them all. e Six begin by reecting upon their shared 
experiences on death row, upon the su ering of a life spent facing death and the 
rituals adopted to help relieve the psychological burdens in their daily lives since. 
Interrupting the rest of the group’s testimony, however, eresa Ramashamole, 
the only female member of the Six, questions the motivation of their meeting:
Why should we talk about our experiences in jail, we should rather talk 
about our future. We are now free. . . . It doesn’t make sense. We should 
rather help each other make a living and make sure there is food on 
the table.
Facing Death does not attempt to resolve such seemingly discontinuous atti-
tudes. Rather, Kumalo’s account o ers up a way of thinking the past alongside 
the future, of understanding the injustice of apartheid as a motive force in resist-
ing the everyday material inequality of the present. ‘I cannot keep quiet about 
what happened’, states Kumalo deantly as Gavshon’s lm concludes with one 
nal, evocative shot of his cell door on death row. Less a capitulation to the 
reiterative, inconsolable compulsions that pattern his traumatic acting out, it is 
more a melancholy form of speaking truth to power, a necessary refusal of apart-
heid’s ‘therapeutic end point’, as Colvin has it.87 Indeed, to borrow from Colvin’s 
more general description of the political advocacy performed by the Khulumani 
Support Group, Kumalo does not ‘deny the emotional su ering that their expe-
riences had produced, or the power of therapy to help individuals relieve some 
of that su ering’. Rather, in their melancholy form, his performances lobby for 
‘a more comprehensive and meaningful form of redress—reparations and lasting 
changes in the social, political and economic conditions’ under which he and his 
fellow victims now survive.88 For, ultimately, it is only with the achievement of 
this wide-ranging, structural transformation that anything like a resolution to 
the psychological su ering of apartheid may ever begin to emerge.
Conclusion
is chapter began by resisting the sovereign claims that confessional act is o	en 
thought to arm. is was not an arbitrary beginning. For under the traumatic 
diagnostics preferred by the Truth Commission, the indivisible experiences of 
those victims of gross abuse have too o	en be seen to rival the collective, speci-
cally relational history of racial injustice that precedes and contains their su er-
ing. I have not sought here to undo this central dilemma, at least not denitively. 
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Rather, in my analysis of He Le Quietly and Facing Death, I source a model of 
individual confession that might, at least, suspend this rivalry, nding in Duma 
Kumalo’s melancholy acting out a socially and structurally embedded sense of 
his traumatised self. His su ering is rendered indicative rather than exceptional. 
In many ways, it is the aggregate sum of his performances, across media and 
through time, that enables this associative, compound sense of sel­ood to con-
solidate itself. For while his confessional acts provide a unique record of his psy-
chological turmoil, this desire to tell his story depends above all on a distributed 
sense of apartheid injustice. He speaks for those rendered silent by the past, his 
compulsive performances conditioned by the irreparable su ering of those who 
can no longer be heard.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, this is not the last word on Kumalo. In fact, his 
voice echoes across this study, both abstractly and actually. To this extent, there 
is also an important conceptual ‘a	erwardsness’ contained by his melancholy 
acting out. And in closing, it is perhaps instructive to return to his self-appointed 
function as a ‘wounded healer’, a categorisation that condenses the more general 
will to renewal, on the one hand, and its implausibility, on the other. Balancing 
insuciency with necessity, Kumalo’s restrained, stilled sense of what recon-
ciliation makes possible resounds across the chapters that follow, guiding the 
hesitation that must also condition a more hopeful appeal for racial justice. Put 
di erently, reconciliation emerges here as a problem-space, expressing at once 
the ‘paralysis of will’ and the ‘horizons of transformative possibility’ that have 
come to dene the country’s ‘idiom of future futures’, to borrow from anthro-
pologist David Scott. And while Kumalo cannot resolve this conict, his melan-
choly performances succeed, nonetheless, in staging the ‘series of paradoxes and 
reversals’ through which reconciliation might yet proceed. 89
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Ch a pter T wo
Risking Reconciliation
On Tragedy, Failure, and Transgression
It seems that we have jumped from one blindness to another, and 
with the same visionary condence.1
—Raymond Williams
A s a genre, tragedy is always perilous in its progress, always court-ing disaster. Conventionally, however, this ‘attunement to . . . contin-gency, chance, peripeteia’ is also its primary asset.2 Its vulnerability to 
catastrophe is precisely what accounts for the close proximity between its own 
tragic development and its less than tragic otherwise. Encoded within tragedy 
is a rival view of what might have been, a contiguous if also intensely fragile 
alternative that, in fact, makes its tragedy all the more tragic. 
is is not quite a 
theory of improvisation. But it does draw us closer to the potentially tragic con-
straints upon which improvisation depends, and in this chapter, I am motivated 
by the lessons that the genre’s risky action arguably supplies. More specically, 
in the context of South Africa’s pursuit of reconciliation, I want to consider the 
ways in which tragedy o	ers up a form not only to contain the country’s contem-
porary disappointments but also to venture forth, however hazardously, a sense 
of hope for the future. Put di	erently, this chapter is premised on the notion 
that tragedy risks reconciliation—which is to say, it both jeopardises and makes 
plausible reconciliation’s fragile realisation. For all its discouraging attachment 
to disaster, tragedy is an essential actor, I want to suggest, in the necessary con-
templation of the country’s just, reconciled future.
In arguing for this perilous interdependence, I look to stabilise my claims 
by drawing example not only from the country’s contemporary repertoire but 
also its prodigious anti-apartheid tragic archive. Most obviously, devised works 
like Athol Fugard’s Orestes (1971), as well as his workshop drama e Island, a 
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revision of Antigone co-produced with John Kani and Winston Ntshona in 1976, 
point towards the ethical and political ends pursued by tragedy under apartheid. 
When read comparatively, they also provide a vital scene, I argue, to evaluate 
the fragile reconciliatory possibilities risked by more recent experiments with 
the genre, most expressly Yaël Farber’s Molora (2003). However, in elaborating 
upon the general accord between tragedy’s anti-apartheid tradition and this, its 
‘post-anti-apartheid’ equivalent, to borrow from Loren Kruger, I am not pro-
posing a straightforwardly derivative relationship. Indeed, the ‘post’ in Kruger’s 
descriptor is designed explicitly to trouble the ‘promise of modernity, emanci-
pation, agency and global citizenship’ upon which this anti-apartheid tradition 
rst depended.3 So while a contemporary revision of the Oresteia like Faber’s 
Molora draws important comparative precedence from those antique adapta-
tions devised under apartheid, it also appears to confound vital aspects of this 
tradition.
Most obviously, whatever we might make of its tragic billing, Molora is not 
really a tragedy. At least, if we defer to Hegel’s evaluative criteria, Farber’s drama 
is no masterpiece.4 At times, it is an immoderate spectacle, regularly more con-
fusing than obviously edifying. Even trading this shallow estimation of its tragic 
qualities for more a descriptive mode does little to help to redeem its tragic cre-
dentials. For in suspending the cycle of revenge that drives the Oresteia towards 
its catastrophic conclusion, Molora arguably fails as a tragedy. Orestes and Elek-
tra do not kill their mother, Klytemnestra, but neither do they end unequivo-
cally her tyrannical rule over them.5 For George Steiner, ‘tragedy is immune to 
hope’.6 And yet, as I describe below, Farber’s play concludes neither hopelessly, 
nor exactly hopefully, descending, instead, into ambivalence—what Walter Ben-
jamin names caustically in the Trauerspiel as a ‘stigma of the demonic’ rather 
than a signal of the tragic.7
Nonetheless, in this chapter I want to examine what might yet emerge if we 
take seriously the sense of failure that Molora risks. By this, I mean to explore 
the ways in which this adaptation of ancient tradition need not maintain the 
strict laws of tragedy handed down by European aesthetic philosophy in order to 
o	er up its own tragic lesson. To this extent, the longstanding inclination among 
critics to measure and describe degrees of orthodoxy is certainly useful, but only 
in so far as it allows us to reect on why—rather than how—a particular exam-
ple potentially errs.8 To discover, as is certainly permissible in Molora, a form of
tragedy that disrupts its own tragic progress is likely as great a source of critical
value as any obedient translation of classical tradition. For tragedy, as Raymond 
Williams insists, is just as much ‘a response to a culture in conscious change and 
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movement’ as it is ‘about something else’, something ‘deeper and closer’, more 
evanescent.9 In other words, as a genre, tragedy is not precisely equivalent to the 
tragic as an interpretive concept. And by jeopardising its formal achievements, 
Molora conceivably asks us to consider those other, more abstract tragic reasons 
that motivate its action, especially in the eld of reconciliation.

e Tragedy of the Truth Commission
As elsewhere in this study, it is the Truth Commission that provides the funda-
mental scene for and against which tragedy’s lessons in the contemporary sphere 
emerge. While its avowed shortcomings might well be styled as tragic, in its 
everyday action the Commission was also rarely far from the type of risks that 
condition tragedy in the stricter, more generic sense of the term. For instance, its 
rst-ever public hearing, held at East London’s City Hall on 15 April 1996, is re-
membered by most for the solemn but hopeful address o	ered by its chairperson, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Lighting a candle of remembrance for apartheid’s 
victims, he proceeded to relate the Commission’s solemn objectives: ‘To unearth 
the truth about our dark past, to lay the ghosts of that past [to rest] so that they 
will not return to haunt us and . . . thereby contribute to the healing of the trau-
matised and wounded people’.10 Few recall that less than thirty minutes later, 
Tutu was obliged to interrupt the Commission’s rst witness, Nohle Mohapi, to 
request an immediate evacuation of the building. ‘
ere is a bomb threat’, he ad-
vised. 
e many hundreds of spectators, national and international journalists, 
television and radio crews, not to mention the deponents and their interpreters, 
all of whom had gathered to witness this remarkable juncture in the nation’s 
history, were forced to le out onto the street. Bomb disposal personnel were 
called, and a full sweep of the building was carried out. No device was discovered 
and, aer more than an hour’s delay, Mohapi was able to resume her evidence. 
Nonetheless, the threat set into sobering relief for all those present the vengeful 
impulses that, despite apartheid’s end, threatened at any moment to derail the 
fragile drama of reconciliation in rehearsal at the Commission’s hearings.
By no means as crudely elicited or perhaps even as starkly felt, Farber’s Molora
arguably depends upon a similar sense of vulnerability in order to progress its 
own tragic claims. Conceived in the immediate wake of the Commission’s pub-
lic hearings, the play openly structures itself as a dramatic analogue, an adjacent 
sphere of public and performative negotiation. In this, it also retrieves from the 
Oresteia—more particularly, e Eumenides—a claim over the essential drama 
of the public trial, arming those accounts of the Commission o	ered up by 
Risking Reconciliation 65 
critics like Catherine Cole who compare it with tragedy’s own beginnings as a 
theatron—a ‘place of seeing’.11 And like its ancient source, Molora commences 
from a point of fundamental enmity. Its opening scene is titled simply ‘testi-
mony’ and in its mise-en-scène it replicates something of the formal arrangement 
of the Truth Commission’s public hearings with two tables set at either extreme 
of the stage. A microphone of the same variety used by the Commission to record 
deponents is also set on each of the tables. 
e rest of the performance space is 
comparatively bare, emulating, as Farber puts it in her stage directions, ‘the drab 
and simple venues in which most of the testimonies [at the Commission] were 
heard’.12 As the main lights go up, a white, middle-aged woman, Klytemnestra, 
leaves her place among the audience to take a seat behind the table positioned 
stage right. Her black daughter, Elektra, follows soon aer, seating herself stage 
le, before they are both joined by an exclusively black, largely female Chorus 
who take up their seats in a line facing the audience at the rear of the stage.
In the context of apartheid’s bitter division of white from black, the racial 
dynamics here are correspondingly stark. It is self-evident who is to play perpe-
trator and victim. With white mother and black daughter sat on opposing sides 
of the stage, a familiar red neon recording light at the base of Klytemnestra’s 
microphone then ickers on and she proceeds to launch into a shameless con-
fession of her wrongdoing. ‘A great Ox—As they say—Stands on my tongue’, 
she begins with what appears to be sardonic fervour, pausing only to allow a 
member of the Chorus to translate her testimony into isiXhosa, a vernacular 
local to audiences at South Africa’s National Arts Festival where Molora was 
initially staged.13 ‘Here I stand and here I struck and here my work is done. I did 
it all. I don’t deny it’, she continues, before proceeding to describe to the gathered 
audience her slaying of her husband, Agamemnon:
I strike him once, twice, and at each stroke he cries in agony. He buckles 
at the knee and crashes here! And when he’s down I add the third—the 
nal blow, to the god who saves the dead beneath the ground. I send that 
blow home . . . in homage . . . ike a prayer. So he goes down, and the life is 
bursting out of him—great sprays of blood. And the murderous shower 
wounds me, dyes me black. And I . . . I revel like the Earth when the spring 
rains come down.14
Without even a hint of remorse, she concludes by defending Agamemnon’s mur-
der as a ‘Masterpiece of Justice’.15
Electra stares Klytemnestra down throughout this uncompromising confes-
sion, only to respond with contempt of her own:
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You were my ruin.  .  .  . You poisoned me with your deeds. You are the 
shadow that fell on my life and made a child of me through fear. I have 
hated you for so long.16
Her testimony here serves as her weaponry, attacking and assailing Klytem-
nestra in a way that she has otherwise been unable. Further aggravated than 
consoled by this confrontational confessional arena, Elektra vows to avenge her 
father’s murder:
For if the dead lie in dust and nothingness, while the guilty pay not with 
blood for blood—
en we are nothing but history without a future.17
Adapted by Farber from a nineteenth-century English translation of Sophocles’s 
Electra, this vengeful pledge is also an antagonistic echo to the adage—‘no future 
without forgiveness’—that according to Archbishop Desmond Tutu dened the 
Commission’s ethical outlook. For Tutu, this maxim was as vital to the national 
recovery as it was to victims’ personal healing:
To forgive is not just to be altruistic. It is the best form of self-interest. 
What dehumanises you, inexorably dehumanises me. Forgiveness gives 
people resilience, enabling them to survive and emerge still human despite 
all e	orts to dehumanise them.18
For Elektra, however, this sense of integrity is contingent not on forgiveness but 
justice, and more particularly the retributive model that customarily drives her 
tragic forebear, rather than the restorative form defended by the Commission. 
As a condition of her hostile confession, she shatters the grounds for any such 
a forgiving future; Klytemnestra’s callous actions must be met with an equally 
unforgiving deed, Elektra arms.

is makes for a highly discordant beginning. But it is not an entirely in-
congruous one, certainly not in tragic terms, nor historically. Undoubtedly, the 
Truth Commission only occasionally permitted the type of incendiary public 
confrontation that Molora enables, preferring a victim-led approach to its hear-
ings—with one notable exception, to which I will return. Even so, any sense of 
reconciliation was far from forthcoming. Despite being evoked at every turn 
by gures like Tutu, seldom was the concept straightforwardly understood or 
uniformly adopted by those testifying at the Commission, as outlined in Paul 
van Zyl’s earlier description. But these specic confusion also conrm what 
many theorists of transitional justice have long considered to be reconciliation’s 
Janus-face.19 For while the concept aims to deliver, what John Borneman calls, 
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a ‘departure from violence’, such concision belies the potentially coercive and 
immobilizing contradictions looming at its root.20 
is inconsistency is by no 
means lost on Borneman. To reprise those claims outlined elsewhere in this 
study, reconciliation rests, as he puts it, ‘on the recuperation of losses that are 
impossible to recuperate’.21 Under these terms, to make it conditional on the 
realisation of, say, remorse is also to mistake it for a singularly moral directive, 
one that risks its own parallel form of social domination. Put positively, recon-
ciliation is likely only ever practicable when taken to guide the pursuit of an 
equitable future, rather than a decisive end to be administered institutionally.
In the vengeful, destructive turns of fate that traditionally drive Aeschylus’s 
tragic cycle forward, then, reconciliation provides neither the language, nor a 
moral framework for its action. In his review of Molora, Glenn Odom makes 
schematic this incongruity, drawing out the fundamental incompatibility be-
tween tragedy and reconciliation:
Tragedy requires a universal space, whereas reconciliation tends to empha-
size a specic, monumentalized space; tragedy removes individuals from 
community, whereas reconciliation subsumes the individual story within 
the communal.22
Not only are they organised around such incongruous principles, he continues, 
but they are also at temporal odds with each other. For while tragedy’s fatalistic 
schema relies upon the repetition, or at least the a	ective reverberation, of the 
past in the present, reconciliation depends, according to Odom, on their discon-
tinuity. In broad terms, it is an instructive evaluation, one that also points out 
how the ethical ends of reconciliation appear to proceed by divesting tragedy of 
its political aims, how the essential agonism of the latter is undone by the moral 
exigency of the former. Of course, tragedy is by no means invested exclusively in 
the political; it maintains its own vital moral principles. But reconciliation, at 
least as far as Odom has it, is only ever an ethics, even when it is politically led. 
To this extent, it makes scant space for the deliberative agenda regularly pursued 
by tragedy—that is, the ‘dissensus’ arguably also central to any transformation 
of South Africa’s inequitable progress.23
Whatever else may be understood of this divide, for Odom Molora’s ‘mix of 
Greek tragic form and reconciliation aesthetics prevents either of these forms 
from reaching closure’.24 Ultimately, the play is, he claims, ‘beyond reconcili-
ation, beyond tragedy’, a miscarriage of both in equal measure.25 But even as I 
would attest to something of their basic incongruity, there is also opportunity to 
consider the separate, if less certain interpretation of reconciliation that Molora
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risks as a condition of this miscarriage. To make this claim is to reect on the 
ways in which reconciliation might nd itself protably revised by tragic inter-
pretation, how it might be better understood when thought to align more closely 
with the fragile, risky progress of tragedy, at least conceptually. 
is is not to 
overlook Molora’s generic misres. Rather, in contrast to Odom, it is to priori-
tise the vital lesson in reconciliation that the tragic also arguably risks—which 
is to say, the fragile and uncertain, rather than calculable, form through which 
reconciliation might otherwise be thought to prosper.
Tragedy’s Conicts
A view of reconciliation dened by its tragic dimensions must nd a way, in the 
rst instance, to accommodate itself to the ethical potential of conict as much 
as conciliation. In the eld of tragic justice, it is the genre’s essential agonism—
its agon—over and above its capacity to pacify that more oen conditions its 
progress. But these fateful contests are also what dene its fragility, what ensure 
that ancient tragedy provides a scene of moral dubiety rather than authority. In 
tragedy, the notion of guilt, like responsibility, is widely distributed rather than 
concentrated in a single character. So too is the urge to vengeance. To this extent, 
then, it is arguably protable to proceed by thinking of tragedy’s conicted-ness
as more a supple guide for its moral order than mere conict alone. Taking us 
beyond the conventionally descriptive or evaluative modes of analysis that critics 
like Hegel and even Benjamin advocate, this less decided framework accounts 
for the intense, volatile conditions under which the genre, perhaps paradoxi-
cally, thrives. ‘Tragic ambiguity’, according to Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet, ‘is to be found in the very language of tragedy’. 
ere is, they 
insist, ‘ambiguity between the human way of proceeding in the drama and the 
plan decided by the gods, between what the tragic characters say and what the 
spectators understand’. 26 Its uncertainty is, in other words, precisely what con-
stitutes its glory as much as its fragility.
But this view of tragedy also risks equivocation, with the genre’s fundamen-
tal ambiguity liable to be mistaken by some for quietism in the sphere of moral 
judgment. Take by way of troubling example those popular revivals performed 
by the Afrikaner establishment under apartheid, for whom the classical sphere 
served to reinforce their high European cultural claims. By 1974, there had been 
at least three prominent Afrikaans translations of Sophocles’s Antigone and a 
number of notable performances, including a national radio broadcast in 1946 
and a production at the Stellenbosch Arts Festival in 1961. According to Betine 
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van Zyl Smit, there was much reward to be found in translating ‘great Classics 
into the youngest language in the world’ and in circulating among the Afri-
kaner establishment the ‘treasures of world literature’.27 Most obviously, they 
served to bolster the cultural authority of Afrikaner nationalism, enriching and 
ennobling, it seems, its dramatic heritage. Motivated by dramatic verisimilitude 
rather than moral deliberation, these productions were designed to proceed 
outside of history. Any of their fragile interpretive progress was secured by the 
integrity of their antique costuming or their duteous translation of ancient dia-
logue. In short, these works were spaces for tragic veneration rather than critical 
judgment or ethical arbitration.
Where these examples suggest something of ancient tragedy’s vulnerabil-
ity before the imperatives of the ruling classes, this conservative tradition, 
nonetheless, meets its progressive equivalent in Fugard’s contemporaneous 
experiments with the genre during the 1960s and early 1970s. Chief among 
this emergent tradition is, of course, e Island (1973), but it is useful to note 
other concurrent engagements with the genre, including, for instance, a staged 
reading of Euripides’s Alcestis by Don MacLennan and the Ikhwezi Players in 
1974, and Barney Simon’s version of Antigone at the Market 
eatre in 1975. 
As an alternative national canon of sorts, these revivals were interested less in 
the abstract authority of classical tradition and more in the conicted, am-
biguous moral terrain that those strict translations into Afrikaans sought to 
erase. Designed to ‘invite  .  .  . reality into them’, as one reviewer notes of Fu-
gard’s productions, these anti-apartheid examples established a tragic sphere at 
instructive odds with the abstract aesthetic principles otherwise imagined to 
underpin the genre.28
In recalling this broadly antagonistic tradition, however, it is not my inten-
tion to set its ambitions as a direct counterpoint to those conservative impulses 
that rule elsewhere. Tragedy’s ambiguous progress—much like reconciliation—
does not permit for any such a resolute sense of opposition. Rather, it is precisely 
the insecurity of this tradition that corroborates its progressive potential, even 
as it also risks frustration and perhaps even failure. Indeed, the works under 
specic analysis in this chapter are from resolute in their political claims. Nor 
are they necessarily all that persuasive. In those revisions staged under apartheid 
by Fugard, most striking is the tacit, necessarily uncertain mode of dissent that 
their tragedy both enables and, indeed, promotes. It is not so much that these 
tragedies invite reality in, but that the onerous and repressive reality of apart-
heid imposes upon them a mode of extemporary and fragile resistance to which 
the tragic is particularly suited as a concept. And it is in this, their improvised 
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progress that a contemporary work like Molora arguably discovers a model of 
tragic interpretation for its own uncertain pursuit of reconciliation.

is agile, wilfully ambiguous attitude emerges even in Fugard’s compar-
atively rudimentary, early experiment with the genre in his production of 
Sophocles’s Antigone from 1965. Petitioned by the Serpent Players, a group of 
non-professional black actors from the New Brighton township, Port Elizabeth, 
to direct them in a revival of the play, Fugard attempted initially to draw from 
the strident qualities targeted by the French playwright Jean Anouilh, who 
staged a revision of the drama in Paris under Nazi occupation in 1944, and Ber-
tolt Brecht, who followed Anouilh with his own version of the tragedy in 1948. 
Under the circumscriptive conditions of apartheid, Sophocles’s drama o	ered a 
comparable opportunity, Fugard imagined, to foment a space of veiled dissent. 
Prohibited under the Group Areas Act from assembling for rehearsals, however, 
the cast was regularly harassed by the police, its members frequently arrested 
and their scripts conscated. 
ese disruptions reached an almost disastrous 
peak with the imprisonment of Sipho Mguqulwa, set to play Antigone’s lover 
Haemon, and then Norman Ntshinga, one of the Serpent Players’ founding 
members, for twenty-ve and ve years respectively on Robben Island for their 
continued aliation with the banned African National Congress (ANC).
Far from closing down the production—which was eventually performed 
to local audiences in New Brighton—their imprisonment transposed Antigone
into the heart of apartheid’s most notorious site of state of discipline. Formu-
lating a rudimentary script from lines memorized during rehearsal, Mguqulwa 
proceeded to stage his own two-man ‘pocket version’ of Sophocles’s tragedy at 
Robben Island’s annual Christmas concert. 
is version focussed on Antigone’s 
trial scene in which she is sentenced by Creon to live, like the inmates on Rob-
ben Island, ‘no more among the living’. 29 As such, Mguqulwa’s extemporary 
adaptation corroborated the repressive authority of apartheid at the same time 
as it arguably sought to resist it from within. According to Fugard—who was 
alerted to the production in a letter smuggled out from Robben Island some 
years later—this performance allowed the prison guards gathered in the rst 
row to enjoy its classical ambitions, while ‘the prisoners . . . got the real message’ 
written into Antigone’s deant struggle against the edicts of power.30
For Fugard, the fragile dissent drawn out by Mguqulwa’s version of Anti-
gone was to prove uniquely instructive, inspiring in e Island one of ‘the most 
dening theatrical experiences of [his] career’.31 Produced collaboratively with 
Kani and Ntshona, two of Mguqulwa’s fellow Serpent Players, Fugard sought 
to retain the extemporary conditions of the inmate’s original performance on 
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Robben Island. As such, the trio eschewed any formal script, preferring instead 
the improvised methods developed by Fugard for a work like e Coat (1966). 
But in retaining their tragic intertext they also attempted to move beyond the 
type of strict adherence to the facts of life under apartheid that rendered this 
earlier work, for Fugard at least, ‘at and lacking in the density and ambiguity 
of truly dramatic images’.32 Borrowing, instead, from the workshop techniques 
ascendant in experimental theatres in Europe and North America, most notably 
Jerzy Grotowski’s Towards a Poor eatre, Fugard, Kani, and Ntshona set out 
in e Island to formulate a practice that might also appeal by way of its tragic 
dimensions to the mythopoeic undercurrents of society as much as it testied 
to its daily brutality.
As a metatheatrical version of Antigone designed to reect on its own risky 
potential, e Island was initially entitled Die Hodoshe Span for its run at the 
Space 
eatre in Cape Town, where Fugard still believed it ‘impossible to get the 
specics’ of the play’s setting onto the stage.33 Much like its appeal to classical 
tradition, the play’s gestural title, retained until the production transferred the 
following year to London’s Royal Court 
eatre, supposedly served to deect 
the glare of the censors from its potentially incendiary references.34 
at said, 
e Island ’s opening scene, which pictures John and Winston, played by Kani
and Ntshona respectively, dressed in prison garb and toiling under the relentless 
heat of the Cape sun, leaves little space for misapprehension. Not unlike those
prisoners incarcerated on Robben Island, just across the bay from the Space 
e-
atre, the two men are caught in absurd cycle of labour, piling sand into wheelbar-
rows before they each deposit their separate loads in front of the other and begin 
the whole process over again. Of course, the sequence provides a provocative
echo to the act of excavation that opens e Island ’s ancient intertext. Crucially, 
however, where the grave dug by Antigone for her brother Polynices is taken
to challenge the authority of Creon’s rule, John and Winston’s act is sundered
from any such principled intent. 
ey are condemned, instead, to a Sisyphean
sequence, burying their deance as quickly as it can be exhumed. And it is under 
this same veil of seeming futility that the rest of the play arguably proceeds.
Returning to their cell, John and Winston engage in a series of droll ex-
changes as the former attempts to convince his cellmate to take part in a stag-
ing of Sophocles’s Antigone at the prison’s annual concert. Winston’s persistent 
reluctance to wear the makeshi wig required for the role of Antigone, to say 
nothing of his inability to comprehend anything of her motivation in defying 
Creon’s rule, grants John opportunity to account for the tragic heroine’s oppo-
sitional, if necessarily ambiguous utility in defying the strictures of their own 
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present imprisonment. Speaking for the instructive benet of the audience as 
much as his cellmate, he notes:
Winston, when are you going to remember this thing? I told you, man, 
Antigone buried Polynices. 
e traitor! 
e one who I said was on our 
side. Right?35
John describes too how in Sophocles’s original, Antigone pleads guilty, even 
though ‘we know she’s Not Guilty’.36 But with Winston struggling to compre-
hend the continuities between Antigone’s innocence and his own, his cellmate 
attempts to explain by recalling the impact of a performance of the play that 
the pair witnessed in New Brighton before their imprisonment. John reminds 
Winston how the actor playing Creon was transformed by his role from a ‘short 
and fat’ man to one who acted by the play’s conclusion as if he was ‘as tall as the 
roof ’.37 Beyond the playfulness of this review, John’s description serves to blur 
the distinction between the ctional performers and their real counterparts. 
Kani, for instance, was given his debut role by Fugard in the very same 1965 
production of Antigone to which his namesake in e Island alludes, replacing 
Mguqulwa in the part of Haemon following his arrest. Still imprisoned on Rob-
ben Island at the time of e Island ’s initial staging, Mguqulwa is conjured into 
dramatic being by the play, with Winston planning to smuggle tobacco to his 
fellow actor, who, he asserts, has been locked away in solitary connement.

is circular, metatheatrical design gestures at e Island ’s origin story, o	er-
ing up the play as a partial tribute to Mguqulwa’s improvised performance. But it 
also consciously confuses the boundaries between stage and actuality. As Fugard 
asks rhetorically in his Notebooks: ‘Two men in a cell on the Island. Two men in 
New Brighton. What is the di	erence?’.38 For Kani and Ntshona, it seems, the 
distinction is negligible. In each, the two are trapped in a state of non-existence, 
‘lost between life and death’, as Ntshona’s character, Winston, puts it in e 
Island. Even at the play’s conclusion, in which John and Winston stage their 
rudimentary adaptation of Antigone, the latter concludes by bemoaning the ‘ev-
erlasting prison’ to which both must return, taking the restrictions of the penal 
colony as co-extensive with the conditions of daily life under apartheid. In con-
tradistinction to Sophocles’s Antigone, then, who brings her torment to an end 
by taking her own life, Winston’s performance is denied such a tragic resolution. 
‘I must now go on my last journey’, he proclaims, ‘I must leave the light of day 
forever for the Island’. Condemned ‘alive to solitary death’, both he and John 
remove their rudimentary costumes and adopt a position as if enchained to each 
other as the prison siren wails and the stage fades to black.39
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Like a number of critics, Kevin J. Wetmore reads this conclusion as a forth-
right expression of the oppositional potential inherent to tragedy in general and 
Antigone in particular. For him, Winston’s nal appeal to the audience speaks 
as much to the actor’s own perilous position within society as it does the char-
acter’s tragic fate. When the performer steps out in the nal scene, he speaks 
not as Antigone or even Winston but as a black citizen contravening the seg-
regationist laws of apartheid that otherwise prohibit his presence on the public 
stage, Wetmore insists.40 But as Deborah D. Foster has also noted, e Island ’s 
contrived conclusion to its classical source causes the play to stumble as much at 
the level of form as content.41 For having pursued a broadly tragic arc, from its 
opening exposition through to its sense of rising action, in the nal analysis, here 
e Island denies its audience that crucial, climactic peripeteia that traditionally 
draws Antigone towards its generic end. Whatever the radical claims that might 
be retrieved from this nal scene, John and Winston’s interminable su	ering es-
tablishes a space of irresolution at telling odds with Sophocles’s ancient denoue-
ment. Put plainly, their ongoing internment refuses to sustain even the fragile
possibility of that less than tragic otherwise which, ultimately, makes Antigone’s 
death all the more tragic. In this, its incisive but also plainly unfaithful climax,
e Island succeeds, nonetheless, in citing the moral imperatives that underpin
tragedy’s faulty progress when mobilised in the eld of racial injustice. For like
Farber’s contemporary experiment with the Oresteia, Fugard, Kani, and Ntsho-
na’s revision arguably also fails in its tragic claims, its generic progress undone
by its pressing political ambition.
On Failure
In asserting the failure of outwardly tragic works like e Island and, more sig-
nicantly, Molora, it is by no means my intention to denigrate the rationale of 
these revisions. 
ere are, I aver, more compelling explanations for their seem-
ing miscarriage, explanations that point far beyond the acuity, or otherwise, of 
their makers. In the rst instance, such failures invite us to deliberate upon the 
situated conditions and constraints that guide their engagement with classical 
tragedy. More abstractly, these works also reference an established tradition of 
possibility found in aesthetic failure more generally, from Loginus in the rst 
century to Beckett in the twentieth. Indeed, theatrical practice in particular has 
long been understood as partially constituted by failure of one sort or another. 
As Róisín O’Gorman and Margaret Werry elaborate, its methods of ‘improvi-
sation, rehearsal and experiment assume an accretion of failure as an integral 
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part of the creative process’.42 Most recently, such theatrical failure has been of a 
fervently representational, rather than generic or formal, variety. In the type of 
post-dramatic theories that have come to drive contemporary engagements with 
the theatrical, failure has more oen emerged in terms of the explicit disintegra-
tion, as Cormac Power describes, of theatre’s deictic unities of time, space, and 
action. Nonetheless, in this, it is a failure that strives to ‘emphasize a criticality 
on the part of the audience’—that is, a typically deconstructive attention to the-
atre’s artice and associated authority. 43 In other words, as Sara Jane Bailes puts 
it, ‘[f]ailure works’; it is ‘generative, prolic even’, and not just theatrically but 
also heuristically.44
It is precisely this heuristic value that motivates my interest in South Africa’s 
otherwise faulty tragic tradition. But tragedy also threatens to defy as much as 
it sustains such potentially edifying ends. For while the genre’s lessons are de-
ned by their ambiguity, in failure, they risk being rendered inscrutable. Some-
thing perhaps evidenced by Winston’s perpetual confusion in e Island, this 
abstruseness emerges too in the broad scepticism with which critics have more 
recently approached Molora. For the play’s value in the eld of reconciliation 
has been found by most reviewers to be generally unconvincing. Unlike Fugard, 
however, Farber is unable to defend the terms of Molora’s tragic miscarriage ac-
cording to the ‘heroic pessimism’ invoked by the former under apartheid.45 In 
this, Fugard can be seen to draw from French existentialists like Albert Camus 
in search of philosophical justication for what more radical critics like Robert 
Kavanagh have dismissed as e Island ’s liberal capitulation to irresolution and 
ongoing injustice.46 For Fugard, however, John and Winston’s temporary tran-
scendence reects the inherent dichotomy of tragedy, which, to follow Camus 
in L’Homme Révolté, ‘indefatigably confronts evil’ only for injustice to continue 
undiminished. ‘Man can only propose to diminish, arithmetically, the su	ering 
of the world, [for] children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society’, Camus 
explains.47 In this, Fugard discovers ‘a disturbingly lucid statement’, as he puts it, 
for the absolute violence of apartheid, a violence that extinguishes even the most 
modest of hopes for a non-tragic otherwise.48
To claim under these terms that e Island fails as a tragedy, then, is also to 
conceive of its failure as plotted by history—that is, according to the irredeem-
able sense of injustice that engulfs its action. In other words, its tragic defeat 
interpolates a situated political one. But once noted this correlation of failure is 
not necessarily all that instructive. At best, it risks reducing such generic misres 
to an elaborate and ultimately unedifying account of those historical conditions 
that make or break tragedy. To extend this model would be to cast Molora’s 
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confusions in the eld of reconciliation as led by the Truth Commission’s own 
generally misguided approach to the concept. 
is is not necessarily without 
signicance. In an e	ort to develop a more generative account, however, I want 
to proceed by charting the negative declaration that this tradition of failure per-
haps provides on behalf of tragedy. Without retrieving for the genre some essen-
tial talent in navigating South Africa’s history of oppression, there is an allied 
potential, I want to suggest, to source from tragedy and its disrupted progress 
a separate agency in the eld of racial justice. For above all, failure labours to 
‘index an alternative route or way of doing’, Bailes insists. It harnesses by way of 
its own miscarriage, its ‘coming undone’, a fragile account of how things might 
be done otherwise.49 Ultimately, it is from within this ‘failure-driven reimagi-
nation’, to borrow from O’Gorman and Werry, that reconciliation is potentially 
and productively undone by tragedy in South Africa.50
Situating Failure
In the undoing of tragedy and the doing of racial justice, Fugard’s devised ap-
proach to the genre under apartheid is instructive. Evidently, the imperatives of 
this anti-apartheid tradition are at a distance from the specic, reconciliatory 
agenda that animates Farber’s contemporary work. Nonetheless, e Island and, 
perhaps more pertinently, a highly speculative work like Orestes (1971) provide 
important formal nourishment for Molora’s tragic failure. Indeed, according 
Brian Astbury, co-founder of the Space 
eatre where e Island was rst staged, 
‘it all began with Orestes’.51 In ten weeks of private and intense rehearsal, Fugard 
refused to furnish his performers—Winston Dunster, Val Donald, and Yvonne 
Brycleand—with any type of formal script. Instead, the group improvised 
around a series of mythical, historical, and philosophical ‘texts’, each layered one 
upon the other in a form he has described since as a type of dramatic palimpsest, 
but which might also be understood as a mode of situated ritualism that gestures 
towards the elemental as much as the factual. 
e nal eighty-minute ‘exposure’, 
as Fugard termed it, was staged eventually at Cape Town’s intimate, seventy-seat 
Castlemarine Auditorium in March 1971.
According to Fugard, Orestes ‘deed translation onto paper in any conven-
tional sense’.52 
e play mystied too the majority of critics who reviewed it over 
its two-week run. As such, the only e	ective record of the play remains a deeply 
personalized impression rendered by Fugard in a letter to the American photog-
rapher Bruce Davidson from 1973.53 
ese notes are partial but prove especially 
useful in deciphering the multiple layers that the director attempted to fold into 
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the production. With fewer than four hundred words of spoken dialogue, Or-
estes granted its audience scant conventional exposition. Instead, spectators were 
reliant on the play’s provocative programme notes to unravel its situated claims 
from its broadly gestural and symbolic exposition. Here, Fugard cited a specic 
act of violent resistance folded into the nal performance:
From our history comes the image of a young man with a large brown 
suitcase on a bench in the Johannesburg station concourse. He was not 
travelling anywhere.54
Although wilfully veiled, this reference would have recalled for most in the audi-
ence the gure of John Harris, a teacher and member of the African Resistance 
Movement (ARM)—a largely white, anti-apartheid collective comprised of uni-
versity students and members of the South African Liberal Party.
As part of their programme of state sabotage, the ARM had Harris place a 
bomb next to a whites-only bench in Johannesburg’s main railway station in July 
1964. Despite him giving notice of the bomb’s exact location and telephoning 
the Johannesburg Railway Police, the device exploded killing one and injuring 
twenty-two others. In his call to the railway authorities, recorded and produced 
as evidence at his trial, Harris made plain the motivation for his attack, terming 
it ‘a symbolic protest against the inhumanity and injustices of apartheid’. He 
maintained too that ‘it is not our intention to harm anyone’, and advised the 
station concourse be cleared at once using the public address system.55 Despite 
this mitigation, Harris was later found guilty of murder, and was subsequently 
hanged at Pretoria Central Prison on 1 April 1965. As such, he was the only white 
South African to be executed by the state for political crimes during the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission’s mandate period, 1960–1994. Accordingly, the 
Commission lists him in its nal report as both a perpetrator of gross human 
rights violations and a victim of apartheid injustice—an ambiguous tragic gure, 
if ever there was one.
For Fugard, this tragic but also broadly futile sense of heroism correlated with 
the cycle of revenge that traditionally drives the Oresteia. As he reects in his 
Notebooks, there was a broad sense that:
Harris stood in relation to his society as Orestes did to Clytemnestra. An 
intolerable burden of guilt for the crimes committed—the act of violence 
an attempt to escape the burden of guilt.56
Nonetheless, articulating their supposedly shameful correlation on stage 
proved problematic. Fugard confesses some years later that ‘I still don’t properly 
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understand the relationship between the two ideas that I coupled’.57 Indeed, Or-
estes’s highly experimental form appears to resist clarity from the start. With the 
three actors seated separately among the spectators in the auditorium, Dunster 
signals the play’s beginning by placing a matchbox on his thigh and pushing it 
slowly towards his knee. Describing his actions as ‘of the most inconsequential 
order’, Fugard suggests that the audience’s attention is directed merely ‘by way of 
a quiet concentration of the other two actors on what the young man was doing’. 
As the matchbox balances precariously on the actor’s leg before one last frac-
tional shove sees it topple to the stage oor, the ‘quiet tension’ that has accrued 
within the auditorium supposedly dissipates in an instant. ‘We have had our rst 
climax, our rst dramatic metaphor’, notes Fugard of this nominal ‘experience 
and dilemma of Crisis’.58
When lined up against Molora’s opening scene, with all its impassioned dis-
pute, Orestes’s restrained beginning arguably underestimates the enmity that 
bristles through their shared source text. Certainly, this cycle of pressure and 
momentary release mirrors the structure through which Aeschylus’s ancient 
tragedy also progresses. But in his turn to rival ‘texts’, Fugard’s Orestes also con-
founds the agonism that traditionally underpins the Oresteia. Harris, according 
to Fugard, is motivated by guilt, rather than some implacable urge to vengeance. 
By contrast, Molora draws out this violent conict even to the point of immod-
eration as its attempts to interpolate the volatility of the Truth Commission’s 
public hearings into its tragic frame. Following its incendiary initial scene, for 
instance, Farber’s play proceeds by taking forthright aim at the Commission’s 
hubristic sloganeering, most particularly its misplaced faith in the redemptive 
technology of public confession. In a scene entitled ‘murder’, truth is made an 
object not of justice but traumatic excess. Here, the violent repression committed 
in the past is exhumed and re-enacted with disturbing detail for the onlook-
ing audience. Picturing Elektra centre stage singing childishly in a bath as her 
mother washes her clean, this scene of serene domesticity is almost immediately 
and inexorably ruptured. Having wrapped her child in a blanket, Klytemnestra 
moves to the back of the stage to grab a pickaxe. She scrapes its blade noisily and 
ominously across the oor as she crosses back towards the table stage le, before 
climbing on top with the axe raised above her head. With no words, only a chill-
ing scream, she proceeds to slam its sharp edge into the wooden table.
As both the site of her preceding confession to Agamemnon’s murder and a 
surrogate object upon which to replay her original crime, the table appears to an-
imate and intensify, rather than appease, the violence of the past. Pointedly, this 
runs counter to the Truth Commission’s own investment in the curative logic of 
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confession. And with the axe stuck fast in the table as a symbol of her enduring 
deance, Klytemnestra covers her face and hands in her husband’s blood before 
dragging his body, which lies prostrate beneath the table and wrapped in plastic, 
into the middle of the stage. Revealing it to her daughter, Elektra screams in 
isiXhosa, ‘Mama what have you done?’59 But Klytemnestra ignores her daugh-
ter’s protestations as she proceeds to bury the body under a heap of soil.
Figure 4. Klytemnestra bathing her daughter, Elektra, in Yaël 
Farber’s Molora (2003). Photo courtesy of Ruphin Coudyzer.
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According to this pattern of forthright confession and graphic re-enactment, 
her murderous deed is given a hard, visceral form. For not only does Klytem-
nestra report her actions in the present tense as if, to follow Rush Rehm’s anal-
ysis of her ancient equivalent, ‘she actually relives the crucial moments’, but she 
also makes manifest the violent behaviour that typically remains o	-stage or 
‘ob-scene’.60 In this, her actions here are also made all the more horrifying and, 
seemingly, unforgivable. Indeed, in its uncompromising portrayal, the play ex-
cises all evidence of Klytemnestra’s own su	ering at Agamemnon’s hand. Here, 
her cruelty appears to nd its precedence not in ancient tradition but in the 
shocking reports of abuse witnessed by the Truth Commission. And evidently 
Farber, a white South African who grew up with many of the privileges that 
her race legally a	orded, is in no position to propose any radical empathy with 
apartheid’s guilty agents.61 Even so, in its preliminary portrayal of Klytemnestra, 
Molora all but disintegrates those conicted, potentially pitiable feelings that 
otherwise guide her tragic relationship with Elektra. 
ere is no sense of the 
shared su	ering that ordinarily bind mother and daughter together, and that 
makes the cycle of vengeance, in very di	erent ways, so anguishing to behold. 
Instead, it is the chilling collapse of the symbolic into the obscene facts of history 
that drives the action forward.
In this particular sense, Molora is not so very di	erent from Fugard’s Or-
estes. Both nd their tragic origins distorted by way of recourse to the situated 
sense of injustice that underwrites their respective progress. In other words, 
their shared ancient source is denatured by too much or too little of the essential 
conicted-ness that ordinarily structures its fragile progress. But equally, as the 
action in Fugard’s play also begins to escalate, Molora’s violent excess appears 
less and less exceptional. With Donald and Dunster engaged in a series of ritu-
alized games, the innocence of their initial exchange slowly gives way to a violent 
encounter with their tragic inheritance. First, Bryceland, who has been watch-
ing passively from the margins, enters onto the stage, before Donald asks her, 
‘How do you spell “Orestes”?’62 Joining hands, Donald and Dunster together 
inscribe alternate letters in a heap of sand on the stage. In this, their ritual per-
formance is washed over by ancient myth, with the pair transformed into the 
roles of Electra and Orestes, respectively. Bryceland, as Clytemnestra, rst beck-
ons to the pair before she is struck down by a series of elemental ‘grunts, snarls, 
groans’ as she painfully stitches together the name ‘Iphigenia’. 
is symbolic 
nativity is hastily reversed, however, with the name ‘broken down again into its 
elementary syllables’ as she bewails her child’s subsequent sacrice to the gods.63
Searching out a ‘vocabulary for grief ’, verbal as much as physical, she ruptures 
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the rising pressure in the auditorium with an act of violent reprisal, staged ‘every 
night, every performance’, Fugard arms. Clytemnestra destroys ‘one unique, 
irreplaceable chair called Agamemnon’, its upholstery torn up and its wooden 
frame shattered before the audience. It is ‘an awesome and chilling spectacle’, 
according to the director.64

ere is much to compare in this violation of the representational order by 
the sphere of violence. Most obviously, where Molora conceives of Agamemnon’s 
murder reproachfully, as testament to the brutality of apartheid, Orestes imag-
ines it as altogether cautionary. Fugard reproved the violence deployed by the 
resistance movement, calling it ‘the most stupid, the most pointless, the most 
tragic, the most misguided’ of ‘all the things men and women resort to’, princi-
pally because ‘it only perpetuates itself ’.65 As Fugard has it, ‘you cannot witness 
destruction without being damaged’.66 Sundered from their innocent begin-
nings aer their mother’s violent action, Orestes and Electra ‘experience them-
selves individually as alone in the most terrible sense of the word’. Both siblings 
now stumble across the stage, blinded, it seems, by their proximity to this scene 
of murderous revenge. When Electra and Orestes eventually locate each other, 
the former imprisons her sibling in a ‘savage little gaol fashioned out of chairs’. 
As Fugard explains, the ‘ugliest of all transformations [has taken] place . . . they 
[have] become a threat to each other’.67
As a withdrawal from the Oresteia’s driving agonism, Fugard’s capitulation 
here to a non-violent political philosophy threatens to wreck the drama’s fragile 
tragic order. At its worst, Orestes sustains a blunt retreat into solipsism. Address-
ing the audience as the drama reaches its climax, Dunster’s character appears 
situated not by myth but history: ‘Me. Male. White. South African. Here’.68
With this, he emerges from his temporary gaol alert for the rst time to the 
world around him and, it seems, his own disturbing isolation within it. And it 
is this terrible realisation, over and above any tragic compulsion to revenge, it 
seems, that motivates the play’s fatal conclusion. Fashioning two bombs out of 
newspaper, Dunster, now in the role of Harris, calmly hands them to Bryceland, 
who performs their detonation in slow motion. As Fugard recounts:
Her head goes back slowly . . . her feet come up, the toes crimped in. 
e 
feet rise still higher, the head goes back still further and the hands drop 
their paper bombs. We barely hear her say: ‘How am I going to walk?’ She 
pushes herself to the edge of the bench and drops to the oor. She experi-
ences herself as being utterly alone. 
e petrol has burnt away the soles of 
her feet. She wants to walk but cannot. She wants to cry but all that comes 
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out are small sounds of disgust as she grabs her ankles and, using her heels 
and her arse, drags herself away across the oor of the station concourse 
so vast and empty it looks like the oor of a palace. 
ere is torn paper 
everywhere.69

is scene of devastation provides no relief to the cycle of pressure and violent 
release pro	ered more generally by the play. Instead, it seems to signal the latest, 
most climactic turn in the tragedy’s futile progress.
As polemic as this denouement appears, the extent to which Orestes actively 
abandons its tragic origins in pursuit of its political principles is perhaps also 
open to debate. In other words, it is not simply that the work fails as a tragedy. 
Rather, it seems that apartheid also imposes on the drama’s generic ambitions 
its own moral and philosophical constraints. Certainly, Fugard is resolute in his 
opposition to violence. And, ultimately, Orestes concludes by reciting a segment 
of Harris’ original trial testimony in order to corroborate this message:
I felt, terrically, ecstatically happy while sitting on the bench. . . . I knew 
what I was doing was right. Later I heard that people had been hurt, but 
this did not make sense because I had known that people were not going 
to be hurt.70
But under Fugard’s ‘triadic’ structure, a term that Mervyn McMurtry deploys 
to describes it coincident use of ritual archetype, mythical character, and histor-
ical action, it is arguably the latter—historical action—that precedes Harris’s 
imprudence.71 To understand Orestes as a failure, then, is to centre the state-led 
cycle of violence that renders its tragic action otiose. But it is also to begin to 
conceive of a non-violent otherwise. Incipient and inchoate, this less-than-tragic 
alternative must also be compelled into being from amid the space of general fu-
tility that rules this historical account. To this extent, it anticipates something of 
the uncertainty, perhaps even the implausibility that also stalks reconciliation’s 
progress. It is in this precise sense that we might take Orestes as an instructive 
guide for Molora’s more contemporary tragic failing.
Tragedy’s Undoing
In its conceptual impulses, Molora sets itself at some distance from the sense 
of futility that drives Orestes. But formally Farber’s revision retrieves much of 
the layered, triadic structure through which this earlier experiment proceeds. 
Indeed, in the adaptation of its ancient beginnings according to the scenic and 
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procedural logic of the Truth Commission, Molora nds important precedence 
in Fugard’s own e	orts to amend a familial structure into a situated, political 
one. Unlike Fugard, however, Farber also moves to intensify, rather than atten 
out, the sense of inner torment that rages through the Oresteia. 
is she achieves 
by inserting a series of supplementary challenges to her audience, particularly 
as the drama shis from the represented or reported pain that typies Orestes
to what is best described, by way of Han-
ies Lehmann, as ‘pain experienced 
in representation’.72 Following the pattern of confession and re-enactment that 
guided Molora’s rst two scenes, Electra subsequently describes how she sent 
her brother Orestes away from the house, fearing for his life. Entitled ‘exile’, the 
scene works to abstract this extreme family drama, making it representative of 
the apartheid struggle more generally. Like those members of the ANC forced 
into exile in Tanzania and elsewhere, Orestes is cast as an exiled political ac-
tivist, with Elektra, like a good number of their female relatives, forced to stay 
behind and su	er the constant harassment and maltreatment of her apartheid 
tormentor. Elektra was, as she testies, ‘the wall [Klytemnestra] beat against 
every day’.73
Prompted by this claim, the ensuing episode—entitled, ‘interrogation’—re-
stages Elektra’s abuse at her mother’s hand. Forcing her daughter down onto 
her knees, Klytemnestra begins by thrusting Elektra’s head into a pot of water. 
Holding it under the surface for a few anguishing moments, Klytemnestra then 
demands of her spluttering and distraught daughter, ‘Where is my baby? What 
have you done with my boy?’74 With Elektra refusing to respond, Klytemnestra 
presses her head once more beneath the water, before, frustrated, she adopts a 
new method; coolly lighting and inhaling on a cigarette, she extinguishes its 
burning embers rst on Elektra’s hand and then upon her neck, before screaming 
with rage, ‘Where is my son?’75
In the face of these extreme acts of torture, there is little space for an audience 
to separate out the represented pain from the pain experienced in representation. 

e assaults appear all too literal and somatic, not nearly abstract or theatrical 
enough for any type of measured evaluation. For a theorist of the post-dramatic 
like Lehman, it is precisely this ‘indecidability’ that leads an audience into an 
‘ethically provocative play with . . . cruelty’.76 For him, such unsettling, contested 
displays directly implicate the spectator, supposedly raising their ‘awareness of 
the problematic of spectating itself ’.77 In other words, to return to the notions 
raised above, they potentially stage the failure of theatre as a space of represen-
tation, inducing critical reection on the boundaries that separate the theatrical 
from the actual. Given the escalating extremity of the violence on display in 
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Molora, however, it is also the a	ective, rather than the strictly ethical, that likely 
comes to rule in these moments.
Reviewers have been uniform in spotlighting precisely this point, describing 
Molora’s scenes of torture as ‘overwhelm[ing] on a purely sensory level’ and ‘har-
rowing almost beyond endurance’.78 Such responses may well include a sense of 
ethical discomfort, but this plausibly remains, for the most part, an adjunct to 
the more intense emotional disquiet and distress that otherwise prevails. For the 
horror that Molora induces is not simply, say, the erschrecken that Brecht suggests 
as ‘necessary for cognition’. 79 It is also, and more likely, the anguish of being 
compelled to endure the graphic re-enactment of a truth that is already known 
and condemned. Put di	erently, even as Molora defers to something of the Com-
mission’s confessional praxis, it assumes few of its corresponding truth-claims. 
Klytemnestra and Elektra are made representative in their acrimony, not par-
ticular. To this extent, the play’s acts of torture tend towards the excessive more 
than they do the edifying or ethically provocative. 
is stands in important 
contrast to the highly ritualised scenes of violence that pattern Fugard’s Orestes, 
which are designed to estrange its audience more than shock them.
Of course, Molora’s excesses are rmly relative, led above all by the intense 
ill-feeling that circulated daily at the Commission’s hearings. But they are also, 
and perhaps more signicantly, allied to the ‘transgressive energy’ that, to return 
to Lehman, is partly constitutive of tragedy itself. As elaborated in his more 
recent treatise on the genre, tragedy is nothing if it is not also aimed towards 
the possible ‘deconstruction of (moral, reasonable) judgment’. By this, Lehman 
means to alert us to the way in which tragedy’s staging of emotional excess neces-
sarily shakes ‘the groundwork that makes it possible for human beings to live to-
gether in a civilized fashion—indeed, to survive at all’. 
is is why, he continues:
[W]e react emotionally when art portrays gruesome crimes, untenable
desires, boundless hatreds, awful torments and events that are morally
unacceptable: it unsettles us, because these phenomena positively demand
judgment—which, however, is at the same time rendered impossible by the 
tragic spectacle. 80
Of course, conventionally, tragedy does not wreck absolutely the means for 
judgment, or the grounds for survival. Instead, it draws out with sharp, even 
cruel distinction their vulnerability, establishing what Lehman describes as a 
state of imminent but ‘suspended transgression’.81
Doubtless, a sense of transgressive possibility also stalked the Truth Com-
mission, where the traumatic truths revealed at its public hearings regularly 
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threatened to devastate the possibility for any reasoned response, save revenge. 
Not that the Commission ever seriously admitted to this fragility. Its uncom-
promising pursuit of reconciliation and ‘redemptive closure’ le little room to 
contemplate, let alone incorporate, the extreme and intransigent a	ects that 
it stirred.82 Refusing such notions, Molora is candid in reanimating the loom-
ing and potentially catastrophic transgressions that arguably also mark out the 
Commission as a tragic enterprise. Indeed, the play appears to actively nurture 
this transgressive potential, consistently pressing its simmering sense of violence 
to the point of febrility. 
is sense of transgressive excess is no more appar-
ent than in Molora’s eighth scene, entitled ‘wet bag method’, which takes as its 
source one of the Commission’s most shocking hearings. Having recalled and 
replayed for the audience the exploitation she su	ered at her mother’s hand, 
Elektra proceeds to demand that Klytemnestra ‘please, demonstrate for this 
commission how you tried to get information out of me as to my brother’s 
whereabouts’.83

e request recalls directly the unique demand made of Je	rey Benzien, a 
disreputable former detective warrant ocer in the South African Police’s Ter-
rorist Unit, by one of his victims, Tony Yengeni, at an Amnesty Committee 
hearing in Cape Town in 1997. Remarkably, Yengeni, by then a prominent ANC 
Member of Parliament and invited along with other victims of abuse to the hear-
ing, was permitted to take the stand and cross-question Benzien. In a highly 
manipulative move, Benzien began by bragging to the Committee of his exper-
tise in torture, which, he claimed, allowed him to capture information from 
ANC cadres such as Yengeni in less than thirty minutes. In an e	ort to cede 
back some form of control, Yengeni responded by requesting that he ‘be given 
the opportunity by the Commission to see what [Benzien] did to me, with my 
own eyes’.84 Granted leave by the hearing’s chair, Benzien proceeded to crouch 
over a (surprisingly willing) volunteer from the assembled audience, placing a 
pillowcase over their head before twisting it to show how he would block o	 the 
victim’s airway. With the bag soaked in water, this technique reputedly induced 
in its victims the added sensation of drowning, he advises.
Engaging a gure like Benzien in this way was, as Mark Sanders attests in 
his review of the hearing, a hazardous ploy.85 Upon witnessing this shocking 
re-enactment of his own torture, Yengeni reportedly began to stumble unchar-
acteristically through his subsequent questions. Others also present at the hear-
ing, particularly reporters, displayed their own signs of distress, ‘breaking down, 
packing up, freaking out’, as Antjie Krog recalls.86 In an e	ort to blunt his own 
shame, Benzien responded perniciously by attempting to defame Yengeni. Asked 
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by the former cadre how he personally responded to being tortured in this way, 
Benzien claimed:
I know that aer the method was applied, you did take us to the house of 
[prominent anti-apartheid activist] Jennifer Schreiner where we took out 
a lot of limpet mines, hand grenades and rearms.87
In this, Benzien nds renewed opportunity to manipulate and terrorise his 
victim, all but destroying Yengeni’s political reputation, which relied in large 
part on his status as a hero of the struggle. Altogether, it was a remarkably 
shocking incident in the history of the Commission, not least in terms of the 
re-traumatizing e	ects it appeared to have on Yengeni, who was not only com-
pelled to share in the ‘visual culture’ of his own victimhood, but also subjected 
once again to the coercive authority of his torturer.88
Speaking in the wake of Benzien’s ultimately successful appeal for amnesty, 
Shirley Gunn, a former ANC cadre like Yengeni, summed up the sense of sus-
tained injustice shared by his many victims:
It didn’t feel like there was closure at all. We know this character and I 
think he haunts many people up to this day. 
e fact that he has been vin-
dicated like this is quite horrifying.89
But where Benzien’s original confession arguably put the concept of reconcilia-
tion under extreme pressure, in reanimating and making all the more direct his 
abusive actions, Molora so intensies the basic incongruity between truth and rec-
onciliation as to make the latter appear almost cruelly absurd in its ambition. For 
Klytemnestra’s demonstration of the wet-bag method goes one step further than 
Benzien’s own, performing it not on a volunteer but on Elektra herself. In this, 
torturer and tortured slip directly back into their former hierarchy as Klytem-
nestra stands menacingly over her daughter, whose face lies down in the ground. 
With a plastic bag, she covers Elektra’s head and twists it tight until the girl begins 
to convulse in active-seeming pain. Aer what feels to be an interminable length 
of time, Klytemnestra releases her, allowing Elektra to gasp desperately for air.
Again, the logic of the post-dramatic here suggests ample opportunity to re-
ect upon the thin boundary that separates actual pain from its articial equiva-
lent. As Lehman puts it, in threatening to ‘transgress . . . the pain threshold’, such 
post-dramatic praxis ‘moves away from a mental or intelligible structure towards 
the exposition of intense physicality, the body is absolutized ’.90 Certainly, this 
investment in the body as the preeminent site of signicance provides a vital 
key for the su	ering staged by the Commission’s original hearings—something, 
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again, taken up by Cole in her analysis of the Commission’s generally perfor-
mative dimensions. As a tool for interpreting Molora’s violent acts of torture, 
however, this singular focus on the body risks appearing agnostic before the 
political agenda also driving their re-enactment—which is to say, Farber’s deci-
sion to give torture an embodied form in her tragic schema. It is perhaps better, 
then, to approach the bodily pain reproduced in this scene as part of Molora’s 
transgressive capitulation, rather than suspension. Under these terms, Elektra’s 
Figure 5. Klytemnestra performing the ‘wet-bag method’ of torture on her daughter, 
Elektra, in Yaël Farber’s Molora (2003). Photo courtesy of Ruphin Coudyzer.
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tortured body not only rehearses Yengeni’s original trauma, but also threatens 
to wreck altogether the play’s tragic status, undoing its general conicted-ness 
in favour of actual and irredeemable conict. Our judgment of Klytemnestra 
and her abusive actions can no longer be suspended, it seems. For like Elektra’s 
pain, Klytemnestra’s violence is here made absolute rather than ambiguous or 
somehow justiable. And in this moment, Molora appears to rupture altogether 
the terms of its own fragile tragic tension.
Reconciliation’s Fragility
If we are to accept this scene as indicative of Molora’s general failure as a tragedy, 
then we must also accept its corollary success as a moment of moral decisive-
ness. 
ere is no plausible arbitration here of Klytemnestra’s violent behaviour. 
Rather, it is made deplorable, indefensible. In wrecking its state of transgressive 
suspension—its ‘indecidability’, to return to Lehman’s earlier term—Farber also 
appears to render reconciliation implausible. Mother and daughter seem abso-
lutely estranged. It is more and more reasonable for us to expect that Molora
will reach its conclusion not just by satisfying its vengeful compulsions but by 
collapsing too all possible future accord. Not even the gods have authority to 
arbitrate here, it seems. In this, Farber arguably nds instruction in Fugard’s 
endless and, above all, pessimistic capitulation to violence. Indeed, with Orestes 
returned from exile, he and Elektra plot precisely such a climax, planning to 
murder rst Ayesthus and then Klytemnestra with the same axe used to slay 
Agamemnon. And following Orestes’s shocking, if also more broadly symbolic, 
attack on Ayesthus, ripping his heart from his chest, the cycle seems set to full 
its ancient climax and in the most violent of terms.
Suddenly and inexplicably, however, Orestes begins to vacillate. ‘Elektra—we 
are lost’, he declares aer a member of the Chorus, Ma Nosomething, rebukes 
him for this latest act of murderous revenge.91 Elektra presses him on, trying 
desperately to renew his conviction. As he raises the axe, however, the rest of 
the Chorus sing out plaintively. Again, Orestes pauses, unable, it seems, to take 
vengeance against his mother. ‘I cannot shed more blood’, he declares, before 
falling to his knees and grabbing Elektra, entreating her to help him ‘rewrite 
this ancient end’.92 But, unlike Orestes, Elektra cannot so readily ‘forget [her] 
hatred’. For her, ‘there can be no forgiveness!’ 
is merciless tragedy, like the 
‘night’s end’, Elektra proclaims, ‘is already written’. And with an impassioned 
cry, she leaps forward, grabbing the axe to take ‘VENGEANCE! An eye for an 
eye and a tooth for a tooth!’93
88 chapter two
With no ancient deus ex machina to intercede and prevent Elektra from mak-
ing herself another victim of the Oresteia’s schema, the task of undoing this fatal 
tradition falls once more to the Chorus. Representatives, according to Farber, of 
the ‘common everyman and everywoman who, in the years following democracy, 
gathered in modest halls across the country to face their perpetrators’, the group 
rise up from their seats at the rear of the stage before rushing forward to envelop 
Elektra, wrestling the axe from her grip.94 As she rages and struggles, the Chorus 
pull her to the ground, cradling her as her frenetic screams eventually give way 
to a ood of pitiable tears. When Elektra nally emerges from their protective 
embrace, she and Orestes begin to crawl tentatively towards Klytemnestra, who 
cowers before them in terror. Rather than strike out, however, the siblings o	er 
her their hands and together the group rise to their feet. Klytemnestra backs 
away, made humble by their show of mercy, before the group’s diviner, Nofen-
ishala Mvotyo, steps out before the audience to pray for a new ‘unity between 
black and white’.95
In the context of the play’s relentless seeming drive towards disaster, Mvotyo’s 
hopeful appeal comes as a broadly welcome one. It intercedes where the other 
characters have been unable. Given the violent transgressions that precede this 
moment, however, it is also entirely unexpected, if not also unconvincing. At 
Figure 6. 
e Chorus, performed by members of the Ngqoko Cultural Group, 
cradle Elektra in Yaël Farber’s Molora (2003). Photo courtesy of Ruphin Coudyzer.
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least, when understood as part of Molora’s capitulation to absolute conict, such 
a comparatively peaceable climax may well strike many as manifestly incongru-
ent. But this is not the only context for rationalising its turn to unity and racial 
reconciliation. For Farber’s play is motivated not by preserving tragic tradition, 
but by failing it, conceptually as well as dramatically. In failing to uphold the 
state of suspended transgression that otherwise denes the Oresteia’s tragic prog-
ress, Molora also disables the tragedy inherent to its cycle of revenge. As soon 
as Klytemnestra’s violent action wrecks the delicate moral order governing the 
tragedy, Elektra’s violent reprisal proves impossible to dignify or defend in such 
tragic terms. Like Molora’s generic frame, the urge to vengeance has itself been 
undone, divested of its conicted and, therefore, tragic ethical status. In other 
words, it falls beyond the scope of tragedy’s fragile deliberations, adhering in-
stead to a more stable variety of retributive justice.
When thought in these terms—as a failure of tragedy’s fragile action—the 
play’s climactic appeal to reconciliation appears to serve as little more than a 
blunt ‘departure from violence’, to return to Borneman. It is, in short, an ar-
mation of reconciliation in the weakest sense of the term. Crucially, however, 
this is not quite where Molora ends. For as swily as this scene of seeming unity 
emerges, it is made vulnerable before the threat of reconciliation’s own plausible 
failure. With Orestes and Elektra huddled alongside the Chorus in the centre 
of the stage, Klytemnestra returns in the play’s epilogue to her seat behind the 
table stage-le. ‘It falls soly the residue of revenge’, she begins portentously, as 
a thick cloud of ash begins to dri down onto the stage. 96 ‘We who made the 
sons and daughters of this land, servants in the halls of their forefathers’, she con-
tinues, ‘[w]e are still only here by grace alone’.97 
e delicate, ethereal beauty of 
this nale belies its malec quality. As Odom elaborates, in Xhosa tradition ash 
upholds its own contradictory connotations as a symbol of mutual destruction 
as much as an object of ancestral reverence.98 Against this backdrop, a loom-
ing sense of peril necessarily persists, the ash now swathing the characters also 
threatening to overwhelm and asphyxiate Molora’s climactic appeal for unity.
Of course, the Oresteia is traditionally venerated for the delicate equilibrium 
thought to prevail at its end.99 In its own, similarly ambivalent nal scene, Mol-
ora not only upholds this frailty but also a	ords its audience a view of recon-
ciliation’s correspondingly risky progress. Here, reconciliation’s vulnerability 
to failure is intensied by precise virtue of its close proximity to a violent oth-
erwise. 
is fragile end might even be declared Molora’s success, a ratication 
of reconciliation’s dening ‘attunement to . . . contingency, chance, peripeteia’. 
Borrowing from the prescripts of tragic interpretation, reconciliation emerges as 
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an entirely provisional end, something subject to the capriciousness of human 
agency. To this extent, Molora’s generic failure is also indicative of its heuris-
tic success in the eld of reconciliation, the play’s climax providing an instruc-
tive view of reconciliation that accounts for its risky and, in strictly conceptual 
terms, tragic progress.
Conclusion
In settling upon this fragile reading of reconciliation, my analysis may not ap-
pear to di	er all that very much from those critics who nd Molora to be marred 
by equivocation. Odom’s complaint is entirely typical in this: ‘beyond recon-
ciliation’ and ‘beyond tragedy’, for him, the play appears to be a failure of both 
in equal measure, conforming ‘neither to the processes of reconciliation nor to 
the requirements of tragedy’.100 
e signicant di	erence, as I understand it, 
however, is that this seeming inability to settle upon either broad end is precisely 
the point, not the problem, of Farber’s adaptation. Indeed, far from undoing its 
value, this refusal nally to resolve its own conicted-ness, whether through con-
tinued violence or some articial sense of unity, establishes a conceptually tragic 
frame through which to approach ‘this thing called reconciliation’. For whatever 
we might claim of its transgressive, occasionally even also anguishing theatrical 
form, ultimately, Molora o	ers up an important lesson in reconciliation’s fragile 
progress. To pursue its achievement is also, Farber’s play insists, to risk its failure.

is is, of course, principally a challenge to the monumental claims of the 
Truth Commission and its desire for a measure of conceptual and historical cer-
tainty. But it is also a point that underpins some of the fundamental claims driv-
ing this study at large. Emerging from a long tradition of devised theatre-making 
and tragic adaptation in South Africa, Molora extracts from this range of an-
ti-apartheid examples a more abstract sense of what the improvisatory might 
enable, even by way of its own failure. Above all, it attempts to discover in the 
tragic a sense of fragile historical possibility that is equal to the unpredictability 
and contingency of reconciliation—that is to say, a sense of what reconciliation’s 
proximity to catastrophe also makes thinkable. But this is not its only achieve-
ment. For in making the black, largely female Chorus the principal agents of 
reconciliation, it also anticipates the more substantial focus that follows in the 
subsequent two chapters on apartheid’s ordinary, oen maligned female victims. 
Indeed, this chapter may well have chosen to pursue this gendered argument 
more insistently. Given the achievements of other critics, as well as the arguments 
that follow elsewhere in this study, however, I have preferred to retain a more 
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conceptual approach to the play.101 For above all it is Molora’s generic failure as 
a tragedy that enables its account of reconciliation’s risky, uncertain progress to 
thrive, a suggestion that does much to inoculate the concept against the seduc-
tive claims of the forgiving nation-state that emerge in the subsequent chapter.
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Ch a pter Thr ee
e Melodrama of Forgiveness
Propriety and Popular Film
e truths produced by truth commissions  .  .  .  cannot be merely 
cerebral and disembodied. e subject of history must be as emo-
tional as she is thinking.
—Deborah Posel
I n many of the most prominent accounts of the Truth Commission, reconciliation has oen been correlated alongside individual accounts of forgiveness. Proling the contrition of some of apartheid’s most notori-
ous perpetrators and, by return, their victims’ capacity to give up on revenge 
in favour of clemency, critics like Antjie Krog and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela 
laud these forgiving turns as a reassuring signal of the Commission’s success 
in the eld of reconciliation.2 But these acts of forgiveness are not quite of the 
same political order as reconciliation, even if they circulate contiguously. Cer-
tainly, both depend upon forms of confessional disclosure and the arbitration 
of guilt. In this, each establishes a method to decide over the past, oering up a 
sense of resolution as alluring as it is perhaps capricious. But forgiveness is also 
tethered to the emotional realm in ways that a remote, institutionalised iteration 
of reconciliation oen nds di
cult to interpolate. It is less a computation of, 
say, healing and closure, to return to Johan Galtung’s account of reconciliation, 
and more an intimate, interpersonal enterprise. ere is, in short, a mutual and 
potentially remedial vulnerability to the act of forgiveness for victim and perpe-
trator alike that reconciliation nds hard to disclose.
Beginning with an act of self-exposure, much depends upon the perpetrator’s 
apology and demonstration of remorse. But this is no guarantee of success. In the 
end, it is the victim’s own willingness to accept this remorse that allows forgive-
ness to prosper. In granting victims with a degree of agency denied them in the 
past, then, forgiveness organises itself around unstable aective economy, one 
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that is liable to elicit a range of extreme responses, censorious as well as compas-
sionate. In other words, forgiveness necessarily proceeds with no assurances, save 
its own inherent riskiness. Nonetheless, it is precisely these emotional risks that 
provide it with the type of compelling, climactic frame that reconciliation, in its 
more austere negotiation of justice, largely fails to replicate. is is not the prin-
cipal fault of reconciliation; it merely attests to the comparative appeal of forgive-
ness when it comes to staging the intense drama of injustice and its seeming relief. 
Indeed, where the defeat of a peaceable otherwise intensies, it is forgiveness, not 
reconciliation, that more oen ourishes as the most captivating corrective. As 
Martha Minow insists in entirely indicative terms, the gi of forgiveness ‘can heal 
grief; forge new constructive alliances; and break cycles of violence’.3 Put bluntly, 
it is thought to retain the uncommon potential to move people, emotionally and 
otherwise. And in a study animated by those alternate ends that improvisation 
risks, forgiveness may well seem to oer up its own allied potential.
I am not proposing, however, to give up on the language of reconciliation. For 
one thing, the accounts that critics like Gobodo-Madikizela provide of forgive-
ness and its achievements in the sphere of racial justice are highly selective and 
highly individualised. For another, its sacramental credentials threaten to re-
vive something of the Christian doctrine that was regularly deployed to sustain 
apartheid’s own corrupt moral authority. As such, its seductive power should 
not be underestimated, especially when it comes to South Africa’s democratic 
transition, in which the ‘power and the glory’ of forgiveness has been deployed 
to animate and authorise a whole host of broadly popular interpretations of the 
Truth Commission and its confessional praxis.4 Take, for example, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu’s review of Red Dust (2004), adapted from Gillian Slovo’s origi-
nal novel by Tom Hooper. Invited to an exclusive preview just a few days before 
its general release at the 2004 Cape Town World Cinema Festival (CTWCF), 
he remarked upon the uncanny emotional response the lm elicited from its 
audience. In re-enacting the terms of a confession heard originally by the Com-
mission’s Amnesty Committee, Red Dust recalled, he argued, ‘so very much, so 
poignantly of all that we, and so many people of our country had gone through 
during the process of the TRC’. Indeed, so deeply moved was Tutu that, by the 
lm’s nal scene in which a white, former police o
cer is granted the forgiveness 
of one of his black victims, the chairperson, along with many of the other former 
commissioner’s present at the screening, was brought to tears. ‘We forgot that 
this was just a lm’, he professed.5
Doubtless, in Tutu, Red Dust found an unusually fulsome sponsor. Under 
his stewardship, the Commission had made many similar such appeals to the 
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sacramental logic of forgiveness. But Hooper’s lm is by no means alone in de-
ferring to the aective intensity of the Commission’s public hearings in order 
to frame its poignant progress. Adapted from Krog’s Country of My Skull, John 
Boorman’s In My Country (2004) makes many similarly emotional appeals, 
taking up a whole host of hearings as example of South Africa’s fundamentally 
forgiving spirit. By comparison, Ian Gabriel’s Forgiveness (2004) broadens this 
sense of personal and, by implication, national redemption, tracking its everyday, 
rather than national, drama. Set in the years aer the Commission concluded, 
Gabriel’s lm invokes, nonetheless, the self-same sacramental metaphors that 
motivated Tutu’s original appeal to light over darkness and goodness over evil. 
Gabriel even concludes his lm’s burdensome narrative of recrimination and 
thwarted revenge by citing on screen a dictum rst tendered by Tutu in a fore-
word to the Commission’s nal report:
Having looked the beast in the eye, having asked and received forgiveness 
and having made amends, let us shut the door on the past—not to forget it 
but in order not to allow it to imprison us.6
is poignant appeal—a trademark of Tutu’s chairmanship—is designed to cer-
tify the lm’s sense of moral deliverance. But it is also an attempt to make im-
perceptible the gap between its own moving, melodramatic climax and the sup-
posedly remarkable achievements of the Commission in the eld of racial justice.
Distinguishing the intense, oen also overwhelming emotion of the cinema 
screen from its original, institutional source is no straightforward task. Indeed, 
such is the strength of the aective bond supposedly secured with the Com-
mission and its confessional praxis, that this trio of lms have been catalogued 
since by lm scholars under a simple but exclusive index as ‘TRC lms’. is is 
not, however, a necessarily creditable label. For their close correspondence with 
the Commission has proven less a foundation from which to explore the recu-
perative capacity of their shared confessional praxis and more a source of critical 
aggravation. For the most part, this criticism circulates around broadly dened 
questions of legitimacy and authenticity. Lesley Marx, for instance, foregrounds 
the articial links that secure these ‘TRC lms’ to the Commission, querying 
more generally ‘the relation between the lmic text and the reality with which 
it engages’. She challenges, in particular, the capacity of this popular cinematic 
genre to provide its audience with the ‘complex truth’ that emerged originally 
at the Truth Commission’s hearings.7 For Patrick Flanery, the challenges levied 
by Marx against this brand of popular cinema are as much a problem of ethical 
propriety as they are of truth. And in rather more trenchant terms, he sets about 
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cataloguing the consistent and ‘outrageous appropriation’ made by these lms 
of the individual testimonies elicited by the Commission.8 His shock is by no 
means abstract but is led by a sense of delity before the appreciable suering 
of those many victims whose stories now sustain these popular tales of national 
redemption.
In part, this chapter attempts to incorporate rather than excise the acute, 
oen polarising feelings that the Commission has stirred up, both on the cin-
ema screen and among reviewers. Rather than simply disclaim the litany of ab-
stractions, appropriations, and elisions that pattern these so-called ‘TRC lms’, 
then, I want to reect on the melodramatic appeal that arguably conditions their 
seeming corruptions. To be clear, this is not to mitigate their acts of appropri-
ation. Nor is to assent automatically to the forgiving ethos that these lms so
fastidiously promote. But accepting the extreme aective atmosphere that has
come to rule the Commission, my principal aim here is to ratify the full range
of truths, felt as well as factual, collective as well as individual, that this con-
fessional sphere delivers. For these are also the ‘complex’ truths that any recital
of reconciliation—forgiving and otherwise—must nd ways to integrate. As
Deborah Posel asserts in the epigraph that begins this chapter, ‘the subject of
history must be as emotional as she is thinking’.9 It is the adjacent priorities
of popular lm, I want to suggest, that provides us with a foundation for their
mutual articulation.
In working out a cinematic mode that is responsive, as well as responsible, 
before the emotional intensities of this confessional arena, however, this chapter 
must also adjudicate upon the moral outrage that so consistently stalks the treat-
ment of these ‘TRC lms’. Put bluntly, is verisimilitude the sole criteria against 
which they must be judged, or are there other, more generic motivations to be 
found in their moving appeal to the language of forgiveness? Merely reciting the 
many egregious diractions made of the Commission by these lms is unlikely 
to yield a satisfying resolution. But this should not necessarily lead us to discount 
their contribution to our understanding of the Commission and, most expressly, 
the intensely emotional terrain within which it acted. In fact, they arguably re-
veal much as a condition of their impropriety, not least the slim divide that sep-
arates their melodramatic drive towards forgiveness from the Commission’s own 
declared achievements in this sphere.
More signicantly, these popular ‘TRC lms’ also serve to set into com-
parative relief the neighbouring achievements of Mark Kaplan’s contempora-
neous documentary lm Between Joyce and Remembrance (2003). Largely ne-
glected amid the controversy that has enveloped these more popular, ctional 
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equivalents, Kaplan’s documentary approach potentially oers up a separate 
mode of democratic rather than strictly popular lmmaking through which 
to integrate the emotional excesses conjured up by the Commission. Certainly, 
Between Joyce and Remembrance is not without its own potential controversy. 
But in securing a mode of lmic representation where the aective intensities 
oen essential to the act of confession might play a pivotal but not redemptive
function in its process, Kaplan’s lm also prioritises the type of unpredictable,
improvisational impulses that are central to this study at large. For Between Joyce 
and Remembrance defers not to the institutional authority of the Truth Com-
mission but the interpersonal claims of those victims who appeared at its hear-
ings, oering up a more general theory of the confessional act and the intense
emotional sphere through which it must navigate.
e Melodramatic Imagination
To secure a sense of emotional integrity from the intensities that stalk the con-
fessional sphere means rst and foremost deciding over the integrity of the 
melodramatic imagination upon which those ‘TRC lms’ screened at the 2004 
CTWCF arguably all depend. A suggestion made most prominently by Anton 
van der Hoven and Jill Arnott in their unusually approbatory review of these 
popular lms, melodrama’s generic claims are not especially distant from the 
Truth Commission’s own aective excesses or, indeed, its supposedly forgiving 
ethos. ough the genre’s sensationalist tendencies appear incongruous with the 
urgent ambitions of the Commission, there is much in the genre’s appeal to the 
emotional, the sensorial as well as the moral that inform our understanding 
of its everyday praxis. In principle, then, Van der Hoven and Arnott defend 
melodrama as a ‘cultural mode and aesthetic practice . . . entirely appropriate to 
understanding the South African context and the painful stories of its recent 
past’.10 Drawing audiences into a primarily ‘ethical apprehension’ of the intense 
human suering begotten by apartheid, they claim it as an unusually adept 
mode through which to rediscover South Africa’s ‘“lost” humanity’, a task ‘cen-
tral to the TRC itself ’, they insist.11 But, of course, melodrama’s more stubborn, 
pejorative adjectival associations also motivate many of those staunch attacks on 
this informal coterie of ‘TRC lms’, with Flanery, for one, decrying the misap-
propriations that animate Boorman’s ‘melodramatic story’.12
Unlike tragedy, consistently venerated for its moral accomplishments, such 
contrary appeals are, in fact, entirely typical of the uncertain value that melo-
drama maintains. Since it was rst granted a measure of aesthetic as well as social 
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credibility by Peter Brooks in the 1970s, the melodramatic imagination has been 
claimed as both radically democratic and ideologically conservative. At its most 
celebrated, melodrama is said to maintain a talent to ‘communicate to a mass 
audience in the most immediate and accessible ways’.13 At its most maligned, 
however, it seems liable to return ‘deceptive non-solutions’ for society’s many 
problems.14 In short, melodrama consistently splits opinion. It is for this reason 
that critics like Jane Shattuc insist that we only ever assess melodrama with care-
ful regard for ‘its double hermeneutic’.15 By this, she means to suggest a mode of 
analysis that might allow for the contradictions animating the genre, one that 
takes these conicts as instructive rather than reductive.
Following critics like Shattuc and, indeed, Brooks, then, I prefer to approach 
the specic melodrama of these ‘TRC lms’ as a ‘not quite respectable yet . . . 
animating and somehow necessary’ mode of representation, especially when it 
comes to giving form to the Truth Commission and the excess of feeling that 
its public hearings delivered.16 Withholding a degree of judgment, my aim is to 
adduce from their melodramatic interpretation of the Commission a sense of the 
generic protocols and palatable denouements that have since been deployed to 
ratify its public praxis. In this way, melodrama might yet tell us something about 
the Truth Commission and its vulnerability before the ‘quasi-theological drama 
of forgiveness’, even if the genre also challenges our sense of aesthetic propriety. 
I prefer to proceed, therefore, not by dismissing melodrama out of hand, but by 
approaching these ‘TRC lms’ according to the genre’s double hermeneutic. To 
read in this way is to secure important insight into the type of ideological con-
icts and coercions upon which absolution’s exaltation arguably also depends. 
But it is also to reckon with the countervailing value that melodrama upholds 
in the much wider, ‘post-sacred’ arena of reconciliation—to pick up on one of 
Brooks’s key descriptors for the melodramatic imagination.17
ere is much precedence for the type of political scaolding under which 
melodrama’s individuated trials and triumphs appear to play out. Indeed, as both 
a cinematic genre and as a broader cultural mode, its broadly demotic appeal 
has been the subject of a wide, globally distributed proliferation that long pre-
cedes South Africa’s transition to democracy. From Mexico in the 1910s to South 
Korea in the 1950s, the genre has come to serve in the wake of various political 
crises as a vital arena for the mobilisation of new collective solidarities. Noble, 
for one, describes how in the aermath of the Mexican Revolution, ‘the kind of 
narrative structures and identications promoted by and through melodrama 
became important audio-visual vehicles through which to tell stories of cohesive 
nationhood’.18 Similarly, for McHugh and Abelmann, the melodramatic screen 
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maintains a rare ability to circulate the democratic reassurances necessary to 
counteract the ideological instability that followed the end of the Korean War 
in the 1950s.19 In each of these critical paradigms, melodrama is seen to prosper 
as the arbitrator of a fractured, authoritarian past, assisting in the composition 
of a new, democratic present and contributing to what has been dubbed since as 
a ‘golden age’ in their respective national cinemas.
No attempt has been made to distinguish quite such an apotheosis in South 
Africa’s still budding national cinema. But arguably these ‘TRC lms’ are part 
of melodrama’s more general proliferation in the earliest years of democracy.20
As elsewhere, the genre’s ourishing is thought to depend upon its contempo-
rary resonance with something of the radical, revolutionary spirit of France in 
the 1790s under which melodrama, according to Brooks, was rst ushered into 
formal existence. For just as the French Revolution’s utter ‘dissolution of an or-
ganic and hierarchically cohesive society’ is hailed as the original harbinger of 
melodrama, it is the parallel desire ‘to legislate the regime of virtue’ that oen 
underpins accounts of its subsequent renewal.21 Indeed, wherever the genre has 
been found to thrive, something of the anxious and ‘traumatized condition of 
melodrama’s rst audiences’ is also thought to rule.22 Set into this paradigm, 
melodrama’s typically Manichean conicts between good and evil combine to 
call forward much more than mere sensation. Arguably, they also serve to locate 
and make operative for their audience an ‘essential moral universe’.23 Where ‘the 
traditional imperatives of truth and ethics have been thrown violently into ques-
tion’, melodrama ‘strives to nd, to articulate, to demonstrate, to “prove” the 
existence of a moral universe’, Brooks insists.24 It is, in other words, a genre that 
soothes as much as it moves its audience.
But for all Brooks’s eorts to discover in the melodramatic imagination the 
terms for a reconstituted moral contract, there are many others who pay con-
trasting attention to the pattern of ‘naïve ethical antithesis’ into which it all 
too oen descends.25 Suspicious of those ‘pure and polar concepts of darkness 
and light, salvation and damnation’ that, for Brooks, constitute the ‘emotional 
[and] spiritual force’ of the genre, critics lament this strictly diametric view of 
the world as liable to exploitation, abstraction, and elision.26 To this extent, then, 
it is important to remain alert to the contradictions, as Christine Gledhill af-
rms, ‘hidden in the formal and ideological operations of melodrama’—which 
is to say the distinction between its democratic appeal and its potentially pop-
ulist manipulation.27 is is, undoubtedly, an awkward separation to maintain. 
In its broadly utopian desire to reform and remake society from below, melo-
drama also maintains a wide appeal that many of the other performative modes 
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countenanced in this present study, for all their democratic ambitions, would 
nd hard to sustain. Whatever else may be said of its formal credentials, melo-
drama is nothing if not a genre performed ‘in the name of “ordinary citizens”’.28
When critics like Flanery deploy melodrama in order to discredit these ‘TRC 
lms’, then, they also risk denigrating the egalitarian ambitions to which the 
genre more generally subscribes, making simplistic the historical, demotic roots 
of melodrama. To this extent, the problem posed by the genre is perhaps better 
framed in terms of the collective, rather than merely individual and specic, 
manipulations it arguably performs. In short, how do you maintain the ordinary, 
democratic impulses of melodrama without also sustaining a popular compul-
sion towards triumphalism, especially in a eld as seductive, politically as well 
as personally, as forgiveness?
e Melodrama of Forgiveness: In My Country and Red Dust
For the likes of Van der Hoven and Arnott, who draw extensively from the re-
cuperative labour performed by Brooks, the melodramatic vernacular of both 
In My Country and Red Dust presents itself as an entirely apposite one through 
which to address the legacies of the apartheid past. From its essential ‘egalitarian 
impulse[s]’ to its consistent focus on the somatic and the non-verbal, melodrama 
gives form, in particular, to the acute and oen also incommunicable suering 
of apartheid’s many victims.29 To bolster their general argument, the pair make 
particular example of the individual confessions delivered before a ctionalised 
version of the Truth Commission during the course of In My Country. ey 
target, for instance, the pitiable cry let out by a character named Albertina So-
bandla as she hears how her husband, Hubert, was stabbed thirty-seven times 
by police. Read by Van der Hoven and Arnott as an ‘expression of [a] pain’ that 
exceeds description, the scene undoubtedly depends upon a similarly moving 
moment in Nomonde Calata’s original deposition, heard during the rst week 
of the Truth Commission’s public hearings.30
Presiding over her appearance before the HRVC in East London in April 
1996, the Commission’s deputy chair, Alex Boraine, has described Calata’s ‘pri-
meval and spontaneous wail’ as an utterly transformative moment. It was ‘as 
if she enshrined in the throwing back of her body and letting out the cry the 
collective horror of the thousands of people who had been trapped in racism and 
oppression for so long’, Boraine a
rms.31 And so, just as Calata is understood 
to have ‘caught up in a single howl all the darkness and horror of the apartheid 
years’, Sobandla’s extreme distress as she falls back into the arms of a professional 
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comforter is taken by Van der Hoven and Arnott as ‘a more, not less, eloquent’ 
portrayal of the suering endured by the ordinary victims of apartheid.32 As 
they understand it, her intense performance operates beyond the limits of lan-
guage—that is, in the otherwise ineable spheres of grief and trauma. And it is 
here, in the somatic and the paralinguistic, that melodrama stakes its e
cacy, 
presenting its audience with, what Van der Hoven and Arnott describe as, those 
‘personally felt moral truths’ that a more discursive confessional account of the 
past can rarely hope to replicate.33
In principle, at least, their claim is a compelling one and might well serve to 
account for the intense emotional encounters that animate the rest of Boorman’s 
lm, of which there are many. Upon closer inspection, however, these outwardly 
derivative scenes do more to destabilize than substantiate Van der Hoven and 
Arnott’s support for those moral truths unveiled by this melodramatic inter-
pretation of the Commission. For one thing, the cry let out by Sobandla largely 
fails to convey with any comparable aective force the anguish that motivated 
Calata’s original distress. Similarly, the basic conguration of her hearing nds 
little correspondence with those staged originally by the Truth Commission. 
e makers of In My Country blithely confuse the distinct procedures of the 
HRVC, a supposedly compassionate space dedicated to eliciting uncritically vic-
tims’ confessional accounts of past abuse, with those of the Amnesty Commit-
tee, a quasi-legal body designed to adjudicate on perpetrators’ criminal liability 
and underwritten by the burden of proof. In Sobandla’s case, the plausibility of 
her extreme anguish is made to depend absolutely on the tormenting appearance 
of her husband’s killer, Sergeant Dreyer, as she attempts to relay her story—pre-
cisely the type of encounter proscribed by the HRVC.
Marched into the hearing under police escort as reproachful shouts issue 
from the assembled crowd, Dreyer takes his seat just a few feet away from So-
bandla on the makeshi stage. He is shown snarling in deance as she recalls 
how the police laughed at her when she attempted to obtain information about 
her husband’s disappearance. His actions are purposefully provocative, en-
trenching the divide between victim and perpetrator, between good and evil, it 
seems. Turning to confront Dreyer directly, Sobandla concludes her evidence 
with a desperate petition for him to acknowledge his part in her husband’s 
death: ‘To this day, I do not know what happened to him. You must tell me’.34
But Dreyer sits unmoved before her, playing the role of merciless perpetrator 
with aplomb. It is only aer he is directed by Reverend Mzondo, the ctional 
equivalent to Tutu, to make a ‘full confession’ that he begins to oer up any 
information. With scant care for Sobandla’s fragile condition, Dreyer describes 
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how her husband was viewed as ‘a thorn in the side’ of the apartheid regime and 
was nominated for ‘elimination’. He recalls how Hubert Sobandla ‘fought like a 
tiger’ when beaten by police o
cers. ‘He was ghting for his life’, Dreyer contin-
ues, with a slight smirk appearing across his face. It is only with this distressing 
revelation that his widow, Albertina Sobandla, collapses, screaming in anguish 
as she is helped from the hall. ‘I’m sorry to Mrs Sobandla’, Dreyer calls out in 
between her cries, before he turns to Mzondo and the rest of the commissioners 
with an obvious sense of self-satisfaction: ‘I’m asking for amnesty. I have made 
a full disclosure’.
Such instances of ‘false invention’, as David Philips terms them, might per-
haps be overlooked as necessary to melodrama’s negotiation of the many aective 
excesses circulating at the Commission were it not for the sense of triumphant 
resolution at which these scenes ultimately aim.35 Boorman’s ‘barely ctional-
ized’ but, ultimately, also fallacious rendering of another case, Seditso Motasi, 
who in 1987 witnessed his mother’s murder at the hands of three security police 
o
cers, provides for an especially instructive example.36 In Boorman’s account,
the boy is re-named Peter Makeba but the details of the case are reprised almost 
verbatim from the transcripts of Paul van Vuuren, one of the oending o
cer’s
original Amnesty Committee hearing. His ctional equivalent, a police o
cer
named Van Deventer, rst reports the clinical method with which he and his
colleagues in the security police rst smothered and then shot Makeba’s father.
He recalls too how they proceeded thereaer to turn their guns on the boy’s
mother, who stood deantly before them in protection of her young son. With
the boy placed for some inexplicable reason alone on a chair facing the assembled 
audience, Boorman adds to this confession a wholly specious scene in which the 
police o
cer turns to petition Makeba for absolution.
Leaving his position behind the microphone, Van Deventer steps out in front 
of his young victim. ‘I’ll look aer him’, Van Deventer announces in a desperate 
eort to make recompense, ‘I’ll pay his school fees’. With little regard for this 
misplaced paternalism, the camera cuts to an extreme close-up of the boy’s face, 
tracking his eyes as they move up to meet those of the amnesty applicant in 
seeming astonishment. Under the rubric of melodrama, this small gesture is un-
derstood to signal Makeba’s assent and Van Deventer falls to his knees in front 
of the boy in relief. Supposedly brought into symbolic parity, the pair embrace 
each other, the police o
cer somehow forgiven and redeemed. Commenting on 
the scene as part of his director’s commentary, Boorman describes it as a ‘moving 
moment’ in which the audience is ‘seeing exactly what happened’ at the original 
hearing. Except, as Flanery also points out, an examination of the transcripts 
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from Van Vuuren’s original hearing reveals no such moving encounter. Financial 
concerns were raised at the conclusion of another o
cer’s Amnesty Committee 
hearing by Motasi’s elderly grandmother, who feared for the future security of 
her orphaned grandchild, but no personal oer of reparation was ever made.
e ‘outrageous appropriation’ of Motasi’s suering, as Flanery describes it, 
does much to betray the genre’s declared concern for those ‘ordinary citizens’, 
to return to Gledhill, that suered most under apartheid.37 When examined 
against the ongoing trauma cited by the lm, it is hard to conceive of its sen-
sationalist reinterpretation as motivated by anything other than melodrama’s 
‘one overriding aesthetic goal: the calling forth of “pure,” “vivid” emotions’—to 
invoke Daniel Gerould’s description.38 is is not to dismiss the genre out of 
hand, but to probe the appeal made by these ‘TRC lms’ to the more specic 
melodrama of forgiveness. In scenes like this, any of the complex moral and 
aective truths that Van der Hoven and Arnott sanctify appear to have been 
overtaken the genre’s more precipitous preference for narrative as much as moral 
redemption. Of course, there is a necessary case to be made for the interpersonal 
and intrapsychical relief that forgiveness may secure. As Minow attests, ‘through 
forgiveness, victims can reassert their own power and reestablish their own dig-
nity while also teaching wrongdoers the eects of their harmful actions’.39 In 
the wider pursuit of reconciliation, forgiveness oers itself up as an important 
Figure 7. A police o
cer named Van Deventer pleads with his victim’s 
young child for forgiveness. From In My Country (2004), directed 
by John Boorman and produced by Sony Pictures Classic.
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mechanism through which to reintegrate those individual perpetrators who oth-
erwise appear beyond the sphere of moral concern.
is rationale is severely undermined, however, when these plausible benets 
are cut free from their situated, personal mooring in an eort, as Bhekizizwe 
Peterson describes, to deify forgiveness ‘as the sine qua non of nationhood and 
progress’.40 Not only do expedient injunctions like Tutu’s ‘no future without 
forgiveness’ threaten to deny victims their ‘acute, pervasive and transgenera-
tional experiences of suering’, but this forgiving drive also appears to act as 
a ‘disempowering burden’, Peterson insists, disabling the criminal case against 
apartheid’s chief architects.41 Moreover, as a number of analysts all a
rm, the 
actual prospect of forgiveness brought about by the Commission found little 
correspondence with the vision propagated publicly by Tutu and others.42 Ex-
amination of the Commission’s HRVC hearings reveals that forgiveness seldom 
ever featured as a topic for discussion, and when it did, it was not without express 
encouragement from the commissioner leading the particular hearings. For the 
limited number of deponents who spoke of forgiveness, it was usually to deny 
its promise and to underline, instead, their abiding sense of distress and anger.
Even if we accept In My Country as giving sweeping but legible shape to the 
Truth Commission in its intricate, peripatetic journeying across the country, the 
way in which specic hearings are selectively rehearsed and revised ultimately 
discredits the lm’s democratic credentials. By comparison, Red Dust can claim 
no such partial mitigation. But neither does it maintain quite the same litany 
of abuses. Favouring the comparative intensity of a single hearing set in the c-
tional frontier town of Smitsriver, Hooper’s lm still confuses the conditions 
that distinguish the HRVC hearings from those of the Amnesty Committee. 
Here, however, there is some important precedence at least. On a large prosce-
nium stage, we are presented with the Commission’s ctional chair, Justice Nev-
ille Mashaba, a victim of gross human rights abuse named Alex Mpondo, the po-
lice o
cer, Dirk Hendricks, accused of torturing Mpondo under apartheid, and 
the deponents’ respective lawyers. Despite the obvious procedural confusions, 
the hearing’s historical source is almost immediately identiable once the de-
tails of the case emerge. Drawing from one of the Commission’s most notorious 
Amnesty Committee hearings, Hendriks appears to approximate the notorious 
apartheid-era police o
cer, Jerey Benzien. Much like Benzien’s most notable 
victim, Tony Yengeni, a former MK cadre turned ANC MP, who came before 
the Amnesty Committee to oppose his application, Mpondo was subjected to a 
similarly brutal interrogation by Hendriks while under arrest for alleged acts of 
terrorism under apartheid.
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It is an acutely provocative case to reprise. Yengeni had been provided a unique 
opportunity by the Amnesty Committee to cross-question Benzien, directing 
him to describe and then, unnervingly, re-enact before the Committee the 
particular methods used in his torture, most notoriously his preferred wet-bag 
method—as witnessed in Yaël Farber’s Molora. Taking a pillow and a curiously 
willing volunteer from the audience, Benzien squatted over his victim, pulling 
tight the makeshi bag over a volunteer’s head to supply a moment of damaging 
disclosure. As a venomous rejoinder to this request, however, Benzien proceeded 
subsequently to prey upon Yengeni’s own vulnerability, remarking upon the MP’s 
faint resistance. According to Benzien, he quickly gave up the names of fellow 
anti-apartheid activists like Jennifer Schreiner.43 It was an unnerving display of 
the sadistic authority still held by the perpetrator over his victim, with Benzien 
actively taunting Yengeni as the two slipped back into their former roles.
In Red Dust’s earliest scenes, Mpondo, much like Yengeni, prompts Hen-
dricks to confess before the Committee to some of his abusive acts. Hendriks’s 
account, presented in the same stoic, chilling tone of Benzien’s own deposition, 
aects a collective gasp of horror from the black audience assembled for the 
hearing. But rather than inviting Hendriks to restage his method, Mpondo is, 
instead, overtaken by traumatic ashbacks to the scene of his original torture. 
Incorporating something of the scene that emerged at Benzien’s Amnesty Com-
mittee hearing, Mpondo is pictured as part of this induced analepsis with his 
head covered as he thrashes on the oor in pain. We hear his skull crash against 
the oor, before the wet-bag is eventually removed and a close-up captures the 
look of terror that ashes across his face. Returning to the public hearing, Hen-
dricks describes how he would repeat the procedure in an eort to break his 
victim, and with each new detail, the lm cuts back to the scene of Mpondo’s 
original torture. In a somewhat crude eort, it seems, to raise the tension of this 
already distressing scene, a small clock ticks volubly in the background, count-
ing down each excruciating second, as Hendricks’s lawyer queries whether the 
technique produced its desired eect. e clock then stops, the silence swelling, 
before Hendricks declares with a measure of climactic satisfaction: ‘He told me 
what I wanted to know’.44
With this shocking revelation, cries of outrage and disgust explode from the 
audience, while Hendriks continues to describe how Mpondo gave him the de-
tails to an arms and ammunitions dump. Mpondo, meanwhile, begins to shake 
with a seeming admixture of anger and self-reproach. e rm, deant gaze he 
had hitherto targeted at Hendricks breaks as he hangs his head in shame. e au-
dience, meanwhile, continues to grow increasingly clamorous, with many shout-
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ing the amnesty applicant down, while others can be seen looking at one another 
open-mouthed in disbelief. ‘Do you think he really sold out?’, remarks one elderly 
woman to her husband, before the Committee’s chair is forced to stand up and 
request calm. ereaer, the hearing adopts a procedural style more appropriate 
to a courtroom drama than any Amnesty Committee hearing. Mpondo’s lawyer 
stands up to oppose Hendricks’s remarks, assuring the commissioner that her 
‘client will refute the allegations in his testimony’ before the hall clears out and 
Mpondo’s narrative search for personal and reputational redemption begins.
Red Dust is not a straightforward tale of forgiveness. At least, it is Mpondo, 
rather than Hendriks, who is most eager to secure the forgiveness of those he 
has wronged in the past. In so doing, he also nds a way to absolve Hendriks 
and agree to his appeal for amnesty, but this is made secondary to Mpondo’s 
own route to absolution. It is from this comparatively incongruous perspective, 
therefore, that Red Dust provides its sensitive account of the tumultuous, fragile 
emotional terrain from which the pursuit of forgiveness always also emerges. In 
scenes that suspend their narrative intelligibility, Mpondo focalises the ongoing 
trauma as well as the rising sense of shame that also stalks his sense of person-
hood. We are made privy to his internal suering—something wholly absent 
from In My Country. But Red Dust cannot shake o the urge to redeem the past 
and give expression to the country’s forgiving future. In this, Mpondo is made 
metonymical, his status as a public representative evidently designed to stand 
in for the country as a whole. As such, his trauma is also the trauma endured 
nationally, while his capacity to overcome the injustice of apartheid also reects 
the supposed willingness of ordinary citizens to do the same. He is, it seems, 
both for the people and of the people, guiding them spiritually and morally to-
wards the lm’s nal, climactic scene of liberation from the past. Cheered and 
ululated by the crowd at the lm’s conclusion, he oers up to the nation a vision 
of its collective deliverance.
Melodrama’s Populism
Where melodrama may claim a prodigious role in the democratic life of the 
nation, in its general appeal to the popular it also appears to stand vulnerable 
before the monumental tale of redemption that has come increasingly to ani-
mate the country’s transition. To this extent, the genre’s plausibly laudable ef-
forts work through apartheid’s most recalcitrant antipathies seem to do less to 
reconstitute the country’s moral sphere than they do to legitimate the injustice 
ongoing in the present. At its worst, the melodramatic scenes of forgiveness that 
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emerge from these ‘TRC lms’ appear as a national asset, a
rming the supposed 
exceptionalism of South Africa’s ‘ordinary citizens’ in the long history of mass 
violence. Under these terms, they risk conscripting the aective in service of 
other less ethical, more coercive, even commercial ends. But such risks are not 
necessarily unique to melodrama; they arguably parallel the priorities driving 
the country’s incipient lm industry more generally in the wake of apartheid. 
For where certain critics, most notably Jacqueline Maingard, celebrate the trans-
formative objectives driving the national cinema in the rst decade of democ-
racy, others remain far less convinced. e industry’s foundational 1996 White 
Paper, for instance, has been subject to particular censure with many commen-
tators unable to reconcile its cultural ambitions with its globalised commercial 
underpinnings. Even as Lucia Saks underlines ‘the crucial role of cinema in en-
visioning the new nation through a progressive/continuous state of vision and 
critique’, she derides the White Paper for its unnerving reliance upon ‘phrases 
that could have emerged from a reader on neoliberal economic policy’.45 In a 
particularly trenchant attack upon the distortive inuences presiding over the 
industry, Flanery too questions how others can even begin to speak of a truly 
national cinema ‘when the nancing, personnel, and circulation, to varying de-
grees, have so oen been and remain emphatically multi-and transnational’.46
e pair of ‘TRC lms’ reviewed above fair especially poorly under this crit-
ical light. Both Red Dust and In My Country were adapted from their South 
African source texts by American screenwriters. With British directors at the 
helm, they were each realised with major Hollywood actors in leading roles, 
namely Hilary Swank, Jamie Bartlett, Juliette Binoche, Samuel L. Jackson, and 
Brendan Gleeson. National funding for In My Country totalled just US$ 20,000 
(c. R 200,000), invested by the Industrial Development Corporation of South 
Africa (IDC), a public nance institution interested, as Saks describes, only by 
‘productions that will attract international players’.47 For the IDC, a project is 
considered feasible only ‘if it can be shot in South Africa and nd an interna-
tional market’.48 Only seven prints of In My Country were distributed nationally 
aer the CTWCF, grossing a mere R 155, 840 at the South African box o
ce.49
Hooper’s lm, by contrast, did secure funding from Videovision Entertainment, 
a large South African production company led by Anant Singh, in o
cial col-
laboration with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Its distributor, the 
British company United International Pictures—which maintains a marginal 
share in a market dominated by Ster-Kinekor, the same distribution company 
that monopolised the industry under apartheid—released only een prints in 
South Africa.50 Earning just R 309,738 in South Africa, the lm’s gross per print 
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was largely equal to that of In My Country at just over R 20,000—barely enough 
to cover the cost of each printing.51
e failure of Red Dust and In My Country to secure a veriably popular 
appeal in South Africa not only tests the claims made by Van der Hoven and Ar-
nott over the ‘signicant social impact’ of melodrama, but such poor box-o
ce 
receipts also seriously derogate the lms’ purchase within the South African 
cinematic economy at large.52 To this extent, it appears increasingly impracti-
cable to defend their melodramatic composition as a response to the concerns 
of a South African audience in pursuit of a new moral, democratic order. Of 
more immediate seeming concern are the demands of an international, chiey 
American audience for whom ‘the master narrative of South Africa’s democratic 
struggle’ is required to function more as an allegorical frame through which to 
navigate their own suering, to borrow from Rita Barnard’s argument over Alan 
Paton’s Cry, the Beloved Country (1948). With similarly scant concern for the 
historical frameworks that condition the lms’ narratives, under these terms, 
the long struggle for democracy nds itself attened out and made serviceable 
as a type of ‘therapeutic travelogue’.53
e casting of Samuel L. Jackson as Langston Whiteld, a cynical American 
journalist reporting on the Commission’s hearings for the Washington Post, in 
Boorman’s In My Country and Hilary Swank as an expatriate South African 
lawyer recently returned from New York in Hooper’s Red Dust certainly ex-
pedite this process. Not simply a boost for the commercial appeal of the lms 
within the American marketplace, their characters act from their removed per-
spective as lters through which to mediate and make accessible the redemptive, 
therapeutic potential of the Commission for a removed, comparatively inexpert 
audience. Swank’s character, for instance, oers obligingly ill-informed estima-
tions of the Commission’s function that are then contested and recomposed as 
the lm progresses, the audience eectively sharing in her enlightenment. Simi-
larly, Jackson’s role in In My Country helpfully (which is to say hazardously) ex-
trapolates many of the lm’s specic contextual details, rendering apartheid, as 
he writes in one of his led newspaper reports, as the ‘South African Holocaust’. 
Eschewing concern for what Achille Mbembe describes plainly as the circum-
stantial as well as historical ‘distance that prevents the traumas, the absence, and 
the loss from ever being the same’, both In My Country and Red Dust attempt 
to render South Africa as a proxy for a more generic collective suering.54 Ul-
timately, the impressions that prevail in both lms are essentially ‘touristic’, to 
borrow again from Barnard, propagating a type of ‘soul branding’ that situates 
the Truth Commission at the heart of South Africa’s national redemption.55
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is is no more evident than in the sumptuous aerial shots of Cape Point, the 
Northern Drakensburg’s sweeping Amphitheatre, and the verdant Blyde River 
Canyon that open In My Country and the equally striking panorama of the 
Eastern Cape’s Valley of Desolation with which Red Dust begins. Just as in Cry, 
the Beloved Country’s loy, opening vision of the Natal midlands, in fact, these 
title sequences oer an inviting pictorial of South Africa, ‘lovely beyond any 
singing of it’, to borrow from Paton’s novel.56 is a
nity with Paton’s ‘almost 
cinematic’ rendering of the hills outside Ixopo, as Herman Wittenberg puts it, 
extends even to the sublime vision through which both lms counterpose the 
country’s profound beauty with a sense of the potent terror brimming beneath 
its surface.57 Directly preceding Red Dust’s evocative, high-angle tracking shots, 
for instance, is a brief but disquieting close-up of a gravely beaten black man 
stricken on a dusty oor. Staring directly into the camera, his limp hand points 
towards the audience both in accusation and in supplication as he is dragged out 
of shot. e large pool of cranial blood le behind captures only an indistinct 
reection of his assailant who struggles to manoeuvre the body. By comparison, 
In My Country’s wide opening vistas cross fade into raw documentary footage of 
a violent assault against a number of black protesters by South African security 
police, likely shot by news crews during the 1980s. In each, the transcendent 
beauty of the landscape, to recall again Wittenberg’s account of Paton’s novel, is 
made to feel ‘threatened by the facts of racial injustice’.58
Unlike Cry, the Beloved Country, however, which at the very least allows this 
sublime vision to structure a narrative tension, Red Dust and In My Country
presently displace such facts of racial injustice with the triumphant interces-
sion of democracy. As the picture shis in Red Dust from its remote prospect 
on top of the hills, it tracks the ight of a number of children racing through 
an informal settlement to greet a long line of trucks traversing the valley oor. 
With the vehicles branded with the insignia of ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ and 
adorned with the nation’s new ag, this stylised entrance invites a comforting 
but crude kinship between the Truth Commission and the all-too familiar im-
ages of international aid agencies as they arrive in post-conict territories to 
provide relief from famine and disease. Like Boorman, who inserts into his title 
sequence footage of Nelson Mandela’s jubilant parade at Soweto’s Soccer City 
Stadium in 1990, Hooper forecloses any sense of those ongoing and unjust lega-
cies that might threaten to undermine his lm’s therapeutic narrative. e nal 
resolution written into Red Dust, in which Mpondo is granted forgiveness by his 
comrade’s family, is never seriously put in doubt. Barcant returns to her job in 
New York armed with fresh aection for her native South Africa, while Mpondo 
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is able to continue with his work in parliament supposedly liberated from the 
burdens of his past.
For the limited audience that ever saw this pair of popular lms in South 
Africa’s cinemas, evidently the aim was to leave them contented with the work 
of the Commission in resolving the di
cult traumas of apartheid and satised 
by the prospect of a healed democratic future for the country more generally. 
Perhaps it is this troubling departure from the bounds of any veriable collec-
tive experience that accounts for their general unpopularity, locally at least. But 
this has not prevented their broader circulation elsewhere, and it is this wider 
appeal to a distorted and increasingly corruptive image of South African excep-
tionalism that irks so many of their critics. Further corroborating images of the 
Rainbow Nation, the forgiving spirit of the apartheid’s many victims endorsed 
by these ‘TRC lms’ entails similarly derealizing consequences, not least for 
the black majority whose lives have been little improved by the transition to 
democracy. Even maintaining a sense of the ‘double hermeneutic’ through which 
the melodramatic imagination proceeds does little to help rescue them from 
their intensely emotive negotiation of the past a strictly democratic, rather than 
merely popular, agenda.
Melodrama’s Unreal: Forgiveness
As intimated already, Ian Gabriel’s Forgiveness maintains a certain distinction 
within this band of ‘TRC lms’, and not just by virtue of its comparatively nar-
row focus on a time and place beyond the Commission’s public hearings. Pro-
duced by Dv8, a modest initiative launched by Jeremy Nathan and Joel Phiri 
in 2001 to ‘develop, produce and market twelve genuine South African digital 
feature lms’, it maintains a degree of separation too from the nancial, aes-
thetic and, indeed, ideological inuences that so clearly dominate Red Dust and 
In My Country.59 Greg Latter, the lead writer for the long-running South Afri-
can ‘edutainment’ television series Soul City, provided the original script and, 
much like his television work, Forgiveness maintains a pedagogical impulse with 
its published screenplay prefaced by support material for use in South African 
schools. ere is, it seems, a broadly creditable commitment to social justice at 
the heart of the lm, something that helps to distinguish it from the compara-
tively touristic ambitions of these other ‘TRC lms’.
at said, the international leverage that aicts In My Country and Red Dust
should not be discounted altogether from an assessment of Forgiveness. In the 
face of consistently low patronage at South African cinema screens, for instance, 
110 chapter three
Gabriel has spoken of the serious obligations placed upon him ‘to make lms 
that speak to and appeal to an international as well as a local audience’.60 Sim-
ilarly, his wife and co-producer on the lm, Cindy Gabriel, has argued in her 
concluding remarks for its press notes that Forgiveness should be viewed as a 
‘drama that deals with the issue of truth and reconciliation in a universal, cine-
matic way’.61 But when set against the gross abstractions made by Boorman and 
Hooper, Gabriel’s narrative retreat in Forgiveness to the small Western Cape 
town of Paternoster, together with his intimate depiction of a Coloured family 
burdened by the racial injustice of the past, helps to salvage some of its credentials 
from the transnational concerns that corrupt these ‘TRC lms’ more generally.
Moreover, where In My Country and Red Dust are arguably constrained 
by their attachment to the Commission’s proceedings, Forgiveness pursues its 
melodramatic ambitions in terms that also exceed such a broadly realist frame-
work. is is a vital feature of the genre, which as Gledhill explains, necessarily 
makes ‘a demand for signicances unavailable within the constraints of socially 
legitimate discourse’.62 Realism may be where melodrama oen begins, but in 
its deferral to those ‘pure and polar concepts of darkness and light, salvation 
and damnation’, to return to Brooks, it is the spiritual realm towards which it 
more oen tends. As Gledhill conceives it, then, the genre must be taken as a 
transition from, and within, the realist mode, sharing rather than eschewing its 
fundamental regard for verisimilitude, even as it also extrapolates its causal logic 
to make intelligible elements of the hyperbolic and the gestural, the emotive and 
the fantastic, the subjective and the surreal that animate the former. In other 
words, the melodramatic imagination satises the demand made by realism to 
depict ‘how things are in a given historical conjuncture’ not by attempting to 
reproduce them but by giving form to the atavistic desires stirring beneath the 
surface.63
It is this wider appeal to the ‘spiritual force’ of melodrama, then, that above 
all distinguishes Gabriel’s ‘TRC lm’ from this more general index. Refusing 
many of the conventions of narrative reason, Forgiveness makes no attempt to 
pursue the ‘literal and rational weighing up of a particular claim to forgiveness 
on the grounds of measurable and representable degrees of sincerity on the part 
of an individual’, as Van der Hoven and Arnott put it.64 Instead, Forgiveness 
hinges on the potential of the melodramatic imagination to make legible the 
‘spiritual meaning’ latent, according to Brooks, ‘within the sphere of human 
ethical relationships’.65 Making recourse to a highly expressive visual grammar, 
Gabriel begins by obviating many of the lm’s historical and contextual markers 
in favour of this more symbolic register. e opening sequence, for instance, 
e Melodrama of Forgiveness 111 
pictures the central character, Tertius Coetzee, speeding along a dusty coastal 
road, leaving no indication of the route by which he has arrived, guratively 
or literally. With the camera preferring instead to give expression to the man’s 
distressed psychical state, these early frames display a fractured vision of his jour-
ney. e principal point of focus is not the road but a medal of Saint Christopher 
that swings from Coetzee’s rear-view mirror. Searching, it seems, for some form 
of salvation, he garners temporary relief from a heavy dose of anti-depressants. 
But his self-medicating also frustrates our attempt to diagnose the underlying 
source of his anguish.
When eventually the car stops at a windswept cemetery and Coetzee pauses 
to add drops to his sleep-deprived eyes, the camera also blurs, inviting the viewer 
to share directly in his distorted visual prospect. It is the rst in a series of moves 
designed, it seems, to encourage our identication with the character. But it is 
also part of the lm’s early narrative disorientation, heightening the audience’s 
sense of anticipation. As Coetzee walks slowly around the cemetery, with the 
wind whipping the sandy topsoil across the graves and further obscuring the 
names marked on their rudimentary wooden crosses, the feeling of diegetic con-
fusion only rises. Eventually, he alights upon a grave marked ‘Daniel Jacobus 
Grootboom’. He stares at the name, wiping away the dirt and residue that con-
ceals the dates: ‘03-10-1971–26-08-1991’. e signicance is unclear, even if we 
might, in the context of the turbulent early years of South Africa’s transition, 
begin to guess at their meaning. But as the man turns to stare wistfully out 
towards an increasingly tempestuous skyline, the audience is le in a state of 
increasingly muddled anticipation.
is inexplicable opening is only compounded as the camera cuts from the 
cemetery to Coetzee’s subsequent arrival at a local B&B. Rather than oering up 
his name to the genial proprietor, as may be anticipated, he remarks in oblique 
terms on a caged Java rice nch, placed at the forefront of the shot: ‘ey’re not 
from here, but they survive in the wild’.66 Aimed, we might surmise, to reect 
upon the character’s own alien status, this circuitous reference speaks to the 
lm’s general refusal to grant its audience with any simple narrative exposition, 
intensifying the generic pleasure thought to inhere in the act of speculation. 
It is only with the arrival of the local priest, Father Dalton, that the lm -
nally provides the viewer with any rm contextual foundation. From Dalton it 
emerges that Coetzee is a former apartheid police o
cer responsible for Daniel 
Grootboom’s death. Having obtained amnesty from the Truth Commission, he 
has travelled to the small town, we discover, in order to meet with his victim’s 
family and seek their forgiveness.
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But Dalton serves to provide more than narrative exposition. In lieu of any 
formal representation of the Truth Commission, the priest also animates some-
thing of the same spiritual framework that, under Tutu, structured its original 
public hearings. Indeed, Tutu’s sacred inuence over the lm manifests in other, 
comparatively crude terms, most obviously in its literal rendering of the sym-
bolism used to describe the act of forgiveness in his memoir, No Future Without 
Forgiveness. ‘Imagine you are in dank, stuy, and dark room’, Tutu writes:
is is because the curtains are drawn and the windows have been shut. 
Outside the light is shining and a fresh breeze is blowing. If you want the 
light to stream into that room and the fresh air to ow in, you will have to 
open the window and draw the curtain apart. . . . So it is with forgiveness.67
By direct comparison, the Grootboom family are pictured initially emerging 
from the dark interior of their home as Coetzee arrives with Dalton to speak 
with them. A neighbour briey interrupts the scene to remark in pointed terms 
to Daniel’s mother, Magda, that it is ‘nice to see you outside again’.68 Her appear-
ance, even on the partial shade of the stoep, is evidently an anomaly. And when 
her daughter, Sannie, seeks to remind them all of the way Coetzee ‘put a bullet in 
Daniel’s head’, Magda turns to her husband, pleading him to ‘take [her] inside’, 
unable, in Tutu’s gurative terms, to tolerate the light.69
is is all part of the excessive styling within which Gabriel frames his lm’s 
melodramatic drive towards forgiveness. At its worst, Forgiveness has been de-
rided as a ‘willed choice in the direction . . . of justifying the amnesty clause’.70
But to maintain a more sympathetic view is also to discover in its sacramental 
structure a potentially moving and numinous transformation in its characters, if 
not also in its audience. In this, much depends, however, on the aective power 
of Coetzee’s subsequent confession. Invited by Sannie to return to the Groot-
boom’s home, he is greeted by the rest of the family with a mix of hostility and 
incredulity. Nonetheless, Dalton encourages them to listen to the former police 
o
cer describe the details of Daniel’s death. With the camera focused tightly
on his face as he sits facing the family, Coetzee begins to recount how Daniel’s
initial capture was made to look like a bungled hijacking, with the young activ-
ist’s car burnt out and le on the side of the road. He is visibly distressed as he
continues to describe how Daniel was then taken to a police facility known eu-
phemistically as ‘the farm’ outside Cape Town and tortured for information. We 
see the family gasp and recoil with collective horror at this disclosure. Despite
being suocated, electrocuted, and forced to stand for many hours without relief, 
Coetzee insists that Daniel refused to confess to his role in any anti-apartheid
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activism. In fact, he spoke only once: ‘He asked me, please rather . . . just kill me’, 
Coetzee confesses.71
With this distressing revelation, the camera cuts suddenly to Daniel’s brother, 
Ernest, as he instinctively grabs at a teapot on the windowsill before bringing it 
crashing down on Coetzee’s head. Playing out in slow motion, the scene momen-
tarily blurs, leaving the audience confused as the family too jump to their feet in 
shock. But as Ernest subsequently slips away, the camera returns to Magda and 
Sannie who rush to stem the blood streaming down Coetzee’s temple. ere is, 
undoubtedly, much melodramatic force written into this reprisal. For one thing, 
it gives expression to the intense, even vengeful aective arena within which the 
act of confession is compelled to operate. But it also gives symbolic form to the 
sacramental structure of the lm. For the family discover in Coetzee’s bodily 
suering—his performed penitence, as it were—an unexpected catharsis. While 
Magda initially remains locked up within the gloom of the indoors, declaring 
despondently, ‘ere’s nothing out there for me’, her husband Hendrik returns 
to work on his small shing boat.72 Where previously he complained of the crip-
pling low yields, he suddenly nds himself hooking in an unexpectedly abun-
dant return of snoek sh.73 is miraculous haul, ‘the biggest catch we’ve had in 
years’, according to Hendrik, is imagined within this apostolic atmosphere as a 
mark of the revivifying process brought about by Coetzee’s confession.74
eir collective salvation reaches its acme when the former police o
cer in-
vites the family out to celebrate Hendrik’s remarkable catch. e dinner serves as 
something of a Last Supper for Coetzee, who has learned of Ernest and Sannie’s 
longstanding plot to have him killed. But it functions too as the moment of mi-
raculous liberation for Magda, who nally frees herself from the darkness of her 
grief. Accordingly, she raises a glass to toast the former policeman, oering him her 
forgiveness. Her ability to ‘look the beast in the eye’, to make literal Tutu’s phrase-
ology, and grant him clemency is, ultimately, what validates the moral authority of 
the lm, her forgiveness safeguarding Coetzee, in the nal analysis, from Ernest’s 
vengeful conspiracy. Unlike those other ‘TRC lms’, Gabriel does not make this 
conclusion inevitable. Indeed, even while Forgiveness aims to leave its audience 
satised in the nal scene by its rehabilitated moral order, it also makes use of its 
melodramatic intensity and inexplicable plot twists to ensure that the audience 
remains suitably doubtful over the power of forgiveness right to the end.
In this, however, it is arguably the melodramatic pleasure of anticipation that 
motivates the lm’s formal progress, over and above the pursuit of justice. Cer-
tainly, under Gledhill’s reasoning, such elements might be defended as part of 
its generic transition from the sphere of the real to a more suggestive sense of the 
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unreal. But this transition also stands vulnerable before the triumphant, populist 
agenda that reigns over these ‘TRC lms’ more generally. For much like In My 
Country and Red Dust, the redemptive arc pursued by Forgiveness contradicts 
many of the ordinary stories of grief upon which it also depends. is is nowhere 
more evident than in its misappropriation of a key scene from Mark Kaplan’s 
documentary lm Between Joyce and Remembrance (2003).75 Captured by Ka-
plan while lming the family of Siphiwo Mtimkulu, a black student activist rst 
tortured and later shot dead by security police in 1982, it depicts his alleged killer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Gideon Nieuwoudt’s abortive confession and subsequent pe-
tition for forgiveness. Just as in Gabriel’s revision, it ends with the former police 
o
cer being attacked by one of his victim’s relatives. But the conditions of Nieu-
woudt’s confession, to say nothing of its subsequent impact on the Mtimkulu 
family, bear little by way of comparison with those that animate Forgiveness.
Melodrama’s Real: Between Joyce and Remembrance
Before his death in 2005, Nieuwoudt was liable to stir especially embittered 
outbursts from South Africa’s black citizenry. Responsible, among a host of 
other crimes, for the death of Steve Biko, feted leader of the Black Conscious-
ness Movement, while in police custody in 1977, the former security policeman 
Figure 8. Tertius Coetzee is attacked by his victim’s brother, Ernest, 
while petitioning the family for forgiveness. From Forgiveness 
(2004), directed by Ian Gabriel and produced by Dv8 Film.
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embodied precisely the type of ‘exquisite cruelty’ that Coetzee too reects in 
Forgiveness.76 Like many prominent agents of the state, Nieuwoudt defended 
himself against such opprobrium, deferring to executives of apartheid like 
Adriaan Vlok, sometime minister for law and order, and to the implicit presi-
dential authority under which he acted. His conduct may have been disgraceful, 
but it was also dutiful—at least, this was the justication generally levied by the 
regime’s rank and le. Nonetheless, when investigations uncovered Nieuwoudt’s 
prominent role in a bomb blast that unlawfully killed three black policemen and 
a police informer in Motherwell in 1989, he was tried and successfully convicted 
in June 1996 to some twenty years in prison.77 He lodged an immediate appeal 
against his conviction, however, securing release from prison on conditional 
bail. He also signalled his intention to make an application to the Amnesty 
Committee, eventually submitting four separate requests, covering his role in 
ten apartheid-era assassinations, the so-called Motherwell Four, Steve Biko, and 
Siphiwo Mtimkulu all included.
Kaplan’s documentary begins as Nieuwoudt was preparing evidence for the 
Truth Commission in September 1997. However, it is not principally a lm 
about his appeal for amnesty. Rather, it takes as its general focus the struggle 
of the Mtimkulu family, amid their aggravated grief, to secure the truth about 
Siphiwo’s disappearance. Nieuwoudt is unavoidably integral to their search, but 
Kaplan is careful to frame his account with details of the police o
cer’s tor-
ture and, later, murder of both Siphiwo and his friend Topsy Mdaka. He even 
includes a series of disturbing re-enactments of the violence inicted by Nieu-
woudt and his colleagues.78 Even so, Nieuwoudt evidently also saw in Kaplan’s 
documentary a unique opportunity to enhance his otherwise corrupted reputa-
tion, petitioning the lmmaker to arrange a meeting with the Mtimkulu family 
‘in the spirit’, as he puts it, ‘of reconciliation and forgiveness’.79 is, despite the 
fact that he had only recently conspired to prevent Siphiwo’s mother, Joyce, from 
testifying before the HRVC when it rst visited East London in 1996. Along 
with a number of former colleagues from the security police, Nieuwoudt had 
acquired a court injunction that prevented him from being named in any public 
submission to the Commission without timeous notice of the evidence against 
him. When other deponents were deemed to have violated the order by referring 
to him as ‘Mr. X’ and ‘that person that cannot be named’, he even charged the 
Truth Commission with contempt of court.
Despite this injunction, Joyce was not deterred from indicting Nieuwoudt for 
the abuses he inicted on her son in police custody in 1981. At a later convening 
of the HRVC in Port Elizabeth, Dumisa Ntsebeza, the commissioner leading 
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the hearing, asked Joyce to clarify precisely who she meant when she referred to 
Nieuwoudt as the ‘forerunner’ in Siphiwo’s torture. She responded forcefully:
He is one of the people who tried to prohibit [Siphiwo] and sent an in-
terdict that we shouldn’t mention his name. I don’t know any other 
Nieuwoudt except that one, he is the same person who used to pretend to 
be a Minister of religion. He would put on the collar and he would come 
and collect Siphiwo. He would say he is a member of the Methodist church 
in town. He is the same Nieuwoudt that I am talking about. He is Gideon 
Nieuwoudt.80
She subsequently relayed for the court how Nieuwoudt and his colleague, Cor-
nelius Roelofse, ‘would take pipes and electric wire and . . . hit him, og on the 
back severely’ before suocating him with a wet towel until he lost conscious-
ness and even electrocuting him on occasion. Joyce recalled how her son was 
starved for days, the meagre food they oered him oen contaminated with 
cigarette ash.
Unable to walk or even eat when eventually he returned home, Siphiwo was 
soon admitted to hospital, rst in Port Elizabeth before being transferred to the 
Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town. Here it was conrmed that he had been 
poisoned, with Joyce even producing for the HRVC clumps of the hair that fell 
from Siphiwo’s head as a consequence.81 Like many of the victims that testied 
before the Commission, Joyce was desperate to secure o
cial corroboration for 
her story:
I want you today to see Commission, that we have his hair together with 
his scalp attached to the hair . . . to witness what I’ve brought here today so 
that they should know the eect of the poison which was used on my son.
Equally pressing, however, are the basic details of Siphiwo’s subsequent disap-
pearance. She concludes, therefore, by asking of the Commission: ‘Where did 
they leave the bones of my child? Where did they take him from Port Elizabeth, 
who handed him over to them? Where did they take him to? What did they 
do to him?’
Nieuwoudt’s request to meet with the Mtimkulu family under what he 
claimed to be ‘the auspices of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee [sic]’ 
presented a unique opportunity for the family to interrogate the former police 
o
cer and, potentially, have such vital questions answered. Capturing Nieu-
woudt’s journey to the Mtimkulu family’s home in August 1997, the camera
trained closely upon his face as he looks out of the window, idly smoking a
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cigarette, Kaplan is still to be convinced, however, by the former police o
cer’s 
particular motives for the visit. He reects in his narrative voiceover on Nieu-
woudt’s astonishing stoicism:
Looking at him, I saw no sign of remorse. What strikes me most is how 
remote he seems. But perhaps this is merely the outward sign of someone 
suddenly powerless, now trying to hold things together while living a 
nightmare.
With this forewarning, Nieuwoudt is pictured knocking on the front door to 
the Mtimkulu family’s typically small, government house. Greeted nervously 
by Siphiwo’s father, Sipho, Nieuwoudt is led to a seat in front of the family. 
He begins with what sounds like a rehearsed plea, spoken more for the sake of 
the camera:
Why I’m here is to seek forgiveness from the family for what hardship I 
have caused in the past as a result of the apartheid regime.
Joyce cuts through his detached explication. With a telling aside to Kaplan, she 
notes, ‘Gideon [Nieuwoudt] knows very well who I am’. And like the lmmaker, 
she is evidently wary of his intentions, using the recorded event, by return, to 
discredit his aected sense of contrition. Continuing undeterred with his ser-
mon-like address, however, Nieuwoudt loses no time in making an appeal to the 
family’s Christian convictions, declaiming:
With truth and sincerity, I came here today. is is where reconciliation 
start[s]. Where the Lord is being honoured and His name be gloried. And 
we seek knowledge and wisdom from Him.
Kaplan promptly undermines this liturgical solemnity, cutting to a recording of 
Joe Mamasela testifying before the Amnesty Committee. Here, the former black 
askari describes Nieuwoudt as ‘the man who quoted the Bible with his head, A 
up to Z’. is performance of faith is, Kaplan implies, learnt by rote and all part 
of his deluded self-narrative.
Nieuwoudt’s eorts at conciliation are equally troublesome. Whether the 
consequence of his faulty English or a more telling legacy of apartheid-era of-
cialese, the former police o
cer repeatedly addresses Joyce and Sipho, as ‘you 
people’, removing in the process any sense of their individuation or, indeed, 
the intimate responsibility he holds in their suering. Similarly, his repeated 
deferral to the language of bureaucracy in describing Siphiwo as ‘the late Mr 
Mtimkulu’ feels, as Lesley Marx attests, ‘both nauseating and chilling’.82 Most 
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troubling, however, is his repeated dissimulation. At one stage, he claims ‘with 
clear conscience’ no knowledge of Siphiwo’s poisoning, even assuring the family 
that ‘I never used no physical method [of torture] on Siphiwo, that I can tell 
you with the truth’. Once more, Kaplan undermines Nieuwoudt’s credibility, 
cutting to a re-enactment of the abuse described originally by Siphiwo in a legal 
a
davit. In this brief, impressionistic scene, we see a young black man being 
forced headrst down into a bath of water, while Siphiwo’s original testimony 
is narrated simultaneously. Nieuwoudt is named as one of the o
cers who held 
his head beneath the cold water until he had swallowed enough to make his 
stomach protrude. Cutting back to the Mtimkulu’s home, he assures them that 
as ‘a matter of fact, I never eliminated Siphiwo, but here . . . I’m here asking you 
people for forgiveness’.
Against these obvious incongruities, Nieuwoudt’s confession presents itself as 
an entirely calculated enterprise. But this does not in any way prepare the viewer 
for what happens next. Having heard his circuitous, dissembling confession, as 
well as his meagre eorts to apologise and make amends, Siphiwo’s teenage son, 
Sikhumbuzo, suddenly emerges from the background of the shot. Grabbing a 
ceramic ornament, he smashes it over the policeman’s head, fracturing his skull. 
It is a shocking intervention, one that entirely unsettles Kaplan as he struggles to 
frame the scene. His camera momentarily loses focus and falls from Nieuwoudt’s 
face towards the oor before the lmmaker composes himself, capturing the 
blood as it pours from Nieuwoudt’s skull. As the rest of the family rush to assist 
him, Sikhumbuzo can be seen rushing out the front door.
ere is very little to separate this entirely spontaneous scene from the vio-
lence later scripted in Forgiveness. Gabriel even echoes the tight visual grammar 
employed by Kaplan as the attack unfolds, although he also slows the action 
down to add to its intensity. In some ways, it is not surprising that it found 
such a swi re-articulation under the rubric of melodrama, given the intense 
emotional sphere from which the scene emerges. Indeed, not altogether unlike 
those highly aective scenes harvested from the Commission’s hearings and re-
played in Red Dust and In My Country, Sikhumbuzo’s shocking attack gives 
expression to something of his profound and enduring suering in a way that 
language alone is arguably unable. But where Forgiveness, like these other ‘TRC 
lms’, integrates this emotional intensity into a redemptive forgiving moral arc, 
critical commentators have struggled in their analysis of Kaplan’s documentary 
to contain its contradictory aective force.
Philips, for instance, admits to a ‘sense of vicarious pleasure that . . . Siphiwo’s 
son could exact some form of physical retaliation for what [Nieuwoudt] had 
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Figure 9. Gideon Nieuwoudt sits with blood pouring from his skull following a 
sudden attack by his victim’s teenage son, Sikhumbuzo. From Between Joyce and 
Remembrance (2003), directed by Mark Kaplan and produced by Grey Matter Media.
done to Siphiwo’.83 Whatever the initial shock, in the context of the family’s 
ongoing suering, Sikhumhuzo’s violent reprisal is not altogether beyond the 
realm of moral propriety. Saks too comments on her curious feeling of satisfac-
tion, while Marx describes it as a ‘cathartic release’.84 Only Mark Sanders, in 
a remote Freudian reading of the attack, seems capable of extricating his own 
emotional response from his critical reading. According to Sanders, Sikhum-
buzo, whose name means remembrance in isiXhosa, has been assigned a re-
sponsibility to deny Nieuwoudt ‘the right to mourn’ alongside and in the same 
‘social formation’ as Siphiwo’s family.85 Under these terms, Sanders presses us 
to consider the attack not under the tumultuous rubric of revenge and, by pos-
sible extension, forgiveness, but collective memory and the traditional sphere 
of mourning.86
Without resolving the contradictory feelings elicited by Sikhumbuzo’s attack, 
Kaplan has criticised what he saw as Gabriel’s agrant appropriation of this en-
tirely impulsive act. With both directors brought together in 2004 on a panel 
at the CTWCF to discuss the topic of ‘Truth, Reconciliation and Forgiveness: 
Fiction or Reality?’, Kaplan pointed to the ‘insouciance’ shown by Gabriel in his 
attitude to the burdensome legacies of apartheid. By contracting Sikhumbuzo’s 
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ongoing suering to reinforce an alternately redemptive moral agenda, Gabriel 
stood accused by Kaplan of eschewing historicity in favour of a fallacious and 
broadly hopeful understanding of the scene, one that conveniently recomposed 
‘former security police men’ as ‘sensitive souls . . . plagued by the demons of their 
past’, while also re-conceiving ‘their victims’ families [as] dysfunctional, manip-
ulative and vindictive’, as he has since put it elsewhere.87
In the broadest sense, Kaplan’s criticism is characteristic of the entrenched 
hostility between the makers of documentary and narrative lm. From its ear-
liest origins, as Bill Nichols recalls, proponents of the former have sought to 
censure the ‘distracting shadow-play of ction’ that patterns the latter.88 And 
according to Daniel Lehman, who audited the fractious panel talk, Gabriel 
sought to defend his construal of the scene in analogous terms, insisting upon 
the permissible ction that motivates Forgiveness. He disclaimed, for instance, 
any similitude between the police o
cer portrayed in his own lm and the one 
documented by Kaplan. ‘Tertius Coetzee is not Gideon Nieuwoudt’, he report-
edly insisted, but a ‘a mélange of seven or eight apartheid cops’ that includes 
Nieuwoudt but also draws upon the likes of Eugene de Kock, head of Vlak-
plaas, and Jerey Benzien, as modelled by Hendricks in Red Dust.89 Indeed, 
as Gabriel has since described in his foreword to the published lmscript, the 
lm was designed ‘to distil the thousands of dierent stories that [came] out of 
the Truth and Reconciliation hearings’, rather than detail any one particular 
experience.90
Having spent more than ve years documenting the Mtimkulu family in their 
frustrated struggle to discover the truth about Siphiwo’s death, by contrast, Ka-
plan did not hide his contempt for Gabriel or the ease with which Forgiveness
appropriated elements of his original documentary. He charged the director, 
along with the lm’s screenwriter, Greg Latter, with eliding the Mtimkulu fam-
ily’s anguish in order to provide a ‘comfortable image to white South Africans’ in 
which ‘even the most evil . . . possess the moral integrity needed for forgiveness to 
take place’.91 In Kaplan’s opinion, the utopianism pursued by Forgiveness failed 
to ‘do justice to the pain and suering of real victims’. It is here, in the variance 
between the monumental claims of the popular sphere and the troublesome, 
oen more complex aims of its democratic alternative, that melodrama risks a 
form of representational injustice. In pursuit of popular appeal, melodrama po-
tentially violates the historical and emotional truth of South Africa’s transition, 
prioritising those scenes of forgiveness aorded to apartheid perpetrators over 
and above the collective grief of their victims. To this extent, the genre threatens 
to extend rather than end the suering wrought by the past.
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Documenting Excess and Insu
ciency
e objections levied by Kaplan against Gabriel’s melodramatic adaptation echo 
many of the more trenchant critiques levied against ‘TRC lms’ at large. But 
to share in Kaplan’s contempt for Forgiveness is also to reect on the very spe-
cic aective claims that emerge from his original account. For while Between 
Joyce and Remembrance navigates the same tumultuous emotional terrain later 
occupied by Gabriel’s narrative lm, it manifestly avoids any melodramatic con-
clusion. is is not to say that Kaplan also dismisses altogether the plausible 
pursuit of forgiveness; Nieuwoudt’s visit to the Mtimkulu family was, in prin-
ciple, conditional on his status as a forgivable agent of abuse. In this, however, 
much depends on the sincerity of his confession. And Nieuwoudt’s appeal for 
forgiveness did not only fail because of its barely disguised self-interest. Rather, 
as Siphiwo’s elderly father, Sipho, put it to Nieuwoudt before he his attacked: 
‘My wife is saying to you . . . you’re too late. And me . . . I say, you’re too late’. 
Having survived for well over a decade with no information about their son’s 
fate, Nieuwoudt’s sudden candour was always likely to feel overdue, to say the 
very least. Even so, for the Mtimkulus there was also, it seems, a more malicious 
belatedness at work in his appeal for forgiveness. Coming at a point convenient 
for Nieuwoudt, the cynical timing of his confession rendered it not only insin-
cere but also antagonistic.
As Sikhumbuzo’s violent reprisal bears out, the family are evidently in no 
mood for this sudden bout of truth-telling. In this, Between Joyce and Remem-
brance returns us to the fragile, even perilous conditions under which all acts 
of confession are arguably proered and received. Refusing Nieuwoudt’s sup-
plications, the Mtimkulu family reveal the grammar tacit to this confessional 
scene, making manifest the intricate temporal as well as emotional precondi-
tions that must otherwise be met in order to validate the delivery and enable the 
reception of his appeal. But they also expose the incendiary consequences of its 
violation—that is, when victims feel compelled under the auspices of a national 
imperative to broker an imperfect treaty with the past. In more general terms, 
then, Between Joyce and Remembrance might be taken as an entirely indicative 
lesson in the pattern of excess and insu
ciency that typies the act of confession 
more generally—the simultaneous potential for too much truth and not enough.
is is, in part, what Sanders also implies when he draws attention to the nec-
essary ‘ambiguities of witnessing’. For him, the confessional act is always liable 
to prove partial, always prone to dissatisfy those clinging to its legal truth value. 
But this statutory inadequacy must also be made to account for those forms of 
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confession performed in extremis, at a time, that is, of uncommon emotional 
insecurity. Arguably, for Nieuwoudt to enter into a meaningful, which is to say 
remedial exchange with the Mtimkulu family, he must also share in this unstable 
confessional economy. Put simply, he must be prepared to make himself vulnera-
ble before their reprehension, over and above their absolution. It is precisely this 
act of self-exposure that provides forgiveness with its measure of authenticity as 
well as its potency. By contrast, an act of confession in anticipation of forgive-
ness, as melodrama scripts it, runs counter to the very logic of uncertainty that 
must otherwise underwrite such a confessional appeal.
Understood in these terms, it seems that Nieuwoudt is attacked as much for 
his violation of the confessional pact as he is for his part in Siphiwo’s original 
abuse. In an interview conducted a few days aer the incident, Sikhumbuzo 
elaborates on this cyclical sense of abuse, noting to Kaplan:
I don’t think that I will forgive him. He is sitting there by his house and 
showing himself with his kids. What about us here?
For Sikhumbuzo, amnesty and the pressure applied to victims to forgive an 
abuser like Nieuwoudt threatens to maintain the original injustice of apartheid. 
For Kaplan, however, it also raises ‘the possibility that Sikhumbuzo’s anger could 
consume him’. His fears are only sharpened when he learns of the teenage boy’s 
subsequent expulsion from school following the attack. e lmmaker cuts to a 
scene of Sikhumbuzo in tears as Joyce describes her grandson’s increasing sense 
of withdrawal. Kaplan subsequently shis to a picture of the teenager on the 
streets with a majita (gang) as they smoke and play music. Here, amid allusion 
to the group’s criminal behaviour, Sikhumbuzo admits to Kaplan his sense of 
confusion and rising emotional turmoil. ‘I hold things back’, he admits, ‘but 
this thing is too bad’. Denied the opportunity to forgive and plausibly grieve 
by Nieuwoudt’s cynical actions, Sikhumbuzo, like many other victims, seems 
bound instead to the repeat the injustice of the past, capitulating before its seem-
ingly irresolvable and ongoing inequity.
As Kaplan understands it, Sikhumbuzo’s enduring torment is entirely indic-
ative of the emotional naïveté both of the Truth Commission and those ‘TRC 
lms’ that sought to ratify its achievements. To make forgiveness the principal 
measure of success is to dismiss the intricate, less than satisfying aective ne-
gotiations that this process not only enables but arguably also advocates. Just 
as Between Joyce and Remembrance begins by postponing judgement on Nieu-
woudt’s motives, it proceeds by troubling any singularly sympathetic engage-
ment with Sikhumbuzo and his actions. His violent behaviour, much like his 
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petty criminality, renders him the subject of situational rather than singularly 
sentimental reection. is is not to frame his attack on Nieuwoudt as a wanton 
act of revenge. But neither is it to perceive it, as Gabriel prefers, as a moment of 
cathartic and obligatory release. Instead, Kaplan encourages a vitally empathic 
response from his audience. Emerging, as theorist Murray Smith puts it, from an 
‘imagining from the inside’, empathy here diers from sympathy and its instinc-
tive feelings for the victim. Instead, it insists upon a feeling with them, refusing 
any ‘total absorption’, maintaining, instead, ‘knowledge of the total situation’ 
from which this aective appeal emerges.92 In Sikhumbuzo’s particular case, this 
empathic structure is designed to ensure that the audience does not slip into 
any straightforwardly uncritical emotional response to the sudden violence wit-
nessed on screen. Instead, Kaplan encourages a more reasoned and rounded en-
gagement with the implications of Nieuwoudt’s confession, giving lmic repre-
sentation to its swirling emotional intensities and seemingly irredeemable costs.
e empathic perspective pursued by Between Joyce and Remembrance might 
be further claried according to the type of witnessing, rather than melodra-
matic, imagination that, in a separate context, Karen Malpede nds crucial to 
any recuperative representation of violence. Such a ‘witnessing imagination’ re-
fuses to elide the complex historical as well as interpersonal terms under which 
such scenes play out. Nor does it dilute the intense, potentially contradictory 
aects it generates. Instead, as Malpede elaborates, it ‘seeks to give form to the 
multiple dynamics which occur between the victim of violence and the person 
who provides the holding empathic environment’.93 By this, she means to elab-
orate upon the formally reexive representational conditions that allow for the 
suering wrought by an intense history of violence to be recognised as much 
more than a political event, and, conversely, in terms more complex than the 
sum of its interpersonal abuses. It is a process designed to make reciprocal and 
collective the emotional excesses of this violence, even as it upholds the integrity 
of its victims’ suering. By contrast to its melodramatic equivalent, then, this 
witnessing imagination does not attempt to ratify the past; it has no abstract 
moral order according to which this hostile history must be made to yield. As 
Malpede has it, it ‘sees into violence’, attempting to bear witness to its complex, 
oen contradictory aective intensity.94
In an eort, it seems, to enable this witnessing imagination to thrive, Kaplan 
also unravels for his audience a parallel record of his own experiences as a lm-
maker under apartheid. Set amid an early report on the uncertain details of Si-
phiwo’s original disappearance, which at the time took Joyce to Lesotho in a fu-
tile search, Kaplan adds evidence of his own mother’s anguish during his broadly 
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contemporaneous internment for y-one days without trial under Section 22 
of the General Laws Amendment Act in 1982. Newspaper cuttings from the 
period detailing the lmmaker’s detention at the Caledon Square Police Station 
in Cape Town are displayed as a backdrop to an original audio recording of his 
mother, Madelaine Lewis, speaking before a protest meeting at the University 
of Cape Town. Made just a day aer Kaplan had been deported to Zimbabwe, 
Lewis discloses her sense of her cruel relief, grateful at the very least that ‘there 
can be no more cells, no more detentions for my son, no rat poison in his food’. 
She concludes, however, by countenancing the suering endured by countless 
other women in South Africa, supposing that ‘I am so much luckier than so 
many other mothers’ whose sons have not been returned to them.
Kaplan’s unusual choice to include his mother’s testimony as an experien-
tial analogue to Joyce’s much more intense maternal suering actively extends 
the lm’s empathetic environment, inviting viewers to imagine the violence of 
apartheid from inside these partially parallel stories. is is not to draw an inapt 
correlation between the director’s ill-treatment and the abuses inicted upon the 
Mtimkulu family. It is, however, to modulate the divide that habitually separates 
white lmmakers from their black subjects, an ambition that owes much to Ka-
plan’s founding experience as the executive director of the Community Video 
Resource Association (CVRA) at the University of Cape Town during the early 
1980s.95 Inuenced by ‘Challenge for Change’, a Canadian participatory lm 
project inaugurated in 1967 in an eort to respond to a diverse set of contem-
porary social issues from across the country, his lmmaking with CVRA at-
tempted, as Harriet Gavshon suggests, to usher in a fundamental change ‘to the 
traditional relations between lmmaker and subject community, observer and 
observed’.96 In Between Joyce and Remembrance, it is evident that these principles 
continue to drive Kaplan’s work, his camera deployed to provide an intimate 
and empathetic, rather than remote, account of the family’s continued suering.
Moreover, just as his lm expands its audience’s empathy, it also attempts 
to distribute the emotional burden of the past, establishing a representational 
arena in which to share out those intense feelings of anger and hostility that 
necessarily remain despite apartheid’s formal end. For in setting his account of 
the Mtimkulu family in dialogue with his family’s own relative anguish, Kaplan 
arguably disaggregates the disproportionate pressure placed on those individ-
ual black victims to serve as the arbiters of forgiveness and with it the fate of 
the nation. His adjacent experience of apartheid sees into both the Mtimkulu 
family’s original experience and the secondary violence bound up in the Truth 
Commission’s implicit demand on them to give up on justice in favour of some 
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unifying national ethos. As Joyce readily admits in one of the documentary’s 
earliest scenes, ‘I have no idea what reconciliation is’. In staging her circumspec-
tion, Kaplan oers a powerful counter to the seductive moralism that appears 
to motivate both the Commission and the melodramatic imagination through 
which it has since been marshalled by the popular cinema screen. is is not to 
give up altogether on forgiveness or, indeed, reconciliation. Instead, it is to frame 
their plausible benets within a much wider, collective project, one that is able 
to admit to their individuated, emotional, even overheated beginnings without 
also circumscribing their endings.
Unlike the universal therapy favoured by more popular ‘TRC lms’, Between 
Joyce and Remembrance attempts to make itself a responsible participant in this 
reciprocal project. At risk of overemphasising Kaplan’s adjacent experience of 
imprisonment and abuse, which recedes as the lm progresses, his own relative 
struggle with and against the emotional volatility of the past implicates the 
Mtimkulu family’s particular story within a wider constituency of suering. 
ere is a sense in which their anger and disdain, to say nothing of their dis-
inclination to forgive, is rendered at once exceptional and exemplary. As such, 
their astonishing encounter with Nieuwoudt oers a more general rejoinder to 
the melodrama of forgiveness that elsewhere threatens to reinscribe the origi-
nal injustice of apartheid. To take Kaplan’s documentary in this way as an in-
dicative account is to calibrate forgiveness too as an insistently social rather 
than individualised act, one that must be legislated collectively and distributed 
equitably. In this, Between Joyce and Remembrance oers up a vital challenge 
to those ‘TRC lms’ that have otherwise taken priority in cinematic reviews 
of the Commission, insisting upon the democratic principles, over and above 
the popular sentiments, around which any appeal to forgiveness must collect, 
melodramatic or otherwise.
Conclusion
‘e camera’, Kaplan remarks in the opening shot to Between Joyce and Remem-
brance, ‘is a way of preventing things from disappearing’. If not precisely equal 
to the melancholic repetition that drives those examples included in the rst 
chapter, this commitment to lm as a mode of representational delity with 
the past and its emotional remainders draws his documentary into a similarly 
intimate, if also volatile ethical sphere. Indeed, like each the works of theatre 
and lm favoured so far in this study, Kaplan’s account occupies a sphere of 
irresolution, whether historical, moral, or emotional, for which the Truth 
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Commission generally refused to accept responsibility. But this encounter with 
the irresolvable is not meant to breed apathy or anger. Instead, it discovers in the 
intense confessional encounter between the Mtimkulu family and Nieuwoudt 
a ‘so weapon’, to borrow an epithet used by Gillian Whitlock, deploying its 
feeling of implacable discord to defend against any expedient redemption of the 
apartheid past.97 In other words, the family’s emotional struggle and, in partic-
ular, Sikhumbuzo’s inability to reckon with his own vengeful, even seemingly 
self-destructive impulses are also the inherited struggles of the past, of apart-
heid’s ongoing inequality and injustice. ese complex legacies can never hope 
to be corrected by a single, individualised act of forgiveness. eir expiation de-
pends, instead, as Kaplan’s lm suggests, on a democratic, which is to say collec-
tive and broadly distributed reckoning with the past.
Of course, this is not the sole responsibility of his lm. Nor is it entirely ca-
pable of fullling this demand. Indeed, the intense, excessive and overwrought 
variety of feelings that emerge from Between Joyce and Remembrance were al-
ways liable to exceed the representational limits of the documentary genre, and 
perhaps even lm in general. But this is no mitigation for the generic insu
-
ciencies of melodrama. For any sense of the darkness and light, or good and evil 
that emerges from the confessional encounter between victim and perpetrator 
necessarily escapes the diametric interpretation that melodrama prefers. Even 
Kaplan’s parallel experience under apartheid, his partial view from the inside 
of its violent history, is inadequate before the contradictions and complexities 
contained by Nieuwoudt’s confessional appeal. To this extent, Between Joyce and 
Remembrance disrupts the straightforward moral authority that forgiveness else-
where assumes, gesturing instead at the situated empathy that must condition 
its pursuit. is is arguably the principal achievement of Kaplan’s lm; not some 
monumental scene of clemency between black and white, but a cumulative sense 
of reciprocity across and between those committed to justice and on both sides 
of the racial divide.
ere is a restraint, then, to Between Joyce and Remembrance that contrasts 
with the hyperbole of those ‘TRC lms’ that patterned the rst half of this 
chapter. In the face of the Mtimkulu family’s implacable sense of loss, Kaplan’s 
documentary is judicious, delimiting his audience’s sense of the possible in the 
eld of reconciliation. Without giving up on its achievement, it is the incremen-
tal and ordinary eorts made by the family to accommodate themselves to their 
intense grief that appears here to guide reconciliation’s more general pursuit. 
As signal of this imperfect but also indispensable end, the lm concludes with 
the ritual burial of Siphiwo’s last remaining clump of hair—an act of symbolic 
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mourning for his family. It is little more than a faint glimmer of light in the 
general gloom of their suering. But vitally, it is also a collective ceremony that 
unites the family with the wider township community, one that even dignies 
Kaplan’s camera as an active participant in this intimate public rite. And it is to 
this ritualised sphere that I turn in my nal chapter, uncertain but hopeful of its 
e
cacy in the eld of reconciliation.
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Ch a pter Fou r
Telling Stories the Way We Like
Zulu Love Letter and Reconciliation’s Rites
We have set out on a quest for a true humanity, and somewhere on 
the distant horizon we can see the glittering prize. . . . In time we 
shall be in a position to bestow upon South Africa the greatest gi 
possible—a more human face. 1
—Steve Biko 
A ntjie Krog’s Country of My Skull (1998) is perhaps the most widely cited and, by return, one of the most widely censured accounts of the Truth Commission. In its critique of the Commission’s deeply gen-
dered praxis, however, it alights upon a controversy more serious than those 
broad generic concerns that stalk its professed nonctional status.2 ‘Truth has 
become woman’, remarks Krog’s narrator as she reects upon the endless succes-
sion of female witnesses who appeared before the Commission to testify during 
its rst six months of public hearings. ‘Dressed in beret or kopdoek [headscarf] 
and her Sunday best’, the truth as woman has become so insistent that it has 
come to penetrate ‘even the most frigid earhole of stone’, she arms.3 But while 
the truth of the apartheid past was, indeed, given an embodiment by women at 
the Truth Commission, it was not of women. Amid its litany of female voices, 
the abuses recorded by the Human Rights Violation Committee (HRVC) were 
most frequently those endured not by these women themselves but by their sons, 
their husbands, their fathers, and their brothers. ‘Everybody recognises her’, 
Krog’s speaker continues, everybody recognises that she ‘has undermined Man 
as the source of truth’. And yet, ‘[n]obody knows her’, she concludes, nobody 
knows the specic truth of her experience of the past, nor, indeed, the specic 
role she might also play in the negotiation of the future.4
Krog’s instinctual misgivings have since been substantiated by quantitative 
analysis. For instance, in a comparatively forensic account of the Commission’s 
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many individual hearings, Fiona Ross provides striking evidence of this gender 
imbalance. For even while half or more of the deponents who appeared before 
the HRVC were female, seventy-nine percent of these women provided evidence 
of violations committed against men, Ross reveals. As a result, women were con-
sistently described by the Commission and in the media as ‘secondary witnesses’, 
with little concern shown for their own status as primary victims of abuse.5 But 
even before this imbalance became institutionalised, Beth Goldblatt and Sheila 
Meintjes had delivered to the Commission in the rst month of its public hearings 
a combative position paper on the long-standing subordination and oppression of 
women under apartheid. Drawing from the evidence of eight prominent female 
anti-apartheid activists, Goldblatt and Meintjes made clear the specic structural 
and symbolic violence committed by the apartheid state against women. Of an 
internal, more oen psychological order, however, it was always less likely to be 
captured fully by the Commission’s mandate to investigate gross abuses, they ar-
gued. For Goldblatt and Meintjes, it was imperative, therefore, that the Commis-
sion recognise the gendered aspects of apartheid oppression and attempt, nally, 
to ‘li the veil of silence hanging over the suering of women’ in South Africa.6
Despite the subsequent institution of three Special Women’s Hearings, held 
in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Durban in 1997, and the adoption of new 
gender-sensitive statement-taking protocols, the Commission largely failed to 
overturn this essential and early misalignment between women’s historical sta-
tus as primary victims and, at the same time, their public function as secondary 
witnesses.7 As Nomonde Calata’s appearance before the HRVC in 1996 bears 
out, more signicant to the Committee than any of the suering she endured 
as a result of the assassination of her husband was an understanding of the role 
he played in the highly politicised Cradock Residents’ Association, the increas-
ingly violent struggle in the Eastern Cape, and, ultimately, the events that led 
up to his death. Nomonde Calata was introduced to the Committee not as a 
victim of apartheid but as a ‘political widow’, a term deployed originally by the 
anti-apartheid activist Mamphela Ramphele to reect the relational status im-
posed upon her following the death in detention of her partner, Steve Biko, in 
1977.8 Indeed, her traumatic cries, as recalled by the Committee’s chair, Alex 
Boraine, and reimagined by John Boorman’s In My Country, have continued to 
function above all as a summary of the country’s agglomerated pain, rather than 
as testament to her unique suering. All this, despite the fact that Calata, like 
Ramphele in fact, served as an active agent in and notable victim of the struggle.
Unable, ultimately, to overturn this essential myopia, the Commission was 
forced to concede in its nal report to the ‘gender bias’ that stemmed from its 
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‘relative neglect of the “ordinary” workings of apartheid’.9 Undoubtedly, this is 
by no means the Truth Commission’s only shortcoming. But it is perhaps the 
one that reveals most plainly the failures that attended its highly individualised, 
rights-based approach to victimhood. e adjacent confessional scenes priori-
tised in this study so far have sought to challenge this strict taxonomy of bodily 
rather than structural or symbolic suering, even if the critique has not so far 
been elaborated in strictly gendered terms. Whether in Farber’s account of the 
melancholy psychical as well as social remains that animate this confessional 
sphere or in Kaplan’s attention to their long, intergenerational shadow, there has 
been much in these works to challenge the Commission’s attachment to the vis-
ible and veriable aspects of apartheid abuse. at some of the most prominent 
voices in this repertoire of injustice are female is also no necessary coincidence. 
Take, for instance, Molora’s Elektra, or Siphiwo Mtimkulu’s mother Joyce, both 
of whom give witness to the much wider range of intense emotional and familial 
suering that many black women have been forced to endure under apartheid 
and since.
is nal chapter continues to prioritise a sphere of confessional praxis con-
stituted not by its fractious contiguity with the Commission but its expressive 
and conceptual autonomy. In turning here to Ramadan Suleman’s Zulu Love 
Letter (2004), a highly evocative and formally innovative narrative lm that 
was scripted and shot by its director in collaboration with the scholar Bhek-
izizwe Peterson over the course of some six years, however, I also attempt locate 
a pointed counterpoint to its specically masculinist limitations. A ctionalised 
account of the apartheid past and its lasting injustice within the democratic pres-
ent, Zulu Love Letter does not defer to the Commission to sustain its truth 
claims. ere are no appeals, for instance, to specic hearings or historical events 
that might be veried by way of the archival record. Signal, it seems, of a more 
general frustration with the Commission and its confessed biases, this divest-
ment distinguishes in Zulu Love Letter a vernacular separation as much from 
the Commission as from the aesthetic repertoire privileged so far in this study.
In this, Suleman and Peterson intend their lm, I want to suggest, less as a 
strict corrective to the Commission and more as a parallel if also experimental 
and above all ritual scene of confessional negotiation. Indeed, by giving cine-
matic form to apartheid’s manifold unjust remains, Zulu Love Letter does not 
disclaim altogether the principles of truth and reconciliation. For instance, in 
Peterson’s own recent scholarly analysis, he underscores, apace with the objec-
tives written into Zulu Love Letter, the exigent need to rst recognize and then 
integrate apartheid’s residual ‘social pathologies’. But equally, he continues:
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e ills of the nation are not likely to be overcome if citizens are not granted
space and time to address their personal and localised anxieties in ways that 
are not necessarily consistent with or parallel to the initiatives and needs
of the larger society.10
In other words—to secure an echo for the general aims of this study—recon-
ciliation must only ever proceed as a situated enterprise. So while Zulu Love 
Letter may retreat from the strictly national ‘strategies of containment’ that con-
ditioned the Commission’s public hearings, it nonetheless sustains something of 
reconciliation’s collective imperative. By way of distinction, however, it begins 
with the situated demands of its cast of black female characters, retrieving from 
their lived, everyday experience of injustice an expanded sense of what recon-
ciliation might otherwise constitute.11 is is, I want to suggest, as much an 
epistemic intervention as it is a more broadly feminist one. For in demarking 
a confessional arena at vital odds with the Commission’s gendered tendencies, 
Zulu Love Letter also attempts to liberate reconciliation from the conceptual 
and interpretive constraints that have elsewhere assailed and arguably derailed it.
As a condition of its imaginative and intellectual autonomy, then, Suleman and 
Peterson’s lm also makes some exceptional demands of this concluding chapter. 
Methodologically, I do not defer to any of the comparative frameworks deployed 
previously. Nor do I suggest a specic generic or modal tradition against which to 
measure the lm’s delities, or not. Rather, Zulu Love Letter’s comparative free-
dom is entirely the point. is does not mean it is entirely without precedence—at 
least, not in the global eld of trauma and experimental cinema. But in the more 
discrete spheres under review in this study, Zulu Love Letter establishes a vital 
aesthetic and ideological distinction that I also attempt to uphold critically. To this 
extent, this chapter is perhaps the most speculative. Nonetheless, it is also intended 
to serve as a summative one. For as much as Zulu Love Letter distinguishes itself 
from the repertoire appraised above, it proceeds by drawing some of the incipient, 
extemporary praxis on display in earlier chapters into a more socially embedded, 
plausibly enduring representational schema, one that renders reconciliation’s fu-
ture renewal in terms more assured than previously seemed viable.
Humble Storytelling, Experimental Style
Much of Zulu Love Letter’s distinction as a cinematic object is achieved by way 
of its rare combination between an outwardly modest narrative and a highly 
experimental cinematic form. Set in the weeks before and aer the Commission 
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launched its rst public hearings in 1996, it is, according to Peterson, at its most 
fundamental an unassuming ‘story of two mothers in search of their daugh-
ters’.12 Despite this professed humility, however, Zulu Love Letter does not re-
treat from the challenging legacies of apartheid. Nor does it uphold a singularly 
realist method of narration. Rather, Suleman and Peterson deploy this ordinary 
lens of motherhood to discover a vernacular mode of storytelling that might 
represent with greater acuity the intractable, oentimes imperceptible, even spir-
itual consequences of loss and specically female suering that derive from the 
extraordinary events of the apartheid past.
On one half of this twin narrative focus is Me’Tau, a black, elderly, and im-
poverished woman from Soweto whose daughter, Dineo, an anti-apartheid ac-
tivist, was murdered by security police in the 1980s. Without ever having had 
her daughter’s remains returned to her, Me’Tau is le in a state of interrupted 
grief, unable to full the burial rites that, according to Zulu ontology, ‘purify 
and restore the sacredness of the corpse’.13 Only by way of the ritual process of 
mourning, termed the ukuzila, can the deceased pass eventually into the realm 
of the ancestors. ‘In the context of the abductions, assassinations and secret dis-
posal of the remains of anti-apartheid activists’, however, as Peterson explains:
[t]he absence of the body, the lack of knowledge of the place and cause of 
death, throws the processes of ukuzila into disarray and with it the atten-
dant prerequisites for individual and group mourning and healing.14
Denied the process of mourning, Me’Tau still holds a monthly vigil for her 
daughter with a host of other grieving mothers at her small, township home.
To this tragically common story of maternal loss, as witnessed elsewhere in, 
say, Between Joyce and Remembrance, Suleman and Peterson add the experience of 
andeka Kumalo, a middle-class black journalist at the Mail & Guardian. Hav-
ing observed Dineo’s original murder by state police, andeka still experiences
regular ashbacks to the scene as well as to her own subsequent detention and
torture on a remote farm in the Transvaal, as it was then termed. Pregnant at the
time, this abuse appears to have also impacted her daughter, Simangaliso (meaning 
miracle in isiZulu), who was born deaf. Now aged thirteen, the girl has no seeming 
knowledge of mother’s previous suering even as she appears to serve as a con-
stant reminder of it. As a result, the two have become largely estranged from each 
other: andeka lives alone in her apartment in downtown Johannesburg, while
her daughter has been all but abandoned to her grandparents’ home in Soweto.
At the most fundamental level of plot, Zulu Love Letter tills a compara-
tively conventional path. With both mothers beginning the lm isolated and 
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comparatively bere, their twinned experiences are brought into closer and 
closer alignment, each helping the other to reckon with their own sense of inner 
torment, until they are seen at the lm’s conclusion in a moment of shared unity. 
eir alliance begins when Me’Tau arrives one evening at the Mail & Guard-
ian’s oces, petitioning andeka to help her nd Dineo’s remains. While the
elderly woman is driven by a ritual urge to cleanse the past and lay Dineo’s spirit 
to rest, Me’Tau also encourages in andeka a broadly comparable, specically
ritualised reconciliation with Simangaliso. As such, the premise of their respec-
tive search may remain dissimilar, but the process unfolds in broadly mutual
terms, one that suggests among other things the power of black female solidar-
ity in the more general struggle against the past. In other words, these women
establish a vital collective arena in which to share and resolve between them
the traumas of apartheid, rather than dwell upon them in melancholy isolation.
To this extent, the broad imperatives of the Truth Commission may appear 
somewhere near at hand. But in the telling of this story Zulu Love Letter is also 
sustained, I want to suggest, by a series of frictions, epistemological as much as 
procedural, that serve to contest the monumental terms around which reconcil-
iation has more oen been composed. For one thing, the lm resists the overtly 
Christianised elaboration of reconciliation and forgiveness witnessed in those 
‘TRC lms’ above, centring by contrast the separate contribution made by a more 
traditional account of healing and spiritual recovery. In this, African ontology’s 
alternative understandings of ‘personhood, sociality and ancestral veneration’, 
arguably prompts, what Peterson describes as, ‘a more life-arming and enrich-
ing alternative to the . . . projects of the state’.15 is is not to endorse uncritically 
the principle of ubuntu, so oen deployed by the Truth Commission to dig-
nify reconciliation’s traditional merits. Rather, it is to centre those non-sensory, 
pluri-dimensional as well as deeply ritualised ways of indigenous being that are 
entirely immanent to the black majority’s understanding of grief and mourning.
is ritual spiritualism serves as a vital key, I aver, to Zulu Love Letter’s ex-
panded account of reconciliation. But it is by no means the lm’s only episte-
mological friction with the Commission, especially in its insistent appeal to the 
‘medicolonial’ logic, as Guiliana Lund has it, of healing.16 As becomes increas-
ingly evident, in Simangaliso’s character Suleman and Peterson also move to in-
troduce the question of disability and, more specically, the implications of her 
deafness to the Commission’s attachment to a discourse of pathogen and cure. 
ere is very little precedence in South African cinema for the critical negotiation 
of disability, and certainly not in such abrasive proximity with the medicalised
metaphors that predominated at the Commission. ‘Healing the wounds of the
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nation’ was, aer all, one if its principal self-descriptions. However, Simangaliso’s 
central role in the lm necessarily brings with it a host of intricate interpretive 
tensions that seek to challenge this normative attitude to impairment.
For one thing, her deafness wrestles with and against the type of symbolic 
framework oen deployed to make manifest the lasting ‘ills’ of apartheid, 
wherein the individual is made surrogate for the suering of the national body.17
e congenital status of her deafness arguably challenges this tired aesthetic ma-
noeuvre, for it also cites the very specic violence inicted upon her mother
during her pregnancy, disclaiming, as such, the curative credentials of forgive-
ness. In ways more somatic than even Duma Kumalo’s melancholy compulsions 
can perhaps attest, Simangaliso insists, instead, upon the enduring, necessarily
irredeemable impact of this wider political trauma. is is not to say that she is
embittered by her disability. Rather, it is to allude the ways in which her deafness 
further confounds the Commission’s deferral to a normative ‘treatment’—in all 
senses—of the past.
Evidently, then, to describe the lm in such humble terms as a story of two 
mothers in search of their daughters is also to submerge something of the provoc-
ative, even radical epistemic agenda at work in its narrative structure. is is not, 
however, how most critics have sought to elaborate upon Suleman and Peterson’s 
lm. Undoubtedly, the comparative dearth of critical interest in contemporary 
cinema in South Africa has checked some of the more serious analysis it argu-
ably deserves. Other than the passing remarks aorded by likes of Lesley Marx 
and Lindiwe Dovey in their wider reections on recent African cinema, or Heidi 
Grunebaum and Annalisa Oboe as part their assessments of the Truth Commis-
sion, critical reection has been largely reduced to the odd citation in national 
lm surveys.18 Only Jacqueline Maingard and Marie Kruger have begun to grap-
ple seriously with Zulu Love Letter’s formal and narrative distinction within 
South Africa’s contemporary cinematic economy.19 Bearing down on the lm’s 
traumatic visual grammar, for instance, Kruger nds that its ‘incoherent visual 
landscape’ pushes the lm towards the ‘limits of cinematic representation’.20 is 
Maingard broadly corroborates. Aording the lm an especially prominent space 
in her study of South Africa’s national cinema, she describes it in admiring terms 
as a lm ‘where meanings are never complete’, where ‘the viewer is constantly 
invited to create narrative coherence’.21 For her, its formal fracture typies South 
Africa’s traumatised condition in the wake of apartheid.
Certainly, those elements of inarticulacy and semantic rupture are worthy 
of sustained attention, especially as they challenge the narrative coherence pur-
sued by the more popular ‘TRC lms’ surveyed above. But to understand these 
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formal features as indicative of ‘the contested terrain of nation and identity in 
South Africa’, as Maingard supposes, is also to risk reducing Zulu Love Letter’s 
distinction to a broadly postmodern interpretation of the aesthetic sphere.22 Nor 
does the retreat made by Kruger into the theories of trauma reect adequately 
the wider epistemological ambition that comes with this formal innovation, es-
pecially as it animates a set of ‘African spiritual and cultural rites’ at odds with 
those ‘neatly self-contained categories and linearity underpinning metaphors 
of . . . the national imaginary’.23 Indeed, as Peterson elaborates:
We were clear during the writing, production and editing of the lm, that 
cinema can present a more complex and experimental take on the issues 
under exploration. We settled on an aesthetic that would not be narrated 
or resolved according to the classical three-act structure but one that would 
try to approximate a loose and open-ended structure. Similarly we favoured 
strategies of visual composition that, like the lm’s thematic concerns, al-
lows for a plurality of temporalities, presences and generic styles (from re-
alism to fantasy) to co-exist within the same frame or sequence.24
In other words, the humility of Zulu Love Letter’s outward story of two mothers 
in search of their daughters is betrayed by its insistent appeal to a sphere of aes-
thetic experiment, one that both includes and exceeds the generic concerns pre-
dominant elsewhere. In formulating an interpretive framework through which 
to approach Suleman and Peterson’s lm, then, this chapter pursues its own 
equally experimental method, exploring the lm’s potential resonance within 
a remarkably wide discursive terrain, ranging from traditional culture to Black 
Consciousness and epistemic justice.
Frank Talk
In beginning to situate Zulu Love Letter’s outwardly modest if also inwardly 
radical tale of motherhood, there are undoubtedly certain precedents to be 
found in feminist aesthetics and vital correspondences to be secured with black 
female lmmaking more generally in South Africa.25 To understand the per-
sonal as political, for example, is still an instructive beginning point. But I also 
want to suggest a powerful resonance in Zulu Love Letter’s humble ambitions 
with the strikingly simple adage, ‘I write what I like’, that was rst deployed by 
Steve Biko as part of his contributions to the South African Students’ Organisa-
tion (SASO) newsletter in 1970. Writing under the wry pseudonym Frank Talk, 
Biko’s conscious simplicity here belies the complex aesthetic philosophy from 
136 chapter four
which his thinking rst emerged.26 Of course, Biko’s political desire for black 
emancipation is well established. Even still, the Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM), which has found a renewed vitality in recent decades, defers to his orig-
inal elaboration of the ‘shackles that bind [black South Africans] to perpetual 
servitude’.27 As Biko puts it in one of the many essays that make up his posthu-
mous collection of selected writing, I Write What I Like (1978):
In an eort to destroy completely the structures that had been built up in 
the African Society and to impose their imperialism with an unnerving 
totality the colonialists were not satised merely with holding a people in 
their grip and emptying the Native’s brain of all form and content, they 
turned to the past of the oppressed people and distorted, disgured and 
destroyed it. No longer was reference made to African culture, it became 
barbarism. Africa was the ‘dark continent’. Religious practices and customs 
were referred to as superstition. e history of African society was reduced 
to tribal battles and internecine wars.28
Black Consciousness, by positive reply, has come to be dened by the black com-
munity’s ‘new-found pride in themselves, their eorts, their value systems, their 
culture, their religion and their outlook in life’, to cite Biko again.29
Amid evaluation of these socio-cultural criteria, however, the imaginative 
autonomy that Biko also here deploys to encourage and eect this sense of total 
liberation—bodily, cognitive, and spiritual—has more oen fallen from critical 
view. Nonetheless, his axiom provides an indicative summary of the belligerent 
as well as independent vernacular imagination upon which Black Consciousness 
in large part depends. ‘I write what I like’ is the autonomous aesthetic impulse 
behind the movement’s political eort to ‘make the black man come to himself; 
to pump life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity’, Biko 
arms. But it is also to ennoble a tradition of black self-expression, that ‘love for 
song and rhythm’, as Biko has it, which has historically dened much of Africa’s 
traditional cultural sphere. ‘Music and rhythm were not luxuries’, he elsewhere 
insists, ‘but part and parcel of our way of communication’.30 In this way, the 
compulsion to ‘write what I like’ depended upon a much longer tradition of 
expressive sovereignty, a way of giving imaginative representation to black life 
beyond the imperatives otherwise imposed by colonial and apartheid rule.
It is under similarly radical but also culturally embedded terms that Zulu 
Love Letter might also be found to encode in its professedly modest story of 
motherhood an aesthetic and cognitive emancipation of its own. In a plausible 
echo of Biko’s simple adage, Suleman and Peterson’s comparatively experimental 
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cinema arguably tells the history of apartheid trauma, injustice, and reconcilia-
tion the way they like. Eschewing the various generic impulses—whether tragic, 
melodramatic, or more broadly realist—governing those other examples privi-
leged in this study, my aim is to explore their preferred aesthetic autonomy, as 
much as the allied political and cultural claims this approach potentially precip-
itates, not least in the eld of reconciliation. For at its most expansive, Suleman 
and Peterson’s professed desire to secure from Zulu Love Letter’s simple story a 
‘ceremony and tribute to [the] victims and survivors’ of apartheid establishes an 
instructive parallel with the ‘quest for a true humanity’ at the fundamental root 
of Biko’s political writing. Just as Biko acclaims the ‘great gi still . . . to come 
from Africa—giving the world a more human face’, Suleman and Peterson cele-
brate their lm’s capacity ‘to foster love and healing’.31
In accounting for this mutualism, it should be noted that any ostensive re-
turn here to Biko and his humanistic agenda comes amid a much wider renewal 
of Black Consciousness in recent decades. Indeed, in some ways it seems that 
critical interest in Biko’s radically humanistic philosophy has been accurately 
indexed by democracy’s rising disappointments. e thirtieth anniversary of 
Biko’s murder, for instance, was marked in 2007 by a signicant return to the te-
nets of Biko’s original quest, with critics deploying the principles of Black Con-
sciousness to attack those structures of racial inequality operative still within 
the emergent democratic imaginary.32 For instance, outlining the ‘classic inferi-
ority complexes [visible] in our day-to-day existence’, the former deputy minister 
for education and president of the Azanian People’s Organisation, Mosibudi 
Mangena, used the occasion to draw out evidence of the stubborn continuities 
between life under apartheid and life under democracy for South Africa’s black 
majority. Even while ‘physical liberation has been attained’, he insisted, ‘black 
people have regressed terribly with regard to psychological freedom’.33
Following the tone set by Mangena’s intervention, much of the critical re-
ection prompted by the anniversary of Biko’s death proved recuperative, even 
hagiographic in its outlook, revivifying the supposedly fading tenets of his po-
litical philosophy. Nonetheless, there are some who remain less than convinced 
by its contemporary revival. Njabulo Ndebele, to take one prominent example, 
has highlighted the problem that Biko’s focus on the oppressed black body has 
arguably bequeathed the present political sphere in South Africa. Even as he 
acknowledged an aesthetic debt to Biko’s impulse to ‘write what I like’, Nde-
bele also cast doubt during the inaugural Steve Biko Memorial Lecture in 2000 
over the logic of victimhood that Black Consciousness has since been made 
to sustain. To reduce the black body to nothing more than an object of racist 
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oppression is for Ndebele, at least, to make black suering into an issue of histor-
ical injustice, something for which the current democratic executive can claim 
little responsibility. Of course, Ndebele makes this observation not to deny the 
deep historical roots from which black suering emerges, but to challenge the 
contemporary political order under which it continues to spread. As he puts it, 
‘white racism no longer exists as a formalised structure’ and it must be ‘the black 
majority [that] carries the historic responsibility to provide, in this situation, 
decisive and visionary leadership’:
Either it embraces this responsibility with conviction, or it gives up its lead-
ership through a throwback psychological dependence on racism which 
has the potential to severely compromise the authority conferred on it by 
history.34
For Ndebele, the stubborn sense of victimhood speaks to ‘the black majority’s 
perception that perhaps they are not yet agents of their own history’.35 If Biko 
and Black Consciousness are to provide an instructive alternative, then, for 
Ndebele, it must help return black subjecthood to the sovereign, humanistic 
ambitions that guided its revolutionary agenda under apartheid. Indeed, as he 
describes in his most widely cited essay collection, e Rediscovery of the Ordi-
nary, it is the ‘insatiable desire to create: to create comparable structures on the 
basis of a new human sensibility’ that must be found to rule in any contemporary 
revival of Black Consciousness, Ndebele arms.36
rough the Eyes of Ordinary Women
For all the broad, creative appeal of this radical humanism, Biko and the Black 
Consciousness Movement have long been charged with a serious, and perhaps 
even fatal, contradiction when it comes to the associated claims of gender. ‘Black 
Consciousness’, as Masego Panyane writes in unequivocal terms, ‘has been drawn 
through the eyes of men’. She follows up this opening lunge by further castigat-
ing the movement’s inevitable misogyny, which is ‘so rife’, she insists, ‘that, even 
if pressed, few students of South African [Black Consciousness] will be able to 
list many names of women who were its protagonists and heroes’.37 Historically, 
critical commentaries have tended to pass over this seeming failure either by un-
derlining its more abstract political claims or by quickly excusing the masculine 
pronoun used to denote black life as a product of its time. And while Panyane 
provides important evidence of the women activists, like Vuyelwa Mashalaba, 
Fatima Meer and, indeed, Mamphela Ramphele, who dedicated themselves to 
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the cognitive as well as material emancipation of South Africa’s black majority, 
she also insists upon the enduring and regrettable misalignment between the 
movement’s masculinist beginnings and its otherwise egalitarian ambitions.
Zulu Love Letter’s latent appeal to Biko’s famous adage and, with it, the tenets 
of Black Consciousness is arguably as much a rejoinder to this fundamental bias 
as it is a contribution to the movement’s contemporary rejuvenation. Its out-
wardly simple, everyday story of motherhood serves both to rearticulate Biko’s 
autonomous imagination and to challenge its founding misogyny. is Suleman 
and Peterson arguably pursue according to a ‘feminist reworking’ of the politics 
of the everyday. As Anthony O’Brien notes, the two are rarely all that distant 
from each other, despite the ‘symptomatic silence on women’s struggles’ that 
accompanied Ndebele’s well-rehearsed shi in narrative focus ‘from state and 
mine and battleeld to “ordinary daily lives” that . .  . are the “very content” of 
political struggle’.38 ough vital in theorising the everyday as an ‘arena of cul-
tural autonomy’ and ‘universally meaningful democratic civilisation’, Ndebele’s 
arguments have not always made explicit their ‘emergent’ feminist praxis. In 
O’Brien’s reading, however, Ndebele’s turn to the ordinary necessarily makes 
‘feminism .  .  . indispensable’ to his politics. 39 Accepting the writer’s tendency 
to occlude the specic struggles of his female characters, for O’Brien, Ndebele 
depends upon feminist praxis to make visible and theorise the political claims 
embedded in the everyday.
Most convincing is the narrative form adopted by Ndebele’s novel e Cry of 
Winnie Mandela (2003), which centres the ordinary experience under apartheid 
of six black women le waiting for their absent husbands to return home from, 
for instance, exile, forced labour, or prison. eir stories are both indicative and 
highly personal. By comparison, in the considered focus that Suleman and Peter-
son provide in their outwardly ordinary story of motherhood over and above the 
spectacular history of apartheid abuse, Zulu Love Letter might well be thought 
to join this ‘progressive male repositioning in response to black feminism in 
South Africa’, as O’Brien has it. Indeed, O’Brien describes Suleman and Peter-
son’s rst feature lm, Fools (1997), based on Ndebele’s original 1983 novella, as 
taking its ‘lesson explicitly’ from e Rediscovery of the Ordinary, ‘emphatically 
continu[ing] it into the new period’.40
But their latest lm together is arguably also more ambitious in its ‘male 
repositioning’. For the ordinary focus it deploys is intimately as well as exper-
imentally tied to its female protagonists over and above the generic everyday 
of democracy. In its opening scene, for instance, its audience is thrust into the 
brooding underbelly of andeka’s modernist apartment block in downtown 
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Johannesburg. Lit by a series of irregular and austere uorescent bulbs, a loud 
cacophony of free jazz can be heard playing out from a car stereo. Sharp, syn-
copated notes reverberate against the cold brick walls, pervading the space and 
disrupting the composure of the opening titles. e camera then tracks an at-
tendant as he scurries over to investigate the source of this disturbance. Panning 
across the underground garage, a series of concrete pillars insistently fracture the 
scene’s stability. Citing both the everyday sphere and its feverish disruption, this 
splintered sequence xes eventually on a Volkswagen Golf parked with the keys 
in the ignition and the driver’s door wide open. Slumped unconscious over the 
steering wheel is andeka. Visibly alarmed, the attendant carefully lis back 
her head before moving around to the passenger’s side to shut o the music. 
With this welcome relief, the camera invites the audience to make a swi assess-
ment of her present condition as it moves down from her face to the press badge 
attached to her jacket and, nally, to the small pool of vomit by her feet. And it 
is under this broadly diagnostic frame that Zulu Love Letter’s earliest expository 
scenes continue to play out.
Without rehearsing again the details of Ndebele’s well-worn argument, it is 
enough to note the ways in which Zulu Love Letter here eschews any ‘outward 
evidence’ for her present catalepsy. Instead, the audience is compelled to specu-
late from a set of disparate visual symptoms on the particular malady that aicts 
the formal arrangement of the lm as much as its principal character. is is 
not to say that the spectacle of the past does not impose itself within the lm. 
Rather, that the type of documentary or realist register more oen preferred in 
this sphere is overtaken by a more experimental interpretation. With ande-
ka’s transfer from her car onto an ambulance gurney, for instance, the lm’s 
disjointed vision further fractures as it gives way to the rst of its six schismatic 
ashbacks or ‘interludes’, as Peterson prefers to describe them, which playback 
at sixteen rather than twenty-four frames per second. is initial blurred, seem-
ingly half-remembered scene is cut together from a set of coarse images that are 
shot from the perspective of andeka’s colleague, Michael, a photojournalist. 
Tracking the outlook of his camera, which points out from the rear window 
of a car as it speeds through the inner streets of Johannesburg, the audience 
can grasp only a few eeting images of the city. Intercut with these shots are 
equally transitory images of news billboards. ‘pre-election violence 
predicted’, reads one. ‘national state of emergency declared’,
declaims another.
ese headlines function, in part, as temporal markers, helping to signal 
not just the anterior character of these formal interludes but also something 
Telling Stories the Way We Like 141 
of the historical period from which they supposedly derive. at said, in her 
terse review of Zulu Love Letter, Loren Kruger nds this initial ashback more 
perplexing than edifying. Erroneously, she guesses that it captures events from 
the ‘pre-postapartheid transition (1990-93)’.41 Her confusion is not without rea-
sonable foundation, for the headlines appear to couple events that were never 
concurrent under apartheid. But neither was a state of emergency ever declared 
during the early 1990s, even if pre-election political violence was, at least, at its 
most prominent and lethal. Indeed, those motivated by historical delity might 
also protest that the headlines are mistakenly sponsored by Mail & Guardian, 
which did not come into existence as a public newspaper until 1994. But likely 
such claims miss the more general point of these formally frenetic and visually 
unsettling scenes. For it is above all the exigent political tension of the city, al-
loyed with the feelings of acute alarm coursing through the streets during the 
nal decade of apartheid, that appears primary here.
For Kruger, however, the scene remains a symptom of Suleman and Peter-
son’s more general tendency in Zulu Love Letter to collapse ‘distinct historical 
moments for dramatic eect’.42 Admittedly, even while the mued rendition of 
the popular protest song ‘Siyaya’, which intermixes with spoken proclamations 
on ‘freedom’ and the people’s ‘demands on the government’, helps to locate the 
scene in a period sometime between 1984 and 1986, this opening interlude is still 
vexing, especially when attempting to secure a sense of narrative stability for the 
dicult scenes that follow. Rather than reading it as just another example of 
the type of historical insouciance typical of the ‘TRC lms’ examined above, as 
Kruger appears to recommend, this narrative confusion might be taken, instead, 
as a conscious choice on behalf of its makers to disrupt the viewer’s attachment 
to those conventional markers of exposition that oen prevail in realist cine-
matic representation. So while Marie Kruger reads Zulu Love Letter’s innovative 
arrangement as part of its modernist pattern of spatial and temporal disorienta-
tion, it is also possible to understand the use of subjective camera angles, in com-
bination with the formal irregularity and temporal disorder on display in these 
interludes, as a visual account of andeka’s troubled memory.43 In other words, 
the seeming inconsistencies in style and content served to reect her disturbed, 
broadly traumatised relationship with the apartheid past.
Under these intensely subjective terms, Suleman and Peterson’s turn away 
from the terrain of the historical in favour of the inward and the psychological 
also presses the lm into a space far beyond the stable ordinary terrain that gov-
erns elsewhere. It petitions its audience to take its seeming historical haphazard-
ness apace with its restless, even at times confounding cinematic style, nding 
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in each an eort to discover an adequate representational form for the everyday 
experience of the extreme violence of apartheid and its traumatic memory. As Pe-
terson asserts, in refusing the ‘valorisation of the forensic facts’, Zulu Love Letter
‘draw[s] us into sensory experiences and knowledge that is oen destabilised and 
erased’ by an otherwise singularly veridical focus.44 When faced by the remem-
bered remains of apartheid, for instance, even the broad documentary faculty 
of the camera appears to ounder, unable to grant the viewer with a veriable or 
secure account. Instead, it is the aective, experiential quality of these interludes 
that takes precedence. Subjecting the audience to an incessantly irregular, un-
settling visual experience, these remembered scenes appear designed to provoke 
in the viewer—as they do in andeka—sudden and overwhelming feelings of 
anxiety. In this, Zulu Love Letter potentially makes for an emotionally exhaust-
ing viewing experience, especially in its earliest scenes, with the aective ten-
sion of the lm regularly threatening to spill out beyond the cinematic frame, 
disrupting the passivity of its audience. At its broadest, this is not altogether 
separate from the emotional intensity of those ‘TRC lms’ witnessed above. 
But instead of aiming to mollify its anxious eects as it goes, Zulu Love Letter
continues to amplify this sense of unease.
Epistemologies of Trauma and Resistance
As Peterson suggests in his ‘Writer’s Statement’, Zulu Love Letter is intent on 
challenging, rather than submitting before, the epistemologies that elsewhere 
govern recitals of the apartheid past, especially those that have come to sustain 
the more monumental accounts favoured nationally. ‘Individuals do not always 
apprehend time as a neat and chronological sequence’, he insists, ‘[n]or do they 
attach the same signicance to the relationship between time and experience or 
deal with trauma in the way societies would oen prefer’.45 In their determina-
tion to contest the synchronic formal composition that elsewhere rules, then, 
Suleman and Peterson regularly favour the connotative over the denotative. e 
audience is compelled to adopt a comparatively agile attitude to the action as 
it unfolds on the screen, untangling the temporal confusions from the broader 
governing plot. Such is the disjointed, discontinuous style through which the 
lm proceeds that as quickly as the initial rumbles of public protest surface in 
its earliest scenes, they also recede. Cutting back to the present, andeka is 
pictured sitting upright in a hospital bed. Her daughter, Simangaliso, is sat at her 
side. However, she seems reluctant to engage with her mother, staring intently at 
a bunch of orange gerberas set at the bedside.
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Here again the lm enters into a visual language more interpretive than infor-
mative. Attempting to bear down, it seems, on Simangaliso’s emotional disloca-
tion, the camera switches away from the reverse angle shots used to establish the 
scene, adopting instead the visual perspective of the young girl as she continues 
to concentrate her gaze at the owers in the vase. A surrealist impulse momen-
tarily takes hold of the scene as the owers begin to wilt, drooping forlornly 
one by one. is symbolic portrait of enervation intervenes where the ordinary 
language of intimacy fails, and not just as a condition of Simangaliso’s disability. 
Certainly, Suleman and Peterson here adopt this otherwise hallucinatory visual 
eect in order to establish an alternative, specically visual lexicon, one that 
might grant the young girl a variety of self-expression. But in its symbolic form, 
it also gestures towards the emotional, rather than strictly communicational, di-
vide that separates Simangaliso from her mother. In epistemological terms, then, 
this scene challenges us to recongure our approach to the girl’s disability, which 
appears to operate in entirely relational rather than essential terms. For it is not 
so much that Simangaliso cannot hear or be heard by her mother, as much as it 
is andeka who is unable to listen past her daughter’s silence. In other words, 
it is those other characters around the girl who arguably perform her deafness.
Critical disability studies is regularly motivated by this relational realignment 
between normalcy and disability. In this, as Dan Goodley elaborates, much has 
been done to recode disability in terms that account for the misalignment be-
tween a person and their environment, rather than simply sustaining some es-
sentialising rubric of individual impairment. An account of disability must only 
ever be taken as ‘situational or contextual’, Goodley arms.46 In cultural terms 
too critics have sought to deconstruct the notion of disability, prioritising the 
radical claims that also emerge from its ‘crip’ perspectives. As far as Zulu Love 
Letter is concerned, there is a similarly compelling argument to be made as the 
lm proceeds on behalf of Sigmangaliso’s privileged, even reconstructive way of 
knowing, especially when it comes to the buried, inarticulable pain and suering 
of the characters around her. But equally, when appraised in more expansive 
terms, Simangaliso retains a certain epistemic privilege by virtue of her deafness 
that proves vital when it comes to reimagining and rearticulating the terms of 
reconciliation. In terms not all that distant from the wounded outlook oered 
by Duma Kumalo, her relational sense of selood insists, as Zulu Love Letter
progresses, on the familial as well as more broadly communal ends around which 
reconciliation must, ultimately, orient itself.
Without setting his argument out in quite such epistemic terms, this is also 
what Ken Lipenga suggests when he takes Simangaliso as the creative pulse of 
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the lm. She is, he insists, its principal storyteller, ‘piecing together stories of 
dierent individuals to come up with a work of art that is simultaneously her 
own story and that of her community’.47 Put in more expansive terms, she may 
be taken as the principal agent of their mutual reconciliation with the past. In-
deed, as a precipitant for the lm’s narrative progress from individual dysfunc-
tion to collective renewal, Simangaliso’s creative outlook comes to drive more 
and more Zulu Love Letter’s visual prospect. However, this early account of her 
seemingly surreal imagination is also forced to compete with her mother’s com-
paratively fractured and burdensome attachment to those traumatic remains of 
the apartheid past. For her own part, andeka does at least attempt to break 
the conspicuous silence between them, tapping her daughter on the shoulder, 
before remarking reassuringly, ‘I’ll be out of here long before your birthday’. 
‘And if not’, she continues, using simple (and reportedly improvised) elements 
of sign language in an eort to engage her daughter, ‘this ward is big enough for 
one hell of a party’.48
However, with Simangaliso’s refusing even to acknowledge her mother, 
andeka relapses once more into a painful ashback. In this extended sequence, 
she recalls images of another young girl, Dineo, and a teenage boy as they attempt 
to outrun a pursuing car. e chase is stitched together from a series of crude 
and grainy images, all shot from a bewildering multiplicity of perspectives. From 
close-ups of the car’s wheels as it tears across the dirt road to heavily blurred 
images of Dineo and her companion as they dash across the screen, the scene 
appears wilfully chaotic, almost incoherent, at times. We are provided with eet-
ing glimpses of the ocers as they abandon their car and pursue the pair on foot 
through a maze of small township homes and shops. ere are ashes too of the 
girl as she begins looking over her shoulder with increasing desperation before 
she stumbles suddenly to a halt, her route cut o by the ocers.
With the chase at end, the camera appears nally to have caught up, with 
Dineo captured in comparatively clear terms as she slumps to the ground. e 
sound of her panicked breath reverberates across the scene. e perspective then 
switches temporarily to one of the police ocers. As his eyes meet with Dineo’s 
own, it provides the audience with a brief but intimate insight into the girl’s 
swelling panic. But instead of submitting to her fear, she holds her arm alo, her 
st clenched in a familiar pose of resistance, as she mouths the words ‘Amandla! 
Awethu! [Power! Is Ours!]’.49 With this act of ultimate deance, the sequence 
cuts away from the past, returning momentarily once more to andeka as she 
lies in her hospital bed. Her breath, like Dineo’s own, is quick and shallow, her 
eyes similarly stricken with fear before we return again to this remembered 
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scene. In this instance, we witness Dineo from andeka’s vantage point, hid-
den away in a nearby church hall. Looking out at the young girl she crouches on 
the oor before the group of police ocers, the sound of a deafening, solitary 
gunshot suddenly rings out, before the scene fades to black.
is fateful interlude nally grants the audience with a narrative schema of
sorts through which to approach the residual, traumatic legacies that continue 
to cut through and overwhelm the quotidian surface of the lm. With andeka 
pictured in the consequent scene, for instance, on her return to the busy news-
room at the Mail & Guardian, her hostile outbursts against her colleagues begin 
to make narrative sense. She rst reprimands a young black reporter hot-desking 
at her computer, before launching into a vitriolic assault against the newspaper’s 
white, male editor-in-chief. With a photograph of Dineo in her dying salute 
hanging prominently on the wall above the editor’s shoulder, andeka proceeds 
almost without provocation to attack the man’s erstwhile complicity with the 
apartheid regime. ‘It was nice and ne when we brought you the scoops’, she 
barks, ‘but when it came to putting your fat-white-liberal-arse on the line .  .  . 
the best you could do was to hide behind all sorts of legalities!’ is familiar in-
dictment ends with an equally voluble critique of the programme of armative 
action rolled out by the ANC in the years following their election to power. 50
Rising to her feet and gesturing in the general direction of the young journal-
ist at her desk, andeka rebukes all those ‘nose brigade cases who think that 
being black is a job description and that “the struggle” refers to which cellular 
network they should subscribe to’. ‘Well’, she concludes, regaining a measure of 
composure, ‘fuck you all’.51
In establishing the depth of andeka’s psychological turmoil, this scene 
serves equally to unveil her allied disquiet with the transition to democracy, ar-
ticulating something of the serious disappointment that underwrites the lm’s 
narrative trajectory more generally. In the broadest of terms, andeka appears 
to stand as a relatively unmediated mouthpiece through which Zulu Love Letter’s 
makers are able to voice their own censure of the political transition. Much like 
andeka, Peterson has been consistently strident in his scholarly criticism of
the compromises and contradictions that have come to blight the nation’s demo-
cratic progress. As he articulates as part of his introduction to the lm’s published 
screenplay, in his view the outward political freedoms achieved by democracy
have yet to deliver a ‘break from the acute, pervasive and transgenerational expe-
riences of suering for the majority of black people’. Rather, the black body has
continued to be targeted, he maintains, ‘as an object of subjugation, humiliation, 
criminalization and disposal’, much as it was under apartheid.52 By comparison,
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Suleman’s own public comments have been limited to the occasional promo-
tional interview. Nonetheless, in his ‘Director’s Statement’, Suleman insists that 
‘the economy and social life of apartheid is still very much alive’, despite its ocial 
legal demise. In obvious contrast with the scene of national unity promoted by 
the Truth Commission, ‘mothers are still mourning, families are still searching 
for the remains of loved ones, and communities are still divided within them-
selves and across racial and class lines’, Suleman insists.53
Admittedly, at their most belligerent, andeka’s assaults against the po-
litical sphere are marred by slips into a self-righteous didacticism. But much 
like the melancholy remains seen to motivate Duma Kumalo, they also speak 
to the traumatic compulsion at the root of her political consciousness. While 
Kumalo’s critique appears to be directed at the material and legal structures of 
inequality that maintain the broad racial injustice of the past, andeka’s vocif-
erousness stands in important contrast to the images of male compromise that 
elsewhere pattern the lm. From the complicit editor at the Mail & Guardian to 
a drunken black police ocer she encounters one aernoon at her local shebeen, 
these fallible male characters all stand in contradistinction to andeka’s own 
staunch commitment to racial justice, individually and professionally. In this, 
her uncompromising political outlook compares favourably with the forthright 
approach adopted by other female gures like Mamphela Ramphele, who notes 
of her own experiences within the South African Student Organisation (SASO), 
led at the time by Biko:
I became quite an aggressive debater and was known for not suering fools 
gladly. Moreover, I intimidated men who did not expect aggression from 
women. Soon a group of similarly inclined women, Vuyelwa Mashalaba, 
Nomsisi Kraai, Deborah Matshoba and enjiwe Mtintso, became a force 
to be reckoned with at an annual SASO meeting.54
Cutting across the Black Consciousness Movement’s masculine rhetoric, this 
form of female resistance was arguably epistemic as much as it was strictly polit-
ical, adding to the movement’s broad commitment to racial justice an expanded, 
specically feminist account of apartheid oppression and, by extension, demo-
cratic liberation. Much like Ramphele, unwilling to suer silently the compro-
mised authority of her male counterparts, andeka refuses, as Peterson elabo-
rates, any of the ‘normative expectations of what patriarchy deems as acceptable 
behaviour by women’.55
Under these terms, andeka’s feminist, if also traumatised political con-
sciousness operates in complementary rather than strictly antagonistic terms 
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with the type of epistemological agency aorded by the lm to her daughter. 
For just as Simangaliso’s deafness conditions, say, a surrealist interpretation of 
the emotional environment, andeka’s ‘resistant ways of imagining’, to bor-
row from José Medina, oer up a vital epistemic counterpoint to the failures 
of the political transition.56 By this, Medina means to lobby on behalf of those 
disadvantaged perspectives that are vital, nonetheless, to any democratic sensi-
bility. So while Simangaliso appears to adopt the role of storyteller, assuming 
responsibility for the creative imagination that, to recall Ndebele, remains piv-
otal to South Africa’s future humanity, andeka arguably drives the resistant, 
feminist imagination that also conditions the lm’s political authority. For at 
its broadest, Zulu Love Letter is as much about the plural epistemologies that 
guide the pursuit of reconciliation as it is a story about two mothers in search 
of their daughters.
e Spiritual and the Secular
It is in fruitful solidarity, rather than divisive competition, then, that Zulu Love 
Letter might be said to track the diversity of interpretive approaches adopted by 
its central female characters. Put dierently, it is their relationality that rules, a 
‘relationality that is’, for Medina, at least, ‘the heart and soul, the epistemic cen-
terpiece, of a democratic culture’.57 is is not to suggest their stable mutuality. 
Rather, as Medina also insists, it is ‘the mechanisms and activities of contestation’ 
that must above all drive their epistemic interaction.58 As Zulu Love Letter pro-
gresses, evidence of this contestation appears more and more visible. Take, for 
instance, andeka’s daily life, where her relationship with her daughter is rarely 
a source of epistemic, let alone emotional stability. For one, her own parents 
continually castigate her for abandoning Simangaliso to them for so many years. 
And upon visiting her daughter’s school, andeka is confronted by the princi-
pal, an elderly white woman named Smuts, who produces for her a selection of 
her daughter’s variously macabre paintings and drawings. ‘Are there problems at 
home that we should know about, Ms. Khumalo?’ Smuts asks provocatively.59
But while mother and daughter here appear impossibly estranged, Suleman and 
Peterson also move to establish an instructive relational bond between andeka 
and Me’Tau, drawing these women into a shared, symbolic journey of familial 
reconciliation.
Critically, however, this bond does not also collapse the cultural, which is 
to say epistemic, distinctions that still divide the two women. Inhabiting out-
wardly discrete spheres of black life—andeka the modern, secular space of 
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the city, Me’Tau the informal township in which traditional Zulu customs and 
beliefs still thrive—they approach the violence of the past in markedly dissim-
ilar ways. When they rst meet in the newsroom at the Mail & Guardian, for 
instance, andeka appears plagued by writer’s block. She is stuck at her desk 
long aer her colleagues have le for the night, her journalistic career eectively 
slipping away from her. By broad comparison, Me’Tau appears spiritually, rather 
than psychologically, burdened, insisting that she cannot rest until she has bur-
ied her daughter’s remains. ‘Ma, no one knows where her body is or the bodies 
of thousands of others’, andeka insists, seemingly helpless, if not altogether 
unsympathetic, before Me’Tau’s request.
e root of their individual suering is not, however, all that distinct, even if 
they each here express it in entirely separate terms. And it is this contest between 
the secular and the sacred that determines their debate over Dineo’s remains. 
‘How can you people hope to heal this land’, Me’Tau demands, alluding to her 
traditional belief in ancestral power that sustains her understanding of mourn-
ing, ‘when there are so many restless souls?’ andeka stares back in silence as 
Me’Tau then explains how she met with one of Dineo’s alleged killers in a des-
perate eort to nd her remains. ‘We are going to bury her, won’t we my child?’ 
asks Me’Tau in supplication. ‘Her soul and her bones’, Me’Tau insists, ‘must 
return to the clan; her spirit must come home’.60 In the investigative space of the 
newsroom, however, andeka nds scant relief in the ritualism of Zulu ontol-
ogy. For her, the sacred signicance that Me’Tau places in her daughter’s remains 
is of less signicance than the continued impunity of the young girl’s killers.
ere is, it might be suggested, borrowing again from Medina, an ‘epistemic 
friction’ driving the two mothers.61 But even as andeka implicitly refuses re-
course to the power of the ancestors, she still attempts to reassure the elderly 
woman. Tentatively agreeing to help Me’Tau in her search, this pivotal conces-
sion is arguably what launches the partially restorative ritualism that ultimately 
drives Zulu Love Letter’s story of motherhood forward. Even as Me’Tau leaves 
the newsroom singing a traditional hymn and andeka is overcome by another 
ashback, the visual order of this interlude appears to have shied. Earlier de-
ployed to establish the irruption of unresolved trauma, here Dineo appears to 
oat above the scene, gesturing instead, it seems, at the restlessness of her un-
buried soul. Whether intended to legitimate the role of traditional ontology that 
Biko envisioned originally for South Africa’s modern cultural sphere or designed 
in more general terms to extend the set of resistant imaginations that drive Zulu 
Love Letter’s epistemic ambitions, Suleman and Peterson continue feed the lm 
with markers of this traditional belief system.
Telling Stories the Way We Like 149 
In the very next scene, for instance, Simangaliso is pictured at her grandpar-
ents’ home in Soweto engrossed in a beadwork project. She threads together a 
series of brightly coloured beads before gluing them along with an assortment 
of small decorative shapes onto a piece of fabric that she has cut into the shape 
of a heart. As Peterson describes in the screenplay, it is as if the young girl is per-
forming some ‘sacred ritual’.62 In seeking to give visual form to this ritualism, 
the whole sequence is shot through a series of intimate close-ups of the girl’s 
hands as they carefully but eciently thread and stitch the materials together. 
Sensitively cut together, the rapid sequence of images ash across the screen with 
a rhythmic quality that is evidently meant to nd its echo in the extra-diegetic 
beat of a traditional Zulu drum that plays over the scene. Simangaliso nally 
writes across the front of the object: ‘is is a love letter’. Again, for a few brief 
seconds, the audience share an approximated sense of Simangaliso’s richly sym-
bolical perspective as the lm’s tracking slows down for a brief moment while 
she nishes composing her titular Zulu love letter.
Beaded letters of the sort produced by Simangaliso in this scene are tradition-
ally stitched together by young Zulu girls during their courtship with a prospec-
tive suitor and from mothers to their daughters. ey were typically designed 
to a specic pattern with each coloured bead holding a particular meaning that 
combines in the nal work to produce an entire narrative system of represen-
tation. As Anitra Nettleton describes, this beadwork ts within a much wider 
range of traditional Zulu ceremonies and rituals designed to carry forward ‘an 
African aesthetic that is historically rooted and yet modern’.63 Having received 
the beads from her grandmother, MaKhumalo, who also instructs on the sig-
nicance of each of the various colours, Sigmangaliso’s love letter manifests its 
ancestral bond in outwardly generational terms. However, this ritualism is also 
critical to her growing sense of expressivity. For, as Lipenga observes, the beads 
provide her too with a form of communication that exceeds the ordinary sphere 
of language, reaching out instead towards the authority of Zulu symbolism.
Ultimately, Simangaliso intends the letter for her mother as a means of fa-
milial reunication. As yet, andeka remains less than convinced by the recu-
perative potential of the traditional sphere. She is pictured instead oscillating 
literally and guratively between the formal city of Johannesburg and the in-
formal spaces of Soweto as the lm extends its epistemic rivalry between the 
rites and customs of Zulu ontology, on the one hand, and those practices and 
protocols of a secular modernity, on the other. In a particularly telling juxtapo-
sition, andeka is seen at one point stumbling out from one of the township’s 
shebeens accompanied by a former comrade, now a perennial drunk, named 
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Bouda’D. With the ‘anniversary’, as Bouda’D puts it, of their arrest looming, 
the pair are moved to recall the torture they both suered some fourteen years 
ago at the hands of the apartheid security police. In his drunken state, Bouda’D 
speaks with unusual candour about the beating he suered under interrogation, 
before placing a reassuring arm around andeka and declaiming:
You and me, we sue the damn state for reparations. Reparations are a must, 
or else we look like fools in front of the Reconciliation Commission. . . . 
You and I, we will always remember him. Fuck reconciliation! We will 
freeze his face like a picture in our minds.64
Pre-empting the failure of the Truth Commission to provide victims with ade-
quate nancial reparations, Bouda’D also signals his disdain for the politics of 
reconciliation more generally. Note too the way he abridges the Commission’s 
full name to spotlight its reconciliatory agenda over and above its truth claims. 
For him, as for many of the victims examined already, the prospect of reconcili-
ation threatens to exacerbate rather than end the psychological torment inicted 
under apartheid.
Crucially, as andeka attempts to extricate herself from this drunken recital, 
she turns away to stare at another young woman and her daughter as they lead 
a goat along the dusty road. Dressed in mourning attire, it seems that the goat 
is being delivered for a ceremonial slaughter. andeka keeps her eyes xed on 
the pair as they continue, arm in arm, up the road. is alternative model of 
communal, ritualised negotiation, which stands in clear contrast to both the 
rights-based model favoured by the Truth Commission and, indeed, the numb-
ing relief found by Bouda’D at the local shebeen, evidently begins to nd an 
appeal for andeka.65 But as the scene cuts to a busy downtown shopping mall, 
she is immediately brought back to her more conventional habitat within the 
rationalised, secular urban sphere. Accompanied by Simangaliso, the pair in-
stead enjoy the relative comforts of city life, shopping for clothes and eating at a 
fast-food outlet as they discuss andeka’s latest boyfriend. In this, the everyday 
serves less as a stage for the complexity and essential drama of their lives, to parse 
Ndebele, and more as the site for its active repression. eir seeming ease in this 
scenario arguably also conceals the violence wrought upon their relationship by 
the apartheid past and, indeed, their contemporary struggle to reconcile with 
each other, even if it also oers a glimpse of what might otherwise prove possible.
If the ordinary is to retain its authority in our understanding of reconcilia-
tion, then Zulu Love Letter makes its success entirely dependent upon the spatial 
and, with it, the spiritual, multisensory distinctions that appear to divide the 
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city from the township. And with every return to Soweto, the claims performed 
by the traditional sphere over the everyday, secular pursuit of reconciliation 
begin to take greater and greater priority. For instance, aer recalling nostal-
gically for Simangaliso the doves that used to ock to the township before the 
violence of the emergency years in the 1980s, andeka embarks on a walk in 
nearby farmland. e scene precipitates a bucolic reverie of sorts. As the camera 
circles around her, she begins to repeat an incantatory line:
Where does the breeze begin to blow, my sister?
Where does the breeze begin to blow? 66
Her invocations are broken, however, by the piercing screech of a vulture heard 
somewhere in the distant background. andeka looks around with increasing 
confusion as the image cuts to a picture of her former colleague, Michael. Unlike 
the previous interludes, in this instance, his face is depicted with relative clarity. 
He is even smiling as he stares directly at the camera. andeka, meanwhile, 
appears unsettled, but not immediately distressed by his sudden manifestation.
is is a momentary relief, however. For as the camera begins to lose its focus 
once more, the interlude subsequently slips back to the more familiar, blurred, 
Figure 10. andeka and her daughter, Simangaliso, enjoy a day 
out in Johannesburg. From Zulu Love Letter (2004), directed by 
Ramadan Suleman. Image courtesy of JBA Production.
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frenetic style that characterised andeka’s previous ashbacks. Images of Mi-
chael’s gruesome death at a remote farm in the Transvaal begin to play out in 
a series of typically fractured and asynchronous stills. In this, the scene holds 
numerous formal continuities with the type of traumatic memories that aicted 
andeka earlier in the lm. But it is also a violence to which andeka was 
never originally a witness. Locked up in a separate cell, she was shrouded from 
the intensity of his suering. And rather than precipitating the type of psycho-
logical collapse that comes with these preceding interludes, this alternative, com-
paratively edifying visitation prompts an entirely separate response. Driving over 
to Me’Tau’s house, andeka appears suddenly convinced by the need to full 
the traditional ceremonial rites that will allow both Dineo’s and Michael’s spir-
its to proceed into the realm of the ancestors.
Situating Truth and Reconciliation
As a condition of its intimate, familial setting, the more general politics of rec-
onciliation oen appear at some distance from Zulu Love Letter’s governing 
narrative. ere are occasional references—as noted in Bouda’D’s drunken ti-
rade—but the lm’s implicit pursuit of reconciliation is more oen staged as 
an issue of interpersonal, rather than national, concern. at said, this distance 
is arguably also indicative of the experimentalism driving Zulu Love Letter in 
more abstractly imaginative terms. For under the guiding inuence of its dis-
ruptive cinematic technique, Suleman and Peterson appear to deploy this exper-
imentalist agenda in an eort to expand reconciliation’s plausible praxis. eir 
approach oers a separate but entirely situated and responsive approach to the 
problem of collective unity, one led by the characters’ own experience rather than 
any national imperative. Whether in its staging of Sigmangaliso’s disability and 
the creative therapy she engages or Me’Tau’s traditional understanding of ritual 
mourning, Zulu Love Letter’s oers up a super-sensory approach to the burden-
some, oen inarticulate remains of apartheid. At its most systematised, the lm 
commits to a broadly interactive, multidimensional interpretation of reconcili-
ation, one that encourages a situated integration of these separate models, as a 
theorist of experimentalism like John Dewey would have it. Indeed, in many 
ways, Zulu Love Letter operates at the apex of the embedded, conceptual impro-
visation driving this study at large. To this extent, then, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that it is also the only example to pursue a more assured account of reconciliation.
In all this, andeka’s sense of traumatic as well as familial recovery proves 
pivotal. Pictured subsequently driving out with Me’Tau towards the home of 
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one of Dineo’s alleged killers, a former black police ocer named Dlamini, the 
pair eventually pull up in a desolate peri-urban space. Again, the spatial is sug-
gestive, here serving to structure this transitional stage in the plot. However, nei-
ther Dlamini, nor indeed the information that might help them in their search 
appear forthcoming. Instead, they encounter the man’s family at the small con-
venience store they run. For Me’Tau, sight of Dlamini’s wife and young children, 
who play and sing together in the car park to the side of the store, stands at odds 
with his cruel and sadistic reputation:
I have dreamt so much of this man and his friends. I never thought of him 
as anyone’s father or husband. He’s got children! Dineo also was a soloist 
in the church choir.67
From this oblique view of Dineo’s killer, pointedly refracted through the every-
day lives of his female relatives, Me’Tau begins to discover something of their 
plausibly shared humanity. is is not to say that she feels any immediate urge to 
reconcile with him. But this encounter does appear to precipitate an alternative 
way of thinking about his status in the story of Dineo’s death.
It is altogether instructive at this tentative moment of realignment that the 
Truth Commission, otherwise latent to the lm’s action, intervenes to stage its 
own alternative claim over Me’Tau and andeka’s mutual pursuit of reconcil-
iation. Distressed by their failure to acquire any information, the two women 
return in solemn silence to Soweto. Arriving at the elderly woman’s home, large 
crowds march past in the road carrying banners reading: ‘they lost their 
lives’ and ‘we want to know the truth’. Me’Tau insists that they join 
the march as it advances up the street towards one of the Truth Commission’s 
preliminary public hearings. As they near a local church hall, the camera slowly 
tracks the long, snaking queue of victims who have gathered to deliver their tes-
timony. Apart from the odd middle-aged man in a wheelchair and the handful 
of teenage boys present to support their mothers, the overwhelming majority of 
the many hundreds waiting patiently in line are black women—mothers, wives, 
sisters, and daughters—all standing together in the face of their mutual grief. It 
is a stark return to the picture of truth as woman outlined by Krog above. For 
Me’Tau and andeka too it oers up a potential space in which to reect again 
upon their mutual, specically maternal suering.
is is not to redeem the Truth Commission’s public action. e sense of 
cautious possibility seeded by their visit to this preliminary public hearing is 
swily threatened as the narrative takes another sinister turn. Having been 
named by Me’Tau and andeka in the written submissions that they provide 
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to the Commission, the white police ocers responsible for the murders of 
Dineo and Michael subsequently attempt to intimidate the two women. With 
Me’Tau’s home under constant surveillance, andeka is sent ominous pictures 
of Michael’s beaten body, precipitating a series of highly disorienting interludes 
as she is drawn ineluctably back into her traumatised state. Making full use of 
the formal fracture deployed in earlier ashbacks, this latest sequence is simi-
larly dicult and distressing to witness. No longer constructed from mnemonic 
ashes, andeka’s renewed psychological torment now drags her into a ctional 
nightmare that twists and deforms the details of Dineo’s assassination. Instead 
of observing the scene, andeka has become a participant, helping Dineo escape 
the pursuing ocers. Me’Tau’s anguished face too suddenly appears on screen, 
while her chilling screams of ‘Dineo! Dineo!’ echo over the scene.68 andeka 
and Dineo, meanwhile, speed away in her car as a police helicopter hovers above. 
With the car coming to sudden halt, Dineo makes a dash for safety. e helicop-
ter’s spotlight tracks her as she sprints o. andeka can only scream aer her in 
desperation, before the scene shis to the now familiar image of the girl cowering 
on the ground before her killers. Two shots ring out and Dineo collapses to the 
ground, but not before she has looked back with seeming reproach at andeka.
Figure 11: andeka and Me’Tau queue to give their statements 
to the Truth Commission. From Zulu Love Letter (2004), directed 
by Ramadan Suleman. Image courtesy of JBA Production.
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In the wake of this renewed traumatic torment, further compounded by the 
suspicious death of andeka’s ex-husband, Moola, in a road trac accident, 
Me’Tau decides to withdraw her statement from the Commission. Whatever 
her initial interest in its redemptive capacity, it seems that the controversy sur-
rounding its hearings have further compounded the feeling of impossible grief 
that Dineo’s murder originally imposed upon her. andeka, meanwhile, seeks 
out her local councillor, launching into a verbal tirade against him:
You were an activist. You were detained. How is it that we now see nothing, 
feel nothing, when all around us the misery continues? . . . We are supposed 
to be in charge in this country. You are supposed to be my testimony to the 
fact that you and I have nally triumphed.69
Taken as representative of the political elite, the councillor’s seeming self-interest 
provides andeka with an individualised account of the myopia so oen ap-
pended to the Commission by its critics. ‘e truth will out my sister’, states 
the councillor in an eort to placate her. But his trite phrasing only raises 
andeka’s ire:
Fuck the truth. e only truth I know is what I felt with my entire body. I 
know that oor, the exact measurements of that cell. . . . Five months and 
three days . .  . enough time to see and feel the four walls of the cell even 
when you are fast asleep. And all the time, inside here, each kick, each 
movement, from a child as stubborn as her mother . . . scared the shit out 
of me. Do I tell them of the life inside me? Will it bring me mercy? Or will 
it bring new pleasures to the beatings?
Rejecting the councillor’s austere attitude to her suering, andeka gives up on 
the corrupted sphere of truth and reconciliation for which he and the Commis-
sion stand. ‘Excuse me. . . . I have a child to bring up’, she states wearily, leaving 
him to call out in even more clichéd terms, ‘I’ll personally ensure that the person 
you suspect is brought to book’.70
As far as the general arc of the lm is concerned, andeka’s despair in this 
moment might also be taken as a moment of reckoning. To borrow momentarily 
from the generic terminology of tragedy, it oers up the anagnorisis that claries 
her understanding of her own traumatised condition as much as its highlights 
the inadequacy of the Commission as a sphere of individual recovery. It is, in 
short, what presses andeka to pursue a form of reconciliation that is respon-
sive above all to her own embodied, emotional, and, it seems, spiritual suering, 
rather than some remote, strictly legal one. In this, she arguably shares with 
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those victims privileged elsewhere in this study a sense of injustice that proceeds 
not through veriable fact but the aective claims that more oen overwhelm 
this forensic variety of truth. But, crucially, she also begins to nd a more sta-
ble sense of connection with the ritualised recovery pursed by other characters 
in Zulu Love Letter, not least the restorative rites performed by her estranged 
daughter, Simangaliso. For as the lm works towards its climax, a sense of famil-
ial reconciliation also begins to seed itself. e clearest sign of this incipient, ten-
tative recovery follows Simangaliso’s discovery one evening of the le containing 
the details of her mother’s torture. At its broadest, this evidence communicates 
a truth that andeka is otherwise unable to articulate, or, at least, a truth that 
she assumes Simangaliso is unable to hear. But it is precisely not a confessional 
account, not an embodied recital of the past on her mother’s part. Instead, Si-
mangaliso is forced to animate this traumatic history, reimagining andeka’s 
experience in a partially speculative, partially ritualistic form.
Waking up in the middle of the night, Simangaliso leaves her bedroom at her 
mother’s apartment to sit beneath the so lamplight still burning in the living 
room. andeka, meanwhile, has fallen asleep on the sofa, leaving a le of doc-
uments open on the oor. Simangaliso begins to leaf through images captured 
of Dineo by Michael before her death. She reads the headline to an article from 
the Mail & Guardian, entitled ‘Dra Bill Denes Political Crime’. Looking up 
at her mother, asleep on the sofa, Simangaliso begins to guess at its implications, 
embarking on something of the same connotative reading imposed on the au-
dience in the lm’s earliest scenes. However, by now, the audience is arguably 
primed to share with Simangaliso in those communicative possibilities encoded 
by the symbolic and the gestural. And in the frequent glances she makes be-
tween her mother, who lies in a state of total exhaustion, and the newspaper 
report, Simangaliso encodes for the audience a clearer understanding of the 
past and its eects on andeka. Indeed, so deeply felt is this sense of realisa-
tion that the young girl appears suddenly overwhelmed. Turning towards an 
open window, she looks out over the Johannesburg skyline, seeming to nd in 
the expansive, dark night sky a visual account for her own grim apprehension 
of the past.
As elsewhere, however, Simangaliso guards against her own emotional fra-
gility by refracting her feelings into a broadly surreal, super-sensory reimagin-
ing of the world around her. Catching her reection in the glass of the window, 
a strong gust of wind is seen suddenly to sweep into the room, pulling the girl’s 
mirrored self out onto the window ledge. Her egy teeters on the edge, desper-
ately looking out over the tormenting sky as she attempts to interpolate the full 
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horror of her mother’s suering. Without warning, however, she drops from 
the window into the darkness below and the surrealism of the scene suddenly 
threatens to rupture into realism. We are no longer convinced of the divide 
that separates Simangaliso’s visual imagination from her lived experience. For 
a few excruciating seconds as the camera pictures her falling from below with 
her arms spread wide, the audience is made to anticipate her tragic death. It 
is a vitally instructive, if also disturbing encounter between the symbolic and 
the real, leading us even closer to the complex, imbricated sense of being that 
Simangaliso upholds. For even if her embodied self is not here at risk, then her 
spiritual self appears to suddenly abandon her. Signicantly, however, she is 
saved by a ock of doves that ashes across the screen, gathering around the girl 
to li her up to safety. As a sign of love and companionship (according to tradi-
tional belief), the doves also return from a time before the violence that drove 
them away, as andeka earlier recalls. Read against the scenes that follow, 
their mystical appearance, rescuing Simangaliso from certain death, appears to 
signal the beginning of a more traditional, ritualised renewal for mother and 
daughter alike.
For instance, rather than returning to her the apartment, Simangaliso is 
transported by the doves into a fantastical scene in which the darkness of the 
Johannesburg night sky has been replaced by the vibrant warmth and verdancy 
of the open countryside. Gone is the sense of peril that stalked the preceding 
scene. Looking from Simangaliso’s perspective over a eld of wheat, we also 
see andeka singing and dancing with a large group of friends and family all 
dressed in traditional Zulu costume for what appears to be her marriage cer-
emony. Neither remembered, nor altogether imagined, this dream sequence 
appears to inaugurate an intimate but otherwise unlikely encounter between 
the pair. As Simangaliso begins to walk towards to the group, still dressed in 
her pyjamas, her mother turns to wave enthusiastically at her daughter. It is a 
moment of rare aection, one that gestures at the residual maternal bond that 
unites them, despite their more recent estrangement. And plausibly, this scene is 
also one that andeka, asleep on the sofa, dreams into being, bringing mother 
and daughter together into a space of mutual reverie.
Much like its more general approach to the turbulence of reconciliation, how-
ever, Zulu Love Letter does not present this symbolic, spiritual reunion in singu-
larly idealised terms. In other words, it provides no swi remedy to the residual 
trauma of the past. As Simangaliso moves closer to her mother, two gunshots 
ring out, scattering the rest of the group as andeka is le alone to confront 
the police ocers responsible for her original torture. Here, the symbolism is 
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lucid. Even in this shared sphere of traditional ritualism, Simangaliso remains 
separated from her mother and her ongoing suering. But it is also a moment 
of profound reckoning for them both. For in translating andeka’s traumatic 
experiences at the hands of the security police into a story of lost tradition, of 
a ritual practice wrecked by the agents of apartheid, Simangaliso not only ar-
rives at a more lucid understanding of the violence inicted on her mother, but 
she is also makes essential the attenuated rites that must be performed to help 
andeka resolve this rupture.
Ritual Ends
In many ways, Zulu Love Letter attempts to secure a climactic space for the 
ritualism that has also been implicit to the theatrical and lmic examples cited 
elsewhere in this study. Whether in the appeal made by Farber’s Molora to the 
rites of tragedy or the indigenous, Xhosa mourning practice also performed 
by the Mtimkulu family at the very close of Between Joyce and Remembrance, 
reconciliation has been throughout the object of a broadly ritualised pursuit. 
But nowhere else is this ritualism pursued in quite such explicit or sustained 
terms. And in locating a situated, which is also to say vernacular approach to 
Figure 12: andeka dressed in traditional costume. From Zulu Love Letter 
(2004), directed by Ramadan Suleman. Image courtesy of JBA Production.
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reconciliation, its re-articulation here through the rites of Zulu cosmology oers 
a vital counter to the institutional model imposed by the Truth Commission. 
Most obviously, it serves to scale reconciliation in familial rather than national 
terms—that is to say, at level of mother and daughter, rather than mother coun-
try. But it also provides a distinctly performative account of reconciliation, one 
in which the rites inherited from traditional Zulu culture also enable the victims 
of racial abuse to enact a version of reconciliation that might bolster rather than 
diminish their collective agency. As such, reconciliation emerges armed with 
renewed purpose in Zulu Love Letter, its plausible achievement led above all by 
a process of familial and interpersonal ritual action, rather than some remote 
institutional authority.
As Simangaliso’s dream sequence gives way to a new day, for instance, she 
is pictured with andeka adding new decorations to her original love letter. 
It is scene of previously inconceivable harmony, one shaped most noticeably 
by their shared act of traditional creativity. In their beadwork, which is per-
formed with the same ritualised rhythms adopted earlier, the pair appear nally 
to have acquired a common language through which to express to each other 
their mutual sense of care and love. For the audience too this shi to the sphere 
of traditional symbolism, in which the camera appears to delight in its slow 
meandering across the scene, comes as a visual relief from the fractured and 
intense formal experimentation conducting many of the lm’s previous scenes. 
As such, this soening in mood and pace as the lm progresses towards a ten-
tative accord between andeka and Simangaliso proves particularly welcome, 
not least for the audience, who have been compelled to share in the characters’ 
entangled and, at times, overwhelming eort to work out the heavy legacies of 
the past. Of course, the cinematic experience is by no means equivalent to the 
traumatic one endured by mother and daughter. But Zulu Love Letter’s general 
success arguably depends on a degree of mutuality, not least in the ritualised 
action that begins to rescue the audience from their own much broader state of 
emotional anxiety.
is ritualism reaches its reconciliatory climax in the lm’s nal scene, which 
returns almost the entire cast of characters to the farm where Michael was mur-
dered and where Me’Tau believes Dineo’s remains must be buried. Having given 
up on the Truth Commission and, indeed, the entire political sphere, andeka 
and Me’Tau visit the site to perform a ritual purication, restoring the place’s 
sacredness while also permitting Dineo and Michael to pass into the realm of 
the ancestors. It is the clearest and most sustained elaboration of the traditional 
African rites that Biko was so eager to celebrate in his quest for a true humanity. 
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Its performance in the space of ctional cinema, however, is without general 
precedence. Certainly, African ethnographic lm has sought to nd ways to 
document such practices but at the time of Zulu Love Letter’s release this type 
of ritual practice remained largely absent from South African narrative lm. As 
such, its inclusion here further extends the experimental ambitions of Suleman 
and Peterson’s vernacular cinema, expanding our sense of what reconciliation 
might otherwise constitute in the sphere of traditional black life.
e entire ritual process of cleansing is captured with respectful sensitivity,
the camera oering an embedded view of the intricacies of the process without 
ever intruding on the solemnity of the scene. Standing in the grounds of the 
now ruined farm building, andeka, Simangaliso, Me’Tau, and her youngest 
daughter, Mapule, are joined by large group of grieving wives and mothers from 
Soweto, all of whom gather around an enamel bowl lled with water and aloes. 
e women, dressed in black, form a circle around the bowl. A number of men,
including the councillor previously rebuked by andeka and her friend from
the township shebeen, Bouda’D, stand at a small remove from the scene, cen-
tering the women’s primary role in the action. Remarkably, however, the ritual
service is initiated by Duma Kumalo. Stepping forward into the centre of the
space, he oers a prayer for the fallen victims:
Our brothers and sister who are buried here, we will always remember you. 
We have come to fetch you so that we can return home. We thank you for 
your sacrice.71
is small irruption of the real—for those attentive, at least, to the specic g-
ures on screen—oers an important challenge to the lm’s broadly ctional
status. For Kumalo, who is named in the screenplay simply as ‘Activist’, this pro-
cess of remembrance and traditional cleansing marks an otherwise improbable
departure from his own melancholy ritual action night aer night on Farber’s
stage. is is not to entirely overturn the compulsive repetition that motivated
his performances in He Le Quietly. But it is to arm something of the alter-
native mode of ritualised, even reconciliatory action that Zulu Love Letter, by
important distinction, otherwise enables. In the lm’s discrete space of remem-
brance and veneration, the sense of humanity shared between these characters
appears to replace the Commission’s account of reconciliation, revising the con-
cept according to the spiritual values of Zulu tradition and custom.
It is not without vital signicance that it is a group of grieving mothers and 
wives who serve, ultimately, as the midwives to this alternative sense of recon-
ciled possibility, stepping forward to oer prayers for the fallen ‘warriors who 
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died for our freedom’.72 is climatic act is carefully choreographed between the 
constituent members of the ritual, rearming, in part, those aspects of com-
munity action and spirituality that Biko believed integral to Africa’s ‘human 
face’. But it also centres the specically female responsibility at the constitutive 
root of this humanity. is is by no means meant to exclude those male partic-
ipants from the cleansing process. Rather, it certies the prominent role that 
these women uphold, both in bearing witness to the traumas of the past and 
in leading society towards a scene of plausible, mutual release. is is, in short, 
reconciliation as woman. And following in the wake of the prayers, andeka 
helps Me’Tau across to the pail of water, before one of the elderly women picks 
up the aloe broom and begins to spread the water onto the ground, oering 
another prayer to the dead:
My children, come and let us go home. Let us return to where you were 
born, where your relatives, friends, teachers are waiting for you. It is time 
to go home.73 
e woman’s voice cracks at times as she attempts to retain her composure 
through this moving performance. Looking out at the group, her call for them 
to go home, however, emerges with clarity and resolve. e camera then cuts to 
Me’Tau, who is rendered in an almost statuesque pose as she looks out over the 
scene with a fortitude absent elsewhere in the lm. She returns the aloe branch 
to the enamel bowl, before the women begin to sing one nal traditional hymn.
Evidently, this collective ritual is not a direct confession to the suering in-
icted on these women under apartheid or, indeed, a recital of their nal reck-
oning with the past. But it does attempt to interpolate and make symbolic the 
mournful legacies of their emotional and, indeed, spiritual distress. Put dif-
ferently, the rites performed at the farm may not narrate the precise details of 
Michael’s brutal murder or the callousness with which Dineo’s remains were 
discarded by the police. Nonetheless, in attempting to enact a spiritual resolu-
tion, the women succeed in performing a mutually restorative and profoundly 
moving account of these historical truths. Its sense of resolution is, by exten-
sion, collectively distributed, avoiding a scene of monumental personal recovery 
for andeka. In this, Zulu Love Letter’s way of telling its story of mother and 
daughter transforms the logic of individual healing that motivated the Truth 
Commission, prioritising instead a situated, highly ritualised and above all col-
lective response to the past. is is not to discount the basic function of the 
Commission as a space of personal testimony or to dismiss the possibility of psy-
chological healing. Rather, it is to underscore Suleman and Peterson’s challenge 
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to the gendered, epistemic injustice implicit to the Commission in its abstract, 
institutionalised pursuit of truth and reconciliation. For here, in the ritualised 
space that these women prioritise, an entirely separate, vernacular model of 
reconciliation begins to ourish, a model founded on the shared humanity of 
apartheid’s ordinary victims and their interdependent recovery.
Conclusion
Whatever Suleman and Peterson claim of their lm’s modest narrative ambi-
tions, Zulu Love Letter is evidently not without its challenges, in both visual as 
well as more interpretive terms. But, arguably, it is at its most valuable when it is 
also at its most demanding. Extending the Truth Commission’s account of the 
apartheid past beyond the terrain of the strictly veriable, reaching out into the 
realm of the spiritual, the symbolic, and the super-sensory, the lm demands a 
certain epistemic humility before the particular sense of reconciliation levied by 
the traditional sphere. is is, in other ways, the move adopted more generally 
by the adjacent sphere privileged throughout in this study. Whether in Duma 
Kumalo’s melancholy insights, or the sphere of fragile renewal in Molora, or the 
sense of agency that emerges in refusing to forgive as evidenced in Between Joyce 
and Remembrance, the works surveyed in previous chapters have sought simi-
larly to challenge the prevailing wisdom of the Truth Commission. ey each 
seek out an alternative epistemic account of ‘this thing called reconciliation’. 
Nonetheless, where Zulu Love Letter distinguishes itself is in its comparative au-
tonomy. Eschewing the generic attachments and precedents observed elsewhere, 
it is liberated from the imaginative limits that otherwise shape and dene the 
rest of this repertoire.
is is as much a conceptual liberation as it is an aesthetic one, unmooring 
reconciliation from the forms of redemption implied by the Truth Commis-
sion as a performative event. Deferring, by contrast, to an alternately ritual-
ised, non-linear, spiritual pursuit of reconciliation, Zulu Love Letter centres in 
uniquely ambitious, stirring terms a sense of the collective humanity that may 
yet emerge from South Africa’s faltering democracy. To this extent, Suleman and 
Peterson’s lm is not just the most vociferous in its critique of the Commission, 
it is also the most optimistic of those works reviewed as part of this study. Of 
course, this is no necessary corrective to the material impoverishment that still 
conditions the lives of the country’s black majority, something the lmmakers 
repeat time and again in their own public commentary. As such, there can be no 
denying the serious challenges that continue to corrupt the country in its wider 
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pursuit of reconciliation. Nonetheless, to return to Biko’s guiding philosophy, 
in its modest, intimate story of two mothers in search of their daughters, Zulu 
Love Letter helps inaugurate the sphere of autonomous black expression that is 




A s far as the logic of improvisation is concerned, it can be hard to settle on an end point. Conclusions tend to prove provisional, serving better as a relief from which to survey the failures and relative successes 
of the foregoing action. ey are more generative than strictly climactic. is 
present study has sought to discover in reconciliation the benets that improvi-
sation’s pattern of repetition and renewal might aord. Refusing any nal word 
on the topic, each of the preceding chapters has tried instead to loosen and dis-
rupt reconciliation’s supposed computation of ‘healing + closure’, as John Gal-
tung rst described it. But this has also risked shattering the concept, rendering 
it useless in the wider pursuit of racial justice. As such, I have tried to resist too 
agitational a mode of analysis—by which I mean, one that would insist with-
out due restraint on improvisation’s separate accomplishments. ose scenes of 
confession favoured by my analysis are not convincing because of the rhetorical 
or actual triumph that they deliver. Forging a faith with their tentative, inti-
mate everyday eects, I have strived instead to account for the fragile conditions 
under which reconciliation might otherwise emerge. To this extent, this study 
has served more as a workshop for reconciliation’s rehearsal than a showcase for 
its ultimate realisation.
To advocate on behalf of this comparatively cautious attitude has necessarily 
meant managing the heavy pressures placed on reconciliation from above—that 
is, from those who consistently hail its institutionalised achievement. ‘Let us 
shut the door on the past’, declared Desmond Tutu indicatively as part of his 
foreword to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s nal report.1 is was 
always likely to prove a hopeful rather than judicious appeal. In the eld of racial 
justice, such declarative ends necessarily risk more than they resolve. When it 
comes to the Truth Commission, Tutu’s willed sense of closure was also forced to 
compete with the priorities of a state that found in this institutional action a con-
venient distraction from its own failures in governance. Even aer the majority of 
its public hearings had concluded and the rst ve volumes of its report had been 
delivered to President Nelson Mandela in October 1998, the Commission’s nd-
ings were repeatedly cast by its political readership as an interim account liable 
to future revision. Much of this talk was strategic. For one thing, the ANC saw 
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the equivalence drawn at the Commission between the violence persecuted by 
the party’s armed wing and that enacted by the apartheid government as a threat 
to its democratic dispensation. Heaping scorn on its many procedural ‘imperfec-
tions’, the party arguably helped undermine the Commission’s public ecacy.2
Nonetheless, it is important not to confuse the political imperatives that have 
conspired to damage the Commission’s legacy for its own internal compromises. 
For instance, at the time of the nal report’s publication, its Amnesty Commit-
tee had barely begun to process the thousands of applications it had received. 
is work would take another ve years to complete. But the Amnesty Com-
mittee’s nal report only served to encode yet more controversies. Of the 7,116 
applicants, only 1,167 were granted amnesty, with the majority of the rest refused 
on administrative grounds. Moreover, many perpetrators, including the former 
apartheid leadership, simply elected to remain silent, eectively stymying the 

ow of information. Given the devastating scale of abuse recorded by the Com-
mission’s Human Rights Violation Committee, such poor justice has resulted 
in many calling out the Truth Commission’s unnished business, even still.3
More than a procedural critique, this sense of disappointment contains its 
own correlative demands, demands that oen begin with the Commission but 
end with much broader calls for political reform and economic redistribution. 
Even Tutu has been compelled in more recent years to call out the corrupted 
promise under which South Africa’s reconciled future now labours. Speaking to 
the Mail & Guardian in 2014, his disappointment was remarkably clear:
As we re
ect on the commission’s contribution to re-weaving the fabric of 
our society, we do so against a backdrop of appalling violence being perpe-
trated, especially against women and children across our country. We do so 
against a backdrop of a hopelessly inequitable country in which most of the 
rich have hung on to their wealth, while the ‘freedom dividend’ for most 
of the poor has been to continue to survive on scraps. We do so against 
the backdrop of an education system that is failing to prepare our youth 
adequately to contribute to their own and our nation’s development. We do 
against the backdrop of the Marikana massacre and the public protector’s 
report into the obscene spending on [President Jacob Zuma’s] property in 
Nkandla. We do so against the backdrop of a death of magnanimity and 
accountability and ethical incorruptibility.4
Tutu’s attempt here to situate the Commission within a much wider eld of 
political failure has been taken up elsewhere. However, others are less quick to 
forgive the Commission its original faults. For instance, at an event to mark the 
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twentieth anniversary of the Commission’s interim report, critics continued to 
attack its rights-based approach, actively aligning this myopic view of apartheid 
injustice with the violence of a comparatively unreformed and, under Zuma’s 
presidency, increasingly authoritarian state. While many spoke of the sense of 
general impunity still enjoyed by the political elite, something not without res-
onance given the litany of corruption scandals that have plagued the ANC in 
recent years, Ditebogo Diale also coupled the Commission’s self-confessed gen-
der bias to the ongoing and oen vicious misogyny that continues to structure 
South African society.5
Such discordancy is signal as much of the despair that has overtaken South 
Africa’s public sphere as the Truth Commission’s own obvious failings. As a 
result of this despondent mood, however, the Commission has also come more 
and more to serve as an open conduit for all manner of opprobrium. And to 
turn the Commission into a totem for the failures of the democratic transition 
is arguably to overemphasise its institutional authority, retrospectively granting 
it a responsibility it was never designed to uphold. Put bluntly, South Africa’s 
transition is far more complex than any single, time-limited event can be pre-
sumed to remedy. is is in no way to excuse the Commission from reproach. It 
is instead to situate its failures within a much wider culture of political misgiv-
ing. Whether valid or not, the critiques levied against the Commission might 
well be understood as an indicative summary of the problems faced nationally in 
the wake of apartheid—that is, as generalizable complaints that also position the 
Commission in a broader eld of disappointment, as critics like Andrew van der 
Vlies have sought to show.6
is wider view returns us somewhere close to the intentions set out origi-
nally in my introduction. In drawing attention to the expediency with which 
the Truth Commission was dispatched by critics during and immediately aer 
its public hearings had concluded, I here cited Eric Doxtader and Joseph Sala-
zar’s call for a more expansive frame of inquiry. e two decades or so that have 
elapsed since their intervention have only further underscored the relative ben-
ets of this type of deliberative, durable, and above all improvised attitude to an 
ideal like reconciliation. To this extent, the deferred perspective at work in this 
study—that is, in a time and place beyond the intense conditions that governed 
the earliest years of the transition—is also what might permit the basic recon-
ciliatory ambition behind the Truth Commission to take root and eventually 

ourish. For while the Commission’s many faults still reverberate, so do its prin-
ciple objectives, though arguably at a lower pitch that perhaps penetrates more 
deeply. Take, for instance, the rising appetite for prosecuting prominent Special 
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Branch ocers, like Joao Rodrigues, who was taken to trial in December 2019 
for the murder of anti-apartheid activist Ahmed Timolin; or, more recently, the 
inquest into the death of Neil Aggett in police custody in 1982, which opened 
at the high court in Johannesburg in February 2020. Such cases imply that the 
political conditions are beginning at last to catch up with the legal imperative to 
investigate those crimes le unsettled by the Truth Commission.
e Commission’s fundamental language of truth and reconciliation has 
also found a more abstract revival in contemporary political movements, most 
obviously the #FeesMustFall protests that rocked higher education institutions 
in 2015 and 2016. Part of a programme to decolonise the university system, the 
‘fallist’ movement set out to achieve a number of symbolic victories, like the 
toppling of statues venerating the colonial and apartheid past, most notably the 
imposing bronze of Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT). 
But it also sought more substantial reforms, particularly to the university curric-
ulum and access programmes. Aer months of violence on campuses across the 
country, which included countless student suspensions and expulsions, student 
leaders negotiated a temporary hiatus to the protests in 2016, with those at UCT 
also petitioning for the inauguration of a truth and reconciliation commission. 
is Institutional Commission of Inquiry was to grant clemency to those stu-
dents previously excluded and amnesty for those implicated in the violence on 
campus, while also providing a forum within which students and managers 
could engage in a more re
ective dialogue. Procedurally, then, it was to have 
many of the hallmarks of the original Truth Commission. Seemingly absent 
from this latest forum, however, was the scepticism under which its institutional 
predecessor has been forced to labour. Very few spoke out against the conceptual 
limitations of such a commission of truth and reconciliation. Even for those 
more senior academics who opposed its institution, at issue was the capitulation 
to violence that it arguably sanctioned. is is not a specic criticism of UCT’s 
proposed Institutional Commission. Rather, what emerges here is a sense of the 
ways in which the original Truth Commission has been subject to a rehabilita-
tion of sorts, especially among those who were not witness to its original action. 
Under the administration of UCT’s student body, the principles of truth and 
reconciliation appear to serve as important instruments for a much wider, ongo-
ing process of structural reform, rather than its end point.
A similar sense of necessity and corresponding deciency has been at work 
in this study. Most particularly, in elaborating upon the shortcomings of the 
Truth Commission, I have sought to balance its institutional failures against 
the complex history of injustice over which it was made to adjudicate. However, 
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I do not wish to vindicate the Commission’s faulty action. For one thing, there 
is no satisfaction to be derived from the lingering shadow of racial injustice in 
South Africa, a problem sustained in no small measure by the Commission’s 
preference for scenes of individual healing over and above state reform and col-
lective action. Nor should this study be taken to encourage other, more targeted 
commissions of truth and reconciliation. As a method of justice, their aims are 
generally too discrete and their achievements too incremental to render them in 
any way sucient in the face of racial oppression, however necessary these aims 
and achievements also remain.
Evidently, the balance between reconciliation’s ordinary, daily action and 
its loy aspirations can be a challenging one to sustain. When it comes to re-
viewing the comparative achievements of the chapters above, I am conscious too 
of the ways in which their fragile, oen anticipatory claims may mirror some-
thing of the Commission’s own faltering eort to resolve itself. In part, this 
is a shared condition of reconciliation’s imprecise agenda. But it also points to 
reconciliation’s chronic deferral as a national priority. In an age of renewed state 
violence, broad underdevelopment and a stubborn sense of political cronyism, 
reconciliation is liable to appear as an anachronism, distant from the country’s 
contemporary exigencies. Nonetheless, part of my aim here has been to renew 
reconciliation in terms that make it pliable before the volatilities that necessarily 
drive the political sphere. As I have sought to present it, reconciliation is at its 
most vital when the conditions for its achievement also appear to be at their most 
inhospitable. It is for this reason that any defence of the concept must proceed 
under a rubric of the plausible, rather than the probable, and at a vital distance 
from the turbulent priorities of the state.
Nonetheless, to insist on reconciliation’s less than climactic ends brings its 
own emotional burdens, especially for those implicated in its everyday negotia-
tion. In the melancholy compulsions that aict Duma Kumalo or the repeated 
injustice in
icted upon the Mtimkulu family, the sense of implausibility that 
nettles ‘this thing called reconciliation’ evidently also manifests itself in a vari-
ety of violent symptoms, both inward and outward. In maintaining reconcili-
ation’s ethical primacy, I have tried hard not to redeem this record of violence 
or presume its necessary conclusion. Instead, I have sought to discover those 
scenes of tentative possibility that gather around the concept. Improvisation 
may prove insucient at describing the possibilities that guide reconciliation’s 
equitable otherwise. But in taking seriously the situated demands as well as the 
corresponding failures that improvisation oers up, I have tried to maintain a 
view of reconciliation that does not collapse before its inevitable inadequacies. 
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My analysis has been motivated, instead, by the possibilities that emerge along-
side these limitations.
If this study has been about the risks and returns of this improvised atti-
tude, then it cannot remain entirely blind to its own particular shortcomings, 
especially those that appear to limit the scope of its intended aereects. Chief 
among them is the manifest lack of black female practitioners on display, espe-
cially given the many black female voices that animate its chapters. As far as 
South Africa’s aesthetic sphere is concerned, there are certain historical disad-
vantages that partially account for their absence here, without also justifying 
them. White practitioners are still overwhelmingly privileged in terms of their 
access to resources and patronage. Redress of sorts has begun to emerge in re-
cent years, but this study extends this decit by privileging those theatre- and 
lmmakers who circulate nationally and internationally, rather than locally or 
communally. Even if there are some strategic reasons for this choice, the allied ef-
fect is far from desirable. My modest hope is that the vital range of black, broadly 
female voices that I try to privilege here will echo elsewhere and with deeper 
resonance as a result.
Indeed, reconciliation’s improvisation does not end with the repertoire ap-
praised in the above chapters. Its pursuit must be ongoing, adaptive before 
the country’s tempestuous political climate. In the sphere of theatre and lm, 
access to nancial and institutional support remains vital. Here, at least, the 
Truth Commission can boast a modest, ongoing contribution, even if there is 
still much more to be achieved. Each year, the Ministry of Justice continues 
to solicit applications from those victims of apartheid abuse and their families 
identied by the Commission for educational grants. But this type of material 
restitution must also be joined by a sweep of ethical and epistemic reforms, not 
least to basic idea of what reconciliation might otherwise constitute. By contrast 
to the Commission’s own declarative ends, this means situating reconciliation’s 
achievement in terms that also make proximate the possible and the impossible, 
the known and the unknown, the xed and the unxed. When it comes to the 
collective, equitable life of the nation, what arrives decided also delimits what 
is thinkable and achievable. e aim, therefore, of Improvising Reconciliation
has been to keep the concept open to the less than calculable. For it is here that 
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